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Introduction
This report constitutes the report on regulatory oversight in the field of nuclear energy 
which the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) is required to submit once a 
year to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment pursuant to section 121 of the 
Nuclear Energy Decree. The report is also delivered to the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health, the Ministry of the Environment, the Finnish Environment Institute, and the 
regional environmental authorities of the localities in which nuclear facilities are located.
The report is a compilation of the regulatory oversight of nuclear safety performed by 
STUK and its results in 2017. The regulatory oversight concerned the engineering, 
construction and operation of nuclear facilities, planning for their decommissioning, 
nuclear waste management and nuclear safeguards.
In addition to safety oversight, the report discusses other subjects including the 
development and implementation of the nuclear energy regulatory framework as well as 
the main features of safety research programmes regarding nuclear safety and nuclear 
waste management in Finland.
The safety indicators for nuclear power plants, significant events at the facilities as well as 
summaries of the inspections carried out by STUK have been compiled in the appendices to 
the report. Furthermore, the report includes the summary of the licenses granted by STUK 
pursuant to the Nuclear Energy Act in 2017 as required by the Nuclear Energy Decree.
STUK’s Financial Statements and Annual Report for 2017 also includes an assessment of 
the attainment of performance targets set out in the performance agreement between the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Health and STUK for the regulatory oversight of nuclear 
energy.
KAINULAINEN Erja (ed.). Regulatory oversight of nuclear safety in Finland. Annual report 2017.
STUK-B 225. Helsinki 2018. 37 pp. + Appendices 57 pp.
Keywords: nuclear energy, nuclear facility, nuclear waste, nuclear safeguards, regulatory oversight, 
indicators
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1 Development and implementation 
of legislation and regulations
Disambiguation of the Nuclear Energy Act
The President of Finland approved the act 
(905/2017) amending the Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987) in a plenary session of the Council of 
State on 14 December 2017. The act entered into 
force on 1 January 2018. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEAE) had initiated the 
project in summer 2016 when the work for prepar-
ing the bill for amending the act started. The bill 
was circulated for comments in spring 2017 and 
submitted to Parliament in late August.
This amendment of the Nuclear Energy Act 
implemented the supplement of the Nuclear 
Safety Directive (2014/87/EURATOM) that 
had been amended to be more detailed follow-
ing the Fukushima accident, and supplemented 
the 2013 implementation of the Directive of Safe 
Management of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste 
(2011/70/EURATOM) due to the additional ques-
tions by the Commission. The most significant 
changes caused by the directives concerned trans-
parency, the licensee’s obligation to provide infor-
mation and its responsibility for contractors and 
subcontractors, involvement of the general public 
in the decision-making process on nuclear facility 
licensing international peer reviews and the licen-
see’s obligations. At the same time, the provisions of 
the act regarding pressure equipment were updated 
due to the new Pressure Equipment Act (1144/2016) 
that entered into force on 1 January 2017. In addi-
tion to the above, national legislation was deemed 
to require disambiguation on matters related to the 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities and nuclear 
waste management, which is why further specifica-
tions were entered in the act regarding these mat-
ters, and the decommissioning licence was added as 
a new licencing phase for nuclear facilities.
The Nuclear Energy Act amendment proposals 
concerning security arrangements in the use of 
nuclear energy were withdrawn from the Nuclear 
Energy Act amendment bill following the com-
ments round a for separate preparation by the 
Ministry of Employment and the Economy, STUK, 
the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Justice. This amendment of the act will possibly 
enter into force during 2018. The amendments to 
the Nuclear Energy Act required by the Council 
Directive (2013/59/Euratom) laying down basic 
safety standards for protection against the dan-
gers arising from exposure to ionising radiation 
are included in the Radiation Act amendment bill 
and will enter into force as an annex act to the new 
Radiation Act.
The steering group appointed by the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Employment and the 
management of STUK made the policy decisions 
regarding the matters included in the Nuclear 
Energy Act amendment (905/2017). Two work-
ing groups comprising representatives of MEAE, 
STUK, universities and licensees as well as VTT 
evaluated the changes needed by the directives 
and licensing-related matters, and made proposals 
regarding them. The Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health (STM) is in responsible for the overall re-
form of the Radiation Act which will implement the 
radiation safety directive (Basic Safety Standards) 
issued by Euratom in 2013. STUK is also actively 
participating in the reform of radiation legislation.
Government decrees on the amendment of 
the Nuclear Energy Decree and on preparing 
for the costs of nuclear waste management
The Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988) was amended 
by Government Decree 1001/2017 due to the amend-
ments made to the Nuclear Energy Act and due to 
the entry into force of the new Act on Environmental 
Impact Assessment procedure (252/2017). The decree 
entered into force on 1 January 2018.
Licensing provisions further specifying the li-
cencing procedure were added to the Nuclear 
Energy Decree, and oversight provisions regard-
ing the decommissioning of nuclear facilities were 
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added in the decree chapter concerning regula-
tory oversight by STUK. Provisions regarding the 
minimum contents of the national nuclear waste 
management programme were also added to the 
decree. The references to the EIA procedure in 
the Nuclear Energy Decree were updated due to 
the new act (252/2017). Furthermore, provisions 
regarding the phases of and documents related to 
the procedure were amended for compliance with 
the new act. Some minor technical corrections 
and specifications were also made to the Nuclear 
Energy Decree.
The Government Decree on preparing for the 
costs of nuclear waste management (991/2017) 
entered into force on 28 December 2017. The 
Government decree now in force will renew and 
supersede the current Government Decision 
165/1988. The competence for issuing the decree 
and the decree itself are based on the Nuclear 
Energy Act (990/1987). The point of law includes 
provisions of how the party with the waste man-
agement obligation must prepare for the future 
costs caused by nuclear waste. In addition to cer-
tain technical corrections (name of the ministry, 
currency), further specifications have been made in 
the decree regarding, e.g., the calculation of reserve 
fund targets, and the accrual period is extended 
from the current 25 years to 40 years.
Update of STUK regulations and YVL Guides
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) issues more detailed regulations regarding 
the technical details on the general safety objec-
tives of nuclear facilities prescribed in chapter 2 a 
of the Nuclear Energy Act (990/1987) in compliance 
with section 7 q of the act. The first five regulations 
by STUK concerning the safety of nuclear facili-
ties were issued on 1 January 2016. Until then, 
these regulations concerning the safety of nuclear 
power plants and the safety of disposal of nucle-
ar waste as well as emergency arrangements and 
nuclear security had been issued as Government 
decrees. At that time, STUK also issued a totally 
new regulation further specifying the provisions 
of the Nuclear Energy Act with regard to radiation 
safety for mining or ore enrichment operations for 
producing uranium or thorium.
According to section 7 r of the Nuclear Energy 
Act (990/1987), the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority (STUK) will specify detailed safety re-
quirements concerning the implementation of safe-
ty level in accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act. 
STUK publishes the safety requirements as YVL 
Guides. There are currently 44 of these guides. 
Most of them entered into force on 1 January 2013.
STUK Regulations and YVL Guides issued pur-
suant to the Nuclear Energy Act are updated to 
conform with the Nuclear Energy Act amendments 
that have entered into force and those entering 
into force as an annexed act to the new Radiation 
Act, as well as with the planned amendments  of 
the act regarding the security arrangements in the 
use of nuclear energy. To advance this work, STUK 
initiated a project of its own (RYSÄ) in early 2016. 
In relation to the implementation of directives, 
only some requirements at the STUK regulation 
level remained pending implementation, because 
the additional requirements needed due to the 
Fukushima accident were already entered in 2013 
in the Government decrees in force at the time, and 
the other new requirements of the Nuclear Safety 
Directive were taken into account when amending 
the Nuclear Energy Act. STUK Regulations and 
YVL Guides are mainly subject to clarifications, 
amendments to legislative references and minor 
adjustments to the requirements. When updat-
ing the regulations and guides, the feedback from 
licensees regarding implementation of the YVL 
Guides is taken into account. Lightening the regu-
latory burden is also a particular objective when 
updating the YVL Guides.
In 2017, the updates to five different STUK 
Regulations each advanced at different stages 
so that STUK Regulation on the Preparedness 
Arrangements of Nuclear Power Plants was almost 
completed, awaiting only finishing touches, and 
three other regulation drafts were undergoing an 
external statement round. All regulations, apart 
from that concerning security arrangements in 
the use of nuclear energy, contain references to 
the radiation legislation being reformed and to the 
amendments of the Nuclear Energy Act entering 
into force as an annex act to it, which is why their 
publication will wait for the publication of the new 
Radiation Act and decrees. The YVL Guide update 
work began in 2017. Most of the YVL Guides will 
be updated using the short circulation procedure 
of drafts where the same guide draft is simultane-
ously sent internally within STUK, outside STUK 
and to the Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety. 
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In addition, the drafts are published on STUK’s 
website for feedback from the general public. In 
2017, 13 YVL Guides were sent for statements. 
STUK Regulations and the YVL Guides to which 
significant amendments to the requirement levels 
are being made are updated following a normal cir-
culation procedure of drafts. Last year, more than 
100 people participated in STUK in the regulation 
and YVL Guide update project, using approxi-
mately five person-years. It is likely that the same 
amount of resources will be used in 2018.
Implementation of the YVL Guides
Last year, the project for implementing the YVL 
Guides published in 2013 (SYLVI) was completed 
for nuclear facilities in operation and under con-
struction. STUK made the decisions on applying 
the YVL Guides to Olkiluoto 3 so that they will en-
ter into force when the operating licence is grant-
ed. For the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear facilities 
already in operation, as well as for VTT’s FiR 1 
research reactor, the YVL Guides have already en-
tered into force (in 2015, 2016). STUK assessed 
guide-specific reports from the licensees, particu-
larly focusing on processing non-conformances and 
measures proposed by the licensees. Furthermore, 
STUK made policy decisions last year regard-
ing the application of the YVL Guides to Posiva’s 
plants and facilities during their construction 
phase and during the future licensing phases.
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2 Results of regulatory oversight of 
nuclear power plants in 2017
2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant and assessed its organisation in dif-
ferent areas by reviewing materials provided by 
the licensee, carrying out inspections in line with 
the periodic inspection programme and the YVL 
Guides, and by overseeing operations at the plant. 
On the basis of this regulatory oversight, STUK 
can state that operations did not cause a radia-
tion hazard to the employees, population or the 
environment. Summaries of inspections included 
in the periodic inspection programme for 2017 are 
included in Appendix 4. In addition, a decision was 
made regarding the Loviisa nuclear power plant’s 
periodic safety review assessment that was begun 
in 2015. The safety assessment shows that the 
technical condition of the plant and the develop-
ment actions planned for it, as well as the licen-
see’s procedures, competencies and resources are 
sufficient for the safe operation of the plant until 
the expiry of its operating licence.
2.1.1 Safe operation of the plant
Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the 
employees in 2017 was 0.24 manSv at Loviisa 1 
and 0.27 manSv at Loviisa 2. The collective ra-
diation dose of Loviisa 1, as well as the combined 
radiation dose for both units (0.51 manSv) are the 
lowest ever recorded. The collective radiation dose 
during the annual outage of Loviisa 1 (0.19 manSv) 
was the lowest ever recorded for the plant. The 
collective radiation dose during the annual out-
age of Loviisa 2 (0.24 manSv) was slightly lower 
than anticipated. The positive development is the 
result of development of the working methods to 
lower the radiation doses and the replacing of re-
actor coolant pump seals that contained activated 
antimony with seals that do not contain antimony 
between 2011 and 2014. The dose rate levels of the 
primary circuit pipelines at Loviisa 1 have fur-
ther decreased from the previous years. Dose rate 
measurements indicate that the rate of decrease in 
radiation levels of the primary circuit at Loviisa 2 
has slowed down compared with the previous year.
The annual effective dose from radiation work 
for a worker may not exceed 100 mSv during a 
period of five years (on average 20 mSv per year) 
and a maximum of 50 mSv during any single year. 
The actual radiation doses remained clearly below 
these limits. The largest individual dose received 
at the Loviisa power plant was 6.31 mSv, mainly 
caused by electrical and I&C work during the an-
nual outage, was also the lowest ever recorded.
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Figure 1. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
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2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
As in previous years, Fortum carried out an 
eye dose measurement campaign for different em-
ployee categories during the annual outages to 
assess the need for eye dosimetry. The measure-
ment results indicate that the eye doses were not 
significantly different from the whole body doses, 
which is why Fortum does not see any need for con-
tinuous measurement of eye doses for employees 
working in the controlled area. However, eye doses 
can be measured on a case by case basis using a 
separate eye dosimeter.
Radioactive releases into the air and sea re-
mained clearly below the set limits. The calculated 
radiation dose of the most exposed individual in 
the vicinity of the plant was about 0.22 µSv per an-
num, i.e. less than 1% of the set limit (Appendix 2, 
indicator A.I.5c).
A total of approximately 500 samples were col-
lected and analysed from the land and marine en-
vironment surrounding the Loviisa nuclear power 
plant in 2017. The measured concentrations were 
so low that they are insignificant in terms of radia-
tion safety concerning the environment or people. 
The exposure to radioactivity of residents in the 
vicinity of the nuclear power plant was also meas-
ured. No radioactive substances originating from 
the Loviisa power plant were detected in them.
Operational events and operating 
experience feedback
In spite of individual events, the plant's operations 
went well in 2017, and safety practices were fully 
observed.
In 2017, Fortum reported the results of 25 event 
investigations to STUK. Of these, 23 concerned 
individual events. One investigation concerned de-
viations occurring in nuclear fuel transfers as a 
whole, while another concerned erroneous signals 
in the plant protection system. The purpose of 
these thematic investigations was to establish 
whether there are any common factors behind 
events of the same type that have not been possible 
to identify and solve merely by investigating indi-
vidual events.
STUK verified by reviewing reports that 
Fortum has investigated the underlying causes of 
the events and initiated the necessary actions to 
correct technical faults and deficiencies in its op-
erations methods and prevent reoccurrence of the 
events. STUK considered the event investigations 
sufficient. In one case, STUK requested Fortum 
to further investigate the underlying causes of an 
event and to assess the sufficiency of the measures 
taken to improve the operations. In two cases, 
STUK suggested that the observations should be 
taken into account in further work undertaken by 
Fortum.
Most of the events revealed areas for improve-
ment in procedures and activities. Three events 
were deviations from managing the operability of 
components which are important to safety. This 
was because periodic tests required by the opera-
tional limits and conditions (OLC) were not carried 
out or were delayed. These events were caused by 
problems in the use of the IT system used for man-
aging the tests. STUK required Fortum to assess 
whether the problems could be solved by investi-
gating individual events, or whether the subject 
warrants a more holistic analysis. In addition, 
STUK will make a separate inspection regarding 
the use and maintenance of the IT system con-
cerned in 2018.
One significant individual event was the falling 
of a fresh nuclear fuel assembly in connection with 
a transfer carried out in the reactor hall. The event 
showed that the new deviation occurred because 
Fortum had failed to identify or rectify problems on 
the basis of events occurring in 2016. Following the 
latest event, STUK enhanced its oversight in order 
to ensure that Fortum will solve these problems. In 
2018, STUK will target one inspection on the effec-
tiveness of the feedback on operating experience.
The most important operational events are de-
scribed in Appendix 3. STUK subjected operating 
experience feedback to one inspection included in 
the periodic inspection programme. The inspection 
investigated the functionality of internal and ex-
ternal processes concerning operating experience 
feedback. The periodic inspections are discussed in 
Appendix 4.
Annual outages and maintenance operations
The annual outages of the plant units were imple-
mented as planned in terms of nuclear and radia-
tion safety. In addition to refuelling and modifica-
tions, a large number of maintenance measures 
and inspections are carried out during each annual 
outage to ensure the safe and reliable operation of 
the nuclear power plant.
The most significant modification carried out 
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during the short annual outages in 2017 was phase 
two of the I&C reform. It included an extension 
of manual back-ups and the monitoring system. 
The annual outage inspections were carried out 
on schedule and in the planned scope. Because an 
indication was found in the ultrasonic inspection 
of an emergency water system nozzle in the pres-
sure vessel of Loviisa 1 in 2016, that nozzle and the 
equivalent nozzles in Loviisa 2 were inspected dur-
ing the annual outage. The indication at Loviisa 1 
had not changed, and no indications were observed 
in the nozzles at Loviisa 2.
More information on the annual outages is 
available in Appendix 3 and a summary of the 
periodic inspections carried out during the annual 
outage is included in Appendix 4.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low- and 
intermediate-level waste (operational waste) at the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant were carried out as 
planned. The volume and activity of operational 
waste in relation to reactor power remained low 
compared with most other countries. Early in the 
summer, STUK carried out an operational over-
sight inspection regarding the release of waste 
from control, where the organisation, instructions 
and procedures were inspected. The inspection did 
not give rise to any remarks.
In 2014, Fortum detected corrosion damage on 
the outer surface of a concrete vault in the hall 
for solidified waste for low- and intermediate-level 
waste (KJT). Fortum has launched a renovation 
project to repair the vault. The purpose of the 
project is to ensure that the engineered barrier 
will be in the planned condition when disposal in 
the facility begins. The project includes removal 
of aluminium nails that pose a corrosion risk from 
the vault structures and the maintenance of the 
surrounding rock surfaces, among other repair ac-
tions. The intention is to remove the aluminium 
nails from the KJT vault structures during 2018. 
Low- and intermediate-level waste was also dis-
cussed in the periodic inspection regarding nuclear 
waste management. Appendix 4 has a summary 
of the periodic inspection carried out in Loviisa 
regarding the waste disposal facilities.
Production use of the solidification facility for 
liquid radioactive waste began on 15 February 
2016, and it has progressed as planned. In 2017, 
Fortum continued the development of the concrete 
mix used for solidification. The intention is to op-
timise the amount of waste to be disposed of and 
to improve the quality control of the solidified end 
product.
Fortum has a development programme for spent 
fuel disposal for the years 2016–2030, because the 
transport of spent nuclear fuel to the Posiva facility 
in Olkiluoto and its disposal require actions to be 
taken at the Loviisa nuclear power plant. The ac-
tions under the development programme have pro-
ceeded as planned in 2017. In connection with the 
programme, STUK reviewed a report by Fortum on 
the service life of the spent fuel storage facility and 
transfer machine as well as a conceptual plan for 
packaging the spent nuclear fuel for transportation 
by Posiva. These documents were requested in con-
nection with the periodic safety assessment. The 
development programme covers all modification 
work on the storage, transfer and disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel required by the Posiva disposal pro-
ject. The condition of the transfer machine in the 
spent nuclear fuel storage will be surveyed during 
2018. Fortum updated the commissioning plan for 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2012. The next 
update of the plan is scheduled for 2018.
Nuclear safeguards
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority grant-
ed Fortum two licences concerning items for nucle-
ar use (Appendix 8). The Loviisa plant submitted 
the nuclear safeguards reports and notifications it 
was responsible for in time, and they were consist-
ent with the observations made during inspections.
In 2017, a total of nine nuclear safeguards in-
spections were conducted at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant. STUK performed an inspection per-
taining to the physical inventory verification of 
nuclear materials together with the IAEA and the 
European Commission both before and after the 
annual outages. Furthermore, STUK inspected the 
locations of the fuel assemblies in the reactor core 
prior to closing of the reactor cover in Loviisa 1 
and Loviisa 2. The IAEA and Commission carried 
one inspection on short notice in the material bal-
ance area at Loviisa. No remarks were made in the 
inspections.
The oversight and inspections by the Radiation and 
Nuclear Safety Authority indicated that the Loviisa 
plant fulfilled its nuclear safeguard obligations.
STUK-B 225
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2.1 Loviisa 1 and 2
Nuclear security
The state of the security arrangements at the 
Loviisa power plant is good, and the activities are 
being constantly developed. STUK assessed the 
security arrangements in a periodic inspection 
(Appendix 4) and by participating in the security 
arrangement exercise organised at the plant. The 
periodic inspection concerned both physical secu-
rity arrangements and information security, and 
included the plant’s structural, technical, opera-
tional and organisational security arrangements. 
In 2017, STUK approved the new versions of the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant’s security plan and 
standing orders regarding security.
Related to the implementation of the YVL 
Guides, an independent, external assessment of se-
curity arrangements, required by Guide YVL A.11, 
was carried out at the Loviisa plant in late 2017.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Loviisa nuclear power plant is at 
a good level. In 2017, STUK oversaw the fire safety 
of the nuclear power plant by means of site visits, 
and by reviewing reports submitted by Fortum. The 
oversight focussed on the implementation of fire 
protection arrangements during annual outages.
The renewal of the hydraulic units of the tur-
bine bypass valves, initiated in 2016, was complet-
ed in 2017. The oil-operated hydraulic units were 
replaced by water hydraulics, which also improved 
the plant units’ fire safety.
Following the fires in high-rise buildings, e.g. in 
Great Britain and Dubai, in the autumn of 2017 
STUK studied the insulation materials and other 
materials used in the facades, ceilings or roofs of 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant which could po-
tentially spread fire, as well as the way in which 
the fire safety of facades has been ensured. STUK 
required Fortum to submit a report by 31 March 
2018 on the structure types and materials used 
in the facades of buildings in the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant site, as well as an updated assessment 
of the significance of these structure types in the 
plant’s fire safety.
2.1.2 Technical condition of the plant and 
preparing for exceptional events
Development of the plant and its safety
Several reform projects that will improve plant 
safety are currently in progress at the Loviisa nu-
clear power plant. The most significant of these 
projects is the I&C reform of the Loviisa plant. 
In its first phase, the control and indication sys-
tem of preventive safety functions and the I&C 
status monitoring system were renewed for both 
plant units in the 2016 annual outage. The sec-
ond phase covering manual back-up and the ex-
tension of monitoring system was installed during 
the 2017 annual outage. The preliminary instal-
lations for the third phase were also done at that 
time. In addition, STUK continued its review of the 
Loviisa I&C renewal documents for the last phase 
and monitored the factory tests of the system. The 
safety I&C, the element which is most important 
for the safety of the I&C reform, will be installed 
during the 2018 annual outages. The other safe-
ty-related modifications carried out in 2017 were 
mainly minor component modifications. Hence, the 
main focus was on planning the modification work, 
paving the way for major system-level improve-
ments to be carried out in 2018.
The renewal project for the polar cranes in the 
reactor halls of the Loviisa power plant progressed 
as planned in 2017. STUK reviewed the docu-
ments related to the modification and oversaw the 
manufacture and factory tests. The crane parts 
were transported to the plant in late 2017 when 
the preliminary installation work also started. The 
intention is to carry out the installation and com-
missioning of the polar cranes in both plant units 
before the 2018 annual outages.
During the annual outages, Fortum replaced 
one high pressure safety injection pump motor and 
the motor heat exchanger at both Loviisa plant 
units. The same operation was performed at both 
plant units in 2016. The pumps are important to 
safety, and this action ensures their operability 
and the availability of spare parts until the end of 
the plant units’ service lives.
The modifications started after the assessments 
done due to the Fukushima accident were contin-
ued in 2017. As part of the preparations for high 
seawater levels, Fortum added flood protection for 
the rest of the systems that could be needed under 
extreme conditions. Fortum started the installa-
tion of a auxiliary outage cooling system in late 
2017. A similar type of protection was installed in 
2015 and 2016 for the auxiliary emergency feed-
water pumping stations. The installation of an 
additional system for ensuring the cooling of fuel 
12
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2.1.3 Organisational operations 
and quality management
In 2017, STUK monitored the impacts of the organi-
sational change made by Fortum in the previous 
year, migration to a process-based management sys-
tem, development of the modification work process 
and particularly the Design Authority function in-
cluded in it, as well as development activities relat-
ed to the safety culture. Regarding quality manage-
ment, the annual inspection concentrated on sup-
plier audits. The summaries of periodic inspections 
regarding the management system, management 
and safety culture are included in Appendix 4.
STUK’s oversight findings indicate that the 
organisational change of 2016 was implemented 
without any major challenges affecting operations, 
albeit that some changes were also seen as nec-
essary in the past year. The Nuclear Projects or-
ganisation has continued to develop the structure 
and areas of responsibility in the organisation. In 
fuel-related work the organisational changes of 
the team (Fuel Usage) is intended to ensure the 
availability of the required competencies. However, 
sufficient induction training and competence man-
agement must be ensured for the new positions. 
At the end of the year, Fortum was in the process 
of carrying out a post-assessment of the organisa-
tional change.
Fortum completed the development of the modi-
fication work process, and established the Design 
Authority function supporting it. Some lower-level 
processes have also now been created, but their 
development work is still ongoing. The licensee has 
also developed its key indicator system used for 
monitoring the results of activities and implemen-
tation of plant safety.
There are many actions in progress at the plant 
for developing and assessing the safety culture, but 
the relations between the actions and their over-
all coordination still have to be further developed. 
Extensive training has been provided at the plant 
for Human Performance procedures, for example, 
but putting these procedures into practice has not 
yet been completed. In its regulatory oversight, par-
ticularly in connection with the events that have oc-
curred when handling fuel, STUK has also required 
the timely identification of local safety culture chal-
lenges and solving them. The assessment of safety 
pools under highly exceptional conditions was also 
started in the 2017 annual outage. According to 
Fortum’s plans, the final installation and commis-
sioning of the modification will take place in 2018 
when a similar system will also be installed at the 
spent fuel storage facility.
New top doors were installed in both plant 
units for the ice condensers inside the contain-
ment. Among other things, these ice condensers se-
cure the cooling of steam released in a major leak 
of the primary circuit and thus also control the 
pressure. The modification improves the operation 
of the doors in accident situations and their insula-
tion capability during normal operation.
Reports and analyses
In order to further specify the earthquake risk of 
the Loviisa power plant, Fortum updated the seis-
mic hazard reports and the earthquake response 
spectrum during 2017. These serve as the basis 
for the seismic plant walk-around required in con-
nection with implementation of the YVL Guides. 
Fortum has planned to implement the plant walk-
around in 2018. During the plant walk-around, 
the intention is to determine the earthquake toler-
ance of all the components which are important to 
safety.
Emergency preparedness arrangements
STUK oversaw the ability of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant emergency preparedness organisation 
to act under exceptional conditions with inspec-
tion visits and by reviewing reports and emergency 
response plan updates submitted by Fortum. No 
events requiring emergency response actions took 
place at the Loviisa nuclear power plant in 2017. 
The annual preparedness exercise was organised 
at the plant in May and it went well. When the 
results of the exercise were assessed, the use of 
certain emergency preparedness-position-specific 
tools and evaluation of the composition of some 
emergency groups were identified as possible ar-
eas for development. Emergency preparedness ar-
rangements at the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
have been systematically developed and the plant’s 
emergency preparedness arrangements comply 
with all the key requirements.
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culture and organisational changes, as well as their 
related development actions, have also been to some 
extent delayed by the common, scarce resources al-
located for them. The matter will be monitored in 
inspections of the area in 2018.
The internal audits of the Loviisa power plant 
have been implemented in compliance with the 
annual plan. STUK has participated in Fortum’s 
supplier audits as an observer and found that the 
audit activities seem appropriate and compliant 
with the procedures.
2.1.4 More extensive assessments at the plant
Periodic safety assessment
In early 2017, STUK made a decision regarding 
the periodic safety assessment that was begun in 
2014. The safety assessment shows that the tech-
nical condition of the plant and the development 
actions planned for it, as well as the licensee’s pro-
cedures, competence and resources are sufficient 
for the safe operation of the plant until the expiry 
of its operating licence.
The actions specified by Fortum concerned de-
velopment of the management system and HUP 
methods, updating and development of determin-
istic safety analyses, the I&C reform and service 
life management of I&C equipment and electrical 
equipment, completion of the on-going modification 
work to improve safety (e.g. the improvements initi-
ated following the Fukushima accident), modifica-
tions regarding heavy lifts (including the renewal of 
polar cranes) and development of documents such 
as those describing operational limits and condi-
tions (OLC), as well as the final safety analysis re-
port (FSAR) and the classification document.
STUK is overseeing the timely implementa-
tion of actions improving the safety of the Loviisa 
power plant in compliance with the requirements 
as part of its annual oversight.
2.2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
STUK oversaw the safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant and assessed its organisation in dif-
ferent areas by means of reviewing materials pro-
vided by the licensee, carrying out inspections in 
line with the periodic inspection programme and 
the YVL Guides, and by overseeing operations at 
the plant. On the basis of this regulatory oversight, 
STUK can state that operations did not cause a ra-
diation hazard to the employees, population or the 
environment. Summaries of inspections included 
in the periodic inspection programme for 2017 are 
included in Appendix 4.
2.1.2 Safe operation of the plant
Radiation safety of the plant, 
personnel and the environment
The collective occupational radiation dose of the 
employees in 2017 was 0.22 manSv at Olkiluoto 1 
and 0.73 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. The collective radi-
ation doses during annual outages was 0.12 manSv 
at Olkiluoto 1 and 0.66 manSv at Olkiluoto 2. The 
collective radiation dose during an unscheduled 
refuelling outage of Olkiluoto 1 was 0.05 manSv,
Radioactive releases into the air and sea re-
mained clearly below the set limits. The calculated 
radiation dose of the most exposed individual in 
the vicinity of the plant was about 0.08 µSv per an-
num, i.e. less than 1% of the set limit (Appendix 2, 
indicator A.I.5c).
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Figure 2. Collective occupational doses since the start of operation of the Olkiluoto units 1 and 2.
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The annual effective dose from radiation work 
for a worker may not exceed 100 mSv during a 
period of five years (on average 20 mSv per year) 
and a maximum of 50 mSv during any single year. 
The actual radiation doses remained clearly below 
these limits. The largest individual dose at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant was 9.0 mSv, caused 
by cleaning work.
As in previous years, TVO carried out an eye 
dose measurement campaign for different employ-
ee categories during the annual outages to assess 
the need for eye dosimetry. The measurement re-
sults indicated that the eye doses were not signifi-
cantly different from the whole body doses, which 
is why TVO does not see any need for continuous 
measurement of the eye doses of employees ex-
posed to radiation. However, the eye doses can be 
measured on a case by case basis using a separate 
eye dosimeter. TVO intends to continue surveying 
the need for eye dosimetry during the 2018 annual 
outage.
A total of approximately 450 samples were 
collected and analysed from the land and marine 
environment surrounding the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2017. Small amounts of radioac-
tive substances originating from the plant were 
observed in some of the analysed environmental 
samples. The measured concentrations were so low 
that they are insignificant in terms of radiation 
safety of the environment or people. The exposure 
to radioactivity of residents in the vicinity of the 
nuclear power plant was also measured. No radio-
active substances originating from the Olkiluoto 
power plant were detected in them.
Operational events and operating 
experience feedback
In 2017, TVO reported the results of 20 event in-
vestigations to STUK. Of these, two were extensive 
investigations (root cause analyses), in which TVO 
wanted to find out why making one safety improve-
ment at Olkiluoto 2 has been delayed by one year 
and why the connection between two deviations 
was not identified in the decision-making during 
annual outage.
Most of the events at the plant units revealed 
areas for improvement in procedures and activi-
ties. The operational transients resulting in reduc-
tions of power were typically caused by equipment 
failures. Small amounts of radioactive material 
were released into the environment in one event 
(fuel leak at Olkiluoto 1). The amounts were clearly 
below the emission limits, and the event had no 
impact on the radiation safety of the population 
or environment. The most important operational 
events are described in Appendix 3.
By reviewing reports STUK verified that TVO 
had investigated the underlying causes of the 
events and initiated the necessary actions to cor-
rect technical faults and deficiencies in its opera-
tional methods and to prevent the reoccurrence of 
the events. STUK deemed TVO’s event investiga-
tions sufficient. There are problems in the op-
eration or reactor hall pool gates of the plant units 
and in keeping them open. These problems were 
evidenced by two events (breaches of operational 
limits and conditions) in 2017. STUK then deemed 
it necessary to emphasise that TVO must demon-
strate in its activities its commitment to the timely 
and planned implementation of the actions it has 
specified.
In addition to reviwing documents, STUK car-
ried out inspections at the plant regarding the 
impacts of event investigations. In its inspections, 
STUK found deficiencies and weaknesses which 
explain why the event investigations cannot al-
ways solve the problems. STUK required TVO to 
improve its investigation process in 2017 and 2018. 
The inspection is described in in closer detail in 
Appendix 4.
Annual outages and maintenance operations
STUK oversaw the annual outages from their plan-
ning to re-starting the plant units. The annual out-
ages of plant units were implemented as planned 
in terms of nuclear and radiation safety. TVO had 
to postpone some of the originally planned work 
to be carried out in future annual outages. One 
of the reasons for postponing the work was the 
delay in detailed planning of the modifications. A 
large number of maintenance measures and in-
spections are also carried out during each annual 
outage to ensure the safe and reliable operation 
of the nuclear power plant. Non-destructive inser-
vice inspections of pressure equipment were imple-
mented in compliance with an inservice inspection 
programme approved by STUK.
The annual outage of Olkiluoto 2 had a longer 
duration than normal maintenance outages due to 
extensive maintenance and reconditioning opera-
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tions. During the outage, TVO carried out other op-
erations in addition to normal maintenance and re-
fuelling, for example an extensive operation where 
the reactor coolant pumps were replaced. TVO 
replaced all six reactor coolant pumps and their 
frequency converters with new ones. Furthermore, 
TVO carried out repairs in the reactor pressure 
vessel during the annual outage. The nozzles of 
the pressure vessel commissioned in 1980 were 
repaired using a method never before used in 
Finland. More information about annual outages 
of the plant units and STUK’s regulatory oversight 
is available in Appendix 3. A summary of STUK's 
periodic inspection of annual outages is also pre-
sented in Appendix 4.
In October, an unscheduled refuelling outage 
took place at Olkiluoto 1 to remove leaking fuel 
from the reactor. At the same time, TVO carried out 
some maintenance and repair work at the plant. 
The unscheduled refuelling outage is discussed in 
Appendix 3.
Operational waste management
The processing, storage and disposal of low- and 
intermediate-level waste (operational waste) at 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant were carried out as 
planned. The volume and activity of operational 
waste in relation to reactor power remained low 
compared with most other countries. The nuclear 
power plant pays attention to keeping the amount 
of waste generated as low as possible by tightly 
packing the waste and releasing from control waste 
with so low a level of radioactivity that no special 
measures are needed. In the holistic development 
of waste management, the planning has been con-
centrated on harmonisation of the waste solidifica-
tion processes in plant units already in operation 
and Olkiluoto 3 to be commissioned, and on under-
ground disposal. Olkiluoto stores radioactive waste 
for which the Government is responsible. This was 
sorted in 2016 into waste to be disposed and waste 
to remain in the small waste storage facility. The 
disposal of radioactive waste accumulated so far 
was implemented at the end of 2016 and the start 
of 2017.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK granted TVO seven licences concerning the 
use of nuclear items for the Olkiluoto plant units 
in operation (Appendix 8). STUK approved the new 
deputy for the TVO employee responsible for nu-
clear safeguards to for taking care of the nuclear 
safeguards duties at the Olkiluoto power plant. 
TVO submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and 
notifications it was responsible for on time, and 
they were consistent with the observations made 
during the inspections.
A total of 17 nuclear safeguards inspections of 
TVO’s operating plants and the spent fuel storage 
facility were performed, plus one inspection regard-
ing procurement of uranium by TVO. STUK per-
formed, together with the IAEA and the European 
Commission, inspections on the physical inventory 
of nuclear materials at both plant units and the 
spent nuclear fuel storage facility both before and 
after the annual outages. Furthermore, STUK in-
spected the locations of the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor core prior to the closing of the reactor cover 
in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. A similar inspection 
was also performed after the unscheduled refuel-
ling outage of Olkiluoto 1. STUK also performed 
two periodic inspections of nuclear safeguards at 
both plant units and at the spent fuel storage facil-
ity. Furthermore, the European Commission, IAEA 
and STUK carried out an additional inspection due 
to the unscheduled refuelling outage for verify-
ing the materials after the reactor cover had been 
closed. STUK also participated in an inspection at 
the spent fuel storage facility, carried out by IAEA 
and the European Commission on short notice. No 
cause for remarks was found in the inspections.
The oversight and inspections by STUK indicat-
ed that the Olkiluoto plants in operation fulfilled 
their nuclear safeguard obligations.
Nuclear security
During 2017, STUK approved the updates of the 
security standing order at Olkiluoto, the securi-
ty plan for Olkiluoto and the security plan for 
the transport of nuclear fuel. TVO carried out the 
updates as part of the application for renewal of 
its operating licence. When processing the docu-
ments, STUK requested the statements prescribed 
in the Nuclear Energy Act from the Ministry of the 
Interior and the Advisory Commission on Nuclear 
Security. Among other things, the statements re-
quired TVO to improve the compatibility of its 
standing security order with the procedures of the 
police.
In 2017, STUK carried out one periodic in-
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spection regarding nuclear security. Among other 
things, the inspection concerned TVO’s risk man-
agement process from the perspective of security 
arrangements and its results, information security 
and the effectiveness of security arrangements. In 
addition, the fence of the plant area was inspected, 
as well as the procedures related to goods trans-
ports and the security organisation’s capabilities 
to observe and respond. A more detailed summary 
of the inspection is presented in Appendix 4. STUK 
also carried out a separate transport inspection 
regarding security arrangements where the com-
munications and management conditions were 
particularly assessed.
The security arrangements comprise an exten-
sive package of administrative, technical and oper-
ational procedures. Although the results of inspec-
tions may require rectifications and improvements 
regarding several areas, the security arrangements 
as a whole meet the requirements.
Fire safety
Fire safety at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant is 
at an acceptable level. In 2017, STUK oversaw fire 
safety of the nuclear power plant by means of regu-
latory inspections and site visits, and by reviewing 
reports submitted by TVO.
Following the fires in high-rise buildings, e.g. in 
Great Britain and Dubai, in the autumn of 2017 
STUK studied the insulation materials and other 
materials used in the facades, ceilings or roofs of 
the Olkiluoto plant units in operation which could 
potentially spread fire, as well as the way in which 
the fire safety of facades has been ensured. STUK 
required TVO to submit by 31 March 2018 a report 
on the structure types and materials used in the 
facades of buildings in the nuclear power plant site 
of Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units, as well as an up-
dated assessment of the significance of these struc-
tural types to the plant’s fire safety. In addition, 
STUK required TVO to describe how the cases of 
insulation materials igniting during the construc-
tion of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit have been taken 
into account when assessing the fire risks of all 
Olkiluoto plant units.
2.2.2 Technical condition of the plant and 
preparing for exceptional events
Development of the plant and its safety
Several modification projects that will improve 
plant safety that were designed based on assess-
ments of the Fukushima accident are currently 
ongoing at the nuclear power plant. These modi-
fications will improve the provisions for extreme 
external threats. TVO will install a steam turbine-
driven core-cooling system to manage a situation 
where a total loss of AC power has occurred. The 
plan is to commission the system at both plant 
units during the 2018 annual outage.
Dependence of the auxiliary feedwater system 
from the seawater cooling was clearly reduced by 
implementing a modification at Olkiluoto 1 in 2014. 
Abnormal vibrations and sounds were nevertheless 
observed during the test run in one new recircula-
tion line. During 2017, TVO continued investigating 
the problems observed and submitted an action 
plan to STUK for its approval for eliminating the 
problems and for continuing the recirculation line 
modification work. STUK approved the plan and the 
pre-inspection documents of the system accordingly 
updated late in the year. According to the schedule 
proposed by TVO, the modifications for eliminating 
the problems will be carried out at Olkiluoto 1 dur-
ing load operations and the 2018 annual outage. 
According to the schedule, the equivalent recircu-
lating line modification would be introduced to all 
trains at Olkiluoto 2 in spring 2019.
A project to replace the reactor coolant pumps 
and the frequency converters needed to control and 
supply power to the pumps, as well as a project 
to replace the nuclear power plant’s emergency 
diesel generators are also ongoing at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant. TVO started with the replace-
ment of one of the six pumps in Olkiluoto 1 during 
the 2016 annual outage. During the 2017 annual 
outage, TVO replaced all the reactor coolant pumps 
at Olkiluoto 2. TVO will commission another five 
new pumps for Olkiluoto 1 during the 2018 annual 
outage. STUK continued its review of documents 
pertaining to replacement of the reactor coolant 
pumps and the supervision of manufacture. In the 
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emergency diesel generator project, eight of the 
power plant’s emergency diesel generators will 
be replaced and a ninth generator will be built. 
TVO has estimated that the first new emergency 
diesel generator will be commissioned in spring 
2018. Then, the remaining eight emergency diesel 
generators will be installed and commissioned 
one by one in such a manner that the last one will 
be commissioned in spring 2022. The new diesel 
generators can be cooled with seawater and air. 
The current ones can be cooled only with seawater. 
STUK is overseeing the upgrade and in 2017 in-
spected its related design documents and oversaw 
the manufacture.
Emergency preparedness arrangements
STUK oversaw the ability of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant emergency preparedness organisation 
to act under exceptional conditions with inspection 
visits and by reviewing reports and emergency re-
sponse plan updates submitted by TVO. No events 
requiring emergency response actions took place 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2017. In 
September, an extensive cooperation exercise re-
garding the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit was organised 
at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. The coopera-
tion exercise has extensive participation from dif-
ferent public-sector organisations which were able 
to respond, in cooperation, to all the key challenges 
of the exercise. When the exercise was assessed, 
maintenance of a joint view of the situation and 
the IT and communication systems supporting it 
were identified as areas for development. These 
would also support the coordination of communica-
tions during the situation. Emergency prepared-
ness arrangements at the Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plant have been constantly developed and the pow-
er plant’s emergency preparedness arrangements 
comply with all the key requirements.
2.2.3 Organisational operations 
and quality management
In recent years, TVO has had significant problems 
with the atmosphere at work, and employee turno-
ver has increased from earlier years. A motivated 
and competent personnel are essentially important 
for the maintenance of a good safety culture. In 
early 2017, STUK assessed that the degraded at-
mosphere at work poses a risk to maintaining com-
petence and the smooth, concentrated and safety-
oriented performance of work at TVO. In spite of 
the organisational challenges, no significant events 
affecting safety have so far occurred, but TVO has, 
e.g., had difficulties in complying with time sched-
ules it has set for different improvement actions. 
In May, STUK required that in order to solve the 
problems regarding the workplace atmosphere and 
safety culture, the management of TVO must make 
a policy decision, and communicate and implement 
the actions with which the management can im-
prove, e.g., the personnel management and take 
safety matters into account in decision-making, and 
with which the availability of resources required for 
safe operations are systematically ensured.
In order to solve the challenges, TVO has start-
ed to develop its operations with various actions. 
At the same time, TVO has re-organised certain 
functions in order to be able to better respond to 
the commissioning of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit. 
During 2017, STUK made oversight visits where 
it viewed the grounds, method of implementation, 
progress and effectiveness of new development ac-
tions implemented by TVO, among other things by 
discussing with the management and by interview-
ing personnel. In addition, STUK monitored the 
development of TVO’s own safety indicators. The 
actions carried out by TVO include management 
training courses completed by the management 
and supervisors of TVO, as well as a substantial 
increase in the number of employees. TVO’s re-
source planning is also now more systematic. TVO 
is engaged in continuous development work sorting 
out basic issues, and STUK is of the opinion that 
the actions are taking the company in the correct 
direction. In the personnel interviews carried out 
by STUK in December, many employees felt that 
taking safety matters into account in decision-
making is on a good level and that responsibilities 
are now less ambiguous than a couple of years ago. 
However, no clear improvement was seen to have 
taken place in the working atmosphere or relation-
ships between the personnel and management at 
TVO. Shortages in human resources affecting the 
implementation of work were also still reported.
STUK will continue the additional oversight 
of TVO’s organisation. Furthermore, STUK will 
carry out an additional inspection in January 2018 
for verifying the impact of TVO’s actions and the 
ways in which the development of different areas is 
monitored, measured and further developed.
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2.2.4 More extensive assessments at the plant
Renewal of the operating licence
The current operating licence of Olkiluoto 1 and 
Olkiluoto 2 plant units will expire on 31 December 
2018. On 26 January 2017, TVO submitted an ap-
plication to the Government for continuing the 
operating licence for 20 years. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) pre-
paring the matter has requested STUK to issue 
a statement regarding TVO’s application. At the 
end of 2016, TVO submitted to STUK the reports 
associated with the periodic safety review in com-
pliance with Guide YVL A.1. In spring 2017, STUK 
made a request for supplementary information re-
garding the documentation, on the basis of which 
TVO supplemented the documentation and sub-
mitted the updated reports in summer 2017.
During 2017, STUK prepared a safety assess-
ment concerning the plant units for the statement 
to be issued for MEAE. STUK’s safety assessment is 
based on the review of various issues and documen-
tation associated with the operating licence applica-
tion as well as the inspection of TVO’s own periodic 
safety review carried out by STUK, as well as the 
results of regulatory oversight. STUK requested 
a statement from the Ministry of the Interior on 
emergency preparedness and nuclear security, and 
a statement from the Advisory Commission on 
Nuclear Safety on STUK’s draft statement. The 
Advisory Commission on Nuclear Safety will only 
issue its statement when the matters presented as 
pending in the draft have been processed. At the 
end of 2017, the matters still pending included the 
organisational and working atmosphere challenges 
of TVO as well as the ageing management of I&C 
systems. In 2017, STUK carried out additional over-
sight of the organisation. For more information on 
the oversight of the organisation, see section 2.2.3. 
STUK's statement and safety assessment will be 
completed in early 2018.
2.3 Olkiluoto 3
STUK inspected the operating licence documentation 
of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit and oversaw the trial 
operation of the plant unit and TVO’s preparation 
for the future operational phase and the finishing 
touches of the construction and installation work.
The operating licence application has been pro-
cessed almost in its entirety. Only the review of 
parts of the largest documentation items – the 
final safety analysis report and probabilistic risk 
assessment – is still in progress. In October, the 
plant supplier announced an additional delay of 
approximately five months in the project. The oper-
ating licence statement by STUK will be postponed 
accordingly, because STUK will only issue its state-
ment when the trial operation tests have shown 
that the plant operates as planned. The operating 
licence is required before starting the plant opera-
tion. The operation is deemed to start once nuclear 
fuel is loaded in the reactor.
The Olkiluoto 3 project has moved from the 
construction phase to the commissioning phase. 
At the same time, the construction and installa-
tion work is being finalised. In addition to the trial 
operation of components and systems, the commis-
sioning phase includes other preparations for plant 
operation, such as the production of instructions 
required for operation, personnel training and the 
completion of emergency preparedness and securi-
ty arrangements, for example. The new phase also 
affected the oversight by STUK. STUK carried out 
several inspections of functions related to prepa-
rations for plant operation and oversaw the trial 
operation and testing of instructions using a plant 
simulator, for example. As part of the preparations 
for plant operation, the transports of fresh fuel for 
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit started in the autumn. 
STUK inspected the prerequisites for fuel imports.
The oversight of trial operations constituted a 
large part of oversight work carried out by STUK 
in 2017. The oversight includes the inspection of 
test plans and results, as well as the oversight 
of certain tests. In addition, STUK inspected the 
prerequisites for progressing in the trial operation, 
first from testing individual systems to the cold 
run tests of the whole plant before loading fuel, 
and then on to hot run tests.
Based on these oversight measures, STUK ob-
served that most of TVO’s procedures and opera-
tions are at a good level. In summary, based on the 
results of regulatory oversight, STUK can state 
that the safety goals of the plant can be achieved.
Processing of the operating 
licence application
STUK continued to process the operating licence 
application. TVO submitted its operating licence 
application to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE) in April 2016.
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When reviewing the operating licence applica-
tion STUK will verify that the prerequisites for 
the safe operation of the plant are met. Detailed 
safety requirements are included in STUK’s regu-
lations and nuclear power plant guidelines (the 
YVL Guides). STUK assesses compliance with 
these requirements during the operating licence 
review process. On the basis of its review, STUK 
will produce a safety assessment regarding the ap-
plication and submit a statement on the matter to 
the MEAE. STUK’s safety assessment will not be 
based solely on a review of the operating licence 
documentation; instead, STUK will utilise in its 
assessment all of the results from its oversight op-
erations, such as the general oversight on the plant 
site, its inspections and results obtained during the 
commissioning tests of the plant.
The operating licence application documenta-
tion has been processed almost in its entirety. 
Section 36 of the Nuclear Energy Decree specifies 
the documents making up the operating licence 
documentation. Of these documents, a review of 
the final safety analysis report and the probabil-
istic risk assessment, was still in progress at the 
end of the year. The operating licence documenta-
tion also includes a report on the fulfilment of the 
safety requirements. STUK has assessed the fulfil-
ment of safety requirements in connection with 
review of the operating licence application docu-
ments and will make its decision regarding the 
report when all other operating licence documents 
have been reviewed. STUK has approved other 
operating licence documents. STUK will not issue 
a statement on the operating licence until it has 
been demonstrated in commissioning tests that the 
plant and its systems operate as planned. STUK 
oversees the testing on site at Olkiluoto. If the trial 
operation proceeds as planned, STUK will issue its 
statement on the operating licence application in 
April 2018. According to the present schedule, the 
loading of nuclear fuel will take place in August-
September 2018.
Review of other licensing documents
I&C component suitability analyses and stress 
analyses of mechanical components and piping, 
among other documents, were submitted to STUK 
in 2017.
STUK monitored the progress of the I&C com-
ponent qualification and reviewed the suitabil-
ity analyses of the I&C equipment and systems. 
Documentation work regarding the qualification 
tests and production of the suitability analyses 
will continue in 2018. However, the final suitability 
analyses must be submitted to STUK in good time 
before loading the fuel. The suitability analyses 
submitted to STUK in 2017 have mainly been of 
good quality, and STUK has not had any objections 
regarding them.
During the year, STUK processed a large num-
ber of stress analyses of mechanical components. 
The purpose of these analyses is to demonstrate 
that the design and dimensioning of pipelines is 
compliant with the requirements. Approval of the 
stress analyses is one precondition for trial op-
eration at high temperatures. The stress analyses 
have also been of good quality, and STUK has ap-
proved nearly all the analyses submitted without 
objections.
Minor modifications were made to the plant 
on the basis of observations made during trial op-
eration. E.g. flow limiters in the systems have been 
changed to make the flow rates compliant with 
the design values. STUK has inspected the safety-
related modifications.
Manufacture, installation and construction
STUK continued its oversight of manufacture, in-
stallation and construction.
The factory tests of pressurizer safety relief 
valves were completed during 2017, and the valves 
were brought to Olkiluoto and installed. The valves 
will protect the plant’s primary circuit from over-
pressure. Some parts of the valves represent new 
design, and several modifications of the design 
have been made during the project. STUK oversaw 
the factory tests of these valves, their on-site tests 
before installation in Olkiluoto and the installation 
work. Although acceptable results were achieved in 
the factory tests and tests at the plant, the valve 
appears to be sensitive to variations in assembly, 
for example. STUK has required TVO to produce 
plans and justification for the future inspections, 
maintenance and monitoring of the valves.
Irregularities regarding the manufacturing 
documentation of the reactor coolant pumps came 
to light in a plant supplier review. The deviations 
were related to the oil lifting and lubrication oil 
systems of the reactor coolant pumps, as well as 
to the compliance of support structure welding 
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instructions and traceability of the structural ma-
terials. STUK required that the deviations are fi-
nally cleared before hot tests. Parts of the oil lifting 
system will be remanufactured due to the irregu-
larities. The oil lifting and lubrication oil systems 
are essential for trouble-free electricity production, 
but they only have a minor impact on safety.
The plant supplier has observed cracking in 
the gasket face in certain valves. The problem is 
related to the use of a cobalt-free welding coating. 
Some valves with cracks have been found in the in-
spections. Hot cracks occurring during welding and 
residual stresses have been found to be the cause 
of the problem. Large valves are more susceptible 
to this risk. Heat transfer is faster in large articles, 
which increases the cooling-induced stresses. The 
valve inspections are still continuing, and they will 
still be carried out in 2018 after the trial opera-
tion before fuel loading. The required valves and/
or valve parts will be remanufactured using opti-
mised welding procedures and installed before fuel 
is loaded. In some valves, the cobalt-free coating 
will be replaced with stellite, because no reliable 
cobalt-free coating material has been found for 
large and massive tapered valve gates. Usually, 
the use of cobalt in nuclear power plants should 
be avoided, because cobalt may become activated 
and thus increase the radiation doses of employees. 
However, the use of cobalt cannot be avoided alto-
gether, because it is difficult to find a replacement 
material for it. Cobalt has been used in the hard 
coatings of certain parts inside the reactor, reactor 
coolant pumps and the control rod drive mecha-
nism. Replacing cobalt-free coating with stellite in 
a few large valves will not significantly increase 
the amount of cobalt or the dose rates. STUK has 
also assessed that the modification is acceptable 
from the radiation protection perspective. STUK 
has reviewed the associated inspection and repair 
plans and overseen the manufacture of new valves.
In the spring, Areva completed the review of the 
manufacturing documents of Olkiluoto 3 compo-
nents manufactured at the Creusot Forge factory. 
Malpractices had been observed at the factory, which 
is why Areva initiated extensive investigations re-
garding the products manufactured at the factory. 
As requested by STUK, TVO submitted a summary 
report of the matter in time at the end of April. More 
detailed reports regarding individual deviations were 
submitted to STUK after that. The quality of ma-
terials used for manufacturing the components for 
Olkiluoto 3 were sufficiently verified by inspections 
and reports by TVO. The conclusion is, that the devia-
tions do not impact the quality or integrity of parts 
installed at the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit.
Oversight of commissioning
The purpose of trial operation is to verify that 
the plant’s systems, structures and components 
operate as planned and have been successful-
ly installed. Large-scale trial operations at the 
Olkiluoto 3 plant unit already began in 2016 when 
components and systems were tested. The joint 
operation systems tests began in 2017. The joint 
operation tests consists of cold tests where the sys-
tems are kept in a cold state, and of hot tests where 
the reactor coolant pumps are used to heat the sys-
tems in the nuclear island and the turbine island 
to their correct operating temperatures.
The trial operation of individual systems still 
continued in 2017. Early in the year, the trial 
operation concentrated on tests which had to be 
completed before the cold tests that began in the 
summer. Not all of the plant systems are required 
in the cold or hot tests, and testing of these sys-
tems continues in parallel with the joint operation 
tests. Such systems include the separate systems 
related to waste processing, for example. The cold 
tests were performed in the summer, after which 
the preparations for hot tests began. The hot tests 
began in December.
STUK reviewed both test programmes for in-
dividual systems and the test programmes for the 
cold and hot tests. The test programmes had to be 
approved before the tests could begin. Among other 
things, the test programmes describe the methods, 
goals and acceptance criteria of the tests. In its 
reviews, STUK pays particular attention that all 
functions which are important to safety are tested 
and to having appropriate acceptance criteria for 
the tests. Most of the test programmes plans have 
been of good quality, and STUK has approved most 
of them without any requirements. Reports of the 
trial operation results have also been submitted to 
STUK. The reports submitted so far have mainly 
concerned systems of the turbine island. The result 
reports have been comprehensive, and STUK has 
not had any objections regarding them. However, 
STUK has paid attention to the long time it takes 
to produce the reports.
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STUK inspected the preparedness for starting 
cold and hot tests. The issues verified in the in-
spections included the degree of completion of the 
systems and equipment required in the tests, and 
the planning by TVO regarding its participation 
and monitoring. For the hot tests, STUK required 
TVO to also ensure the availability of resources for 
overseeing the tests in the evenings and weekends.
The main objective of the cold tests was to dem-
onstrate the integrity of the primary circuit in a 
primary circuit pressure test. The integrity is im-
portant for two reasons: firstly, it ensures that the 
reactor receives sufficient cooling at all times, and 
secondly, in case of any leaks in the fuel cladding, 
integrity of the primary circuit will stop them from 
spreading in the plant. STUK oversaw the primary 
circuit pressure test on site. The test results were 
acceptable, and no leaks through the pressure-
bearing primary circuit interface were observed. A 
detailed report of the test results has been submit-
ted to STUK for review.
In addition to the primary circuit pressure test, 
STUK has also overseen other tests, such as tests 
of the emergency diesel generators, and commis-
sioning activities in general. One of the four emer-
gency diesel generators was damaged in trial op-
eration, and the crankshaft of the engine had to be 
replaced. Investigations regarding the root cause of 
the fault are in progress. STUK has required that 
the cause is established before continuing trial op-
eration of the diesel generator.
Oversight of preparation for operation
In addition to the technical readiness of the plant, 
a prerequisite for safe operation of the plant is 
the organisation’s ability to use the plant in a safe 
manner. Procedures that cover the different func-
tions of the plant and a variety of exceptional situ-
ations must be in place and competent employees 
for the plant must be available. For example, only 
a person approved by STUK for the position may 
act as a nuclear plant operator in the control room 
of the plant.
STUK reviewed the production of the instruc-
tions for operation and maintenance of the plant 
as part of its construction inspection programme. 
The status of the procedures was a theme in the 
electrical and I&C engineering inspections, for ex-
ample. Validation of the procedures for emergency 
and abnormal operation situations with a plant 
identical simulator began in 2017. Validation of the 
procedures will continue in 2018. STUK reviewed 
the validation plans and oversaw the validation 
work. Furthermore, STUK oversaw the validation 
of control room user interfaces.
The simulator training of operators began in 
February. STUK has monitored the arrangements 
and progress of training and required TVO to sys-
tematically monitor the development of operators’ 
competence.
The import of fresh fuel for the Olkiluoto 3 
plant unit started in the autumn. Before allowing 
the import, STUK inspected that the prerequisites 
for the import were in place. The inspection cov-
ered the security and emergency and safeguards 
preparedness arrangements, readiness of the re-
quired facilities and equipment, as well as the re-
quired instructions and training of personnel.
STUK granted TVO four licences concerning 
nuclear use items for the Olkiluoto plant unit 
under construction (Appendix 8). TVO submit-
ted the nuclear safeguards reports and notifica-
tions regarding Olkiluoto 3 that it was respon-
sible for on time, and they were consistent with 
the observations made during inspections. STUK 
inspected the nuclear safeguard preparations of 
Olkiluoto 3 in three inspections together with 
the European Commission and the IAEA. The 
European Commission installed the nuclear safe-
guards surveillance equipment early in the year. 
In summer 2017, the IAEA, the Commission and 
STUK reviewed the basic technical characteristics 
document, i.e., details of the plant. The survail-
lance equipment was switched on before the first 
fuel batch was received in October. The inspections 
covered nuclear safeguards design data and the 
installation and commissioning of monitoring in-
struments. The oversight and inspections by STUK 
indicated that the Olkiluoto plant under construc-
tion fulfilled the nuclear safeguards obligations.
The annual emergency preparedness exercise of 
the Olkiluoto power plant in 2017 was a coopera-
tion exercise organised by public authorities every 
three years. The Olkiluoto 3 plant unit was the 
scene of the exercise. One of the objectives of the 
exercise was to demonstrate the operation of the 
emergency preparedness plan and organisation in 
a emergency situation concerning Olkiluoto 3. In 
cooperation, the organisations were able to respond 
to all the key challenges of the exercise. When the 
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exercise was assessed, the areas for development 
identified at TVO included preparations for long-
lasting situations and accuracy of communications. 
Furthermore, there were still minor deficiencies in 
the components and instructions; these need to be 
rectified before operation of the plant unit begins. 
TVO will submit its own assessment of the exercise 
and the plans for rectifying the deficiencies identi-
fied within three months from the exercise.
In recent years, TVO has had significant prob-
lems with the atmosphere at work, and employee 
turnover has increased from earlier years. This 
matter is discussed in more detail in section 2.2.3 
of this report.
2.4 Hanhikivi 1
The documents submitted to STUK in connection 
with the construction licence application regard-
ing the Hanhikivi 1 plant unit of Fennovoima 
(FV) were not complete, and Fennovoima has sup-
plemented and will supplement its construction 
licence application in stages. Submission of the 
supplementary documentation has been delayed 
for the estimates presented in the construction 
licence application and the first licensing plan. 
Fennovoima has regularly updated its licensing 
plan to correspond to the status of document deliv-
eries. In December 2017, Fennovoima announced 
that it will deliver most of the licensing documents 
regarding the Hanhikivi 1 nuclear power plant 
unit for processing by STUK by summer 2018, with 
the last documents delivered in autumn 2018. This 
would allow STUK to complete the safety assess-
ment in 2019.
Interaction between Fennovoima, the plant sup-
plier and STUK continued in 2017. Dozens of bilat-
eral and trilateral meetings took place during the 
year between Fennovoima, the plant supplier and 
the main design organisations. In addition to pro-
ject and management meetings, matters discussed 
in topic-specific meetings included the time sched-
ule of documents to be delivered during the con-
struction licence phase and piloting of the contents 
of documents, starting the manufacture of main 
components of the plant, taking radiation protec-
tion into account in the plant design, the manage-
ment strategy for serious reactor accidents, taking 
security arrangements into account in the plant 
design, nuclear safeguards, and the safety culture 
of the organisations participating in the project.
STUK monitored the development of manage-
ment systems and quality assurance of Fenno-
voima, the plant supplier and its main subcontrac-
tors, and assessed the organisations' capabilities 
to begin construction of the nuclear power plant. 
STUK participated in the audits carried out by 
Fennovoima in its supply chain, for example at the 
factory of EMSS Kramatorsk, the producer of ma-
terials for the main components of the plant. STUK 
has also monitored, as an observer, the design re-
view by the plant supplier and Fennovoima.
The submission of documentation to STUK has 
been delayed, among other things, by the fact that 
the basic design work and configuration manage-
ment of the plant, i.e. the management of its techni-
cal composition, have not been completed yet: for ex-
ample, the updated general part of the preliminary 
safety analysis report has not yet been submitted 
for review by STUK. Without an updated gen-
eral view of the plant and its systems, the results 
of topic-specific meetings with STUK will be less 
productive, because it is difficult to form an opinion 
of individual safety characteristics in the absence 
of an overall view. STUK discussed the matter with 
Fennovoima, and Fennovoima suggested a series of 
meetings at the end of the year for presenting the 
design concepts to STUK. These activities began at 
the beginning of 2018 and will continue as the dif-
ferent design concepts are completed.
Fennovoima submitted the nuclear safeguards 
reports and notifications it was responsible for in 
time. The results of STUK’s oversight indicate that 
Fennovoima was capable of fulfilling the nuclear 
safeguards obligations regarding data subject to 
a licence and preliminary planning of nuclear 
safeguards. The plan for arranging the safeguards 
that are necessary to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons is being assessed by STUK.
Management systems, quality 
management and safety culture
The quality management of the major actors (in-
cluding Fennovoima, the plant supplier RAOS pro-
ject Oy, the project supervisor Titan 2) is still being 
developed. Management systems which are compli-
ant with requirements must be created in a safety-
critical field of activity, and the operations must be 
conducted accordingly.
The development of Fennovoima’s management 
system has fallen somewhat behind schedule, and 
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there is no readiness to start the construction work 
yet. Fennovoima is expected to produce prelimi-
nary safety analysis report by the summer in 2018 
with a description of how the readiness for con-
struction is to be ensured in practice before start-
ing any activities which are important to safety. 
However, the results of the regulatory inspection 
programme (RKT) during the construction licence 
process indicate that Fennovoima’s situation has 
developed and is better than a couple of years ago.
The management system development plan of 
the plant supplier, RAOS Project Oy (RAOS), is 
also behind schedule by several sets of processes 
and instructions. The activities of main designer 
Atomproekt and main designer of the primary 
circuit, Gidropress, have progressed, but in spite 
of the large amount of work done, STUK still does 
not have any comprehensive proof of the design 
processes (including configuration and compliance 
management) fully meeting the Finnish require-
ments. STUK is keeping an eye on the situation, 
among other things by monitoring the develop-
ment of quality plans and in connection with 
review of technical documentation. This allows 
STUK to satisfy itself that the design processes are 
systematic and the design solutions are traceable.
The quality management of the sub-supplier 
chain of Long Lead Items (LLI) has been convinc-
ing throughout the project, and no significant de-
viations have taken place. However, some of the or-
ganisations in the supply chain are still unfamiliar 
with the Finnish quality inspection requirements 
and intensity of the control procedures.
The survey of the safety culture in the 
Hanhikivi 1 project, ordered by STUK from VTT 
Technical Research Centre of Finland, was com-
pleted in autumn 2017. The subjects of the sur-
vey were Fennovoima, the plant supplier RAOS 
Project Oy and the project supervisor Titan 2. 
VTT assessed the safety culture at Fennovoima 
to be acceptable when seen as a whole. VTT’s as-
sessment indicates that there is significant room 
for development in the state of safety cultures at 
RAOS Project Oy and Titan 2. In its decision on the 
matter, STUK required that the recommendations 
of the survey are taken into account in the project. 
Fennovoima was required to enhance its supply 
control and the guidance and monitoring of its sup-
pliers. Fennovoima must also ensure that the sup-
pliers’ understanding of the project requirements 
is appropriate. Fennovoima must also develop its 
organisation and methods of operation so that the 
long-term impacts are better taken into account in 
decision-making related to safety matters and the 
development as a licensee is in balance with the 
short-term project objectives. Fennovoima must 
improve the actions of its management team when 
dealing with safety matters. Furthermore, STUK 
required Fennovoima to take actions regarding 
the concerns and rumours that have emerged in 
the project. The matter was discussed in detail in 
STUK’s media release of October 2017 (in Finnish): 
http://www.stuk.fi/-/stuk-vaatii-parempaa-turval-
lisuuskulttuuria-pyhajoen-ydinvoimalaitoshank-
keeseen.
The geological surveys performed by the plant 
supplier on the plant site in spring 2017 revealed 
uncertainties regarding, e.g., the standards and 
requirements to be followed when performing the 
surveys and the way in which the results of 
the survey s are to be taken into account in the 
plant design. Fennovoima initiated its own inves-
tigation into the matter. STUK has suggested to 
Fennovoima that in addition to the comprehensive-
ness and correctness of methods and results, the 
actions of organisations in the planning, implemen-
tation and assessment of geological surveys should 
also be investigated. Fennovoima will present the 
results of the first phase of investigations to STUK 
in early 2018 regarding the acceptability and suf-
ficiency of the geological surveys which have been 
carried out. STUK will assess the suitability of the 
plant site and process the associated reference re-
ports as part of processing the preliminary safety 
assessment report in 2018.
Technology
According to section 55 of the Nuclear Energy 
Act, the licence applicant can also submit plans 
and manufacturing documents regarding long lead 
items in addition to other construction licence appli-
cation documents for processing by STUK. In 2017, 
STUK analysed the plans concerning the design 
bases and materials of the reactor pressure vessel. 
One key item in the analysis was the suitability of 
materials to be chosen for the pressure vessel and 
their endurance during their planned service life 
of 60 years. The most significant decision require-
ments by STUK concerned carrying out an accel-
erated embrittlement study of basic and welding 
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materials of the reactor pressure vessel before com-
missioning the plant, and additions to the load cases 
to be analysed in the Hanhikivi 1 plant design com-
pared to a reference plant. In the meetings STUK 
has also discussed the supplier control and guidance 
by Fennovoima regarding the manufacture of ma-
jor components. According to Fennovoima, the first 
supplier-specific delivery control plans describing 
the scope and methods of Fennovoima’s controls, are 
being prepared.
Regarding construction engineering, the ap-
plication of Finnish official requirements to the 
design of the Hanhikivi plant and delivery of a 
3D model describing the plant to STUK were dis-
cussed in 2017.
In 2017, STUK also discussed the plant’s I&C 
systems with Fennovoima and the plant supplier 
and participated, as an observer, in the audits of 
the I&C design organisations. The supply chain 
of I&C technology for the duration of the plant 
design, construction and commissioning is yet to 
be defined. Sufficient initial data has also not yet 
been obtained on the plant and process design 
for designing the I&C system. Preparation of the 
licensing documentation regarding I&C to be sub-
mitted for review by regulatory authority has been 
postponed until 2018.
2.5 Research reactor
VTT submitted the operating licence application 
regarding decommissioning to the Government in 
June 2017, and at the same time also submitted 
the first set of decommissioning documentation to 
STUK for inspection. The most significant docu-
ment submitted for inspection was the final decom-
missioning plan of the research reactor, describing, 
among other things, the phases of the dismantling 
work, the dismantling methods to be used, radia-
tion protection and the arrangements for nuclear 
safeguards. VTT has planned that it will submit 
the rest of the safety documentation regarding the 
operating licence application to STUK in the first 
half of 2018. STUK monitored safety of the re-
search reactor by reviewing the licensing materials 
provided by the licensee, as well as by carrying 
out inspections in line with the periodic inspection 
programme.
VTT submitted a waste management plan for 
the research reactor to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment (MEAE) in June 2017. 
The waste management plan includes the details 
of VTT’s provisions for nuclear waste management 
costs during decommissioning of the research reac-
tor. The main change from the previous year was 
the further specification of estimated volumes of 
work and costs, made on the basis of the detailed 
dismantling plan. STUK submitted a statement to 
the MEAE on the nuclear waste management plan 
where STUK stated that VTT has continued the 
decommissioning planning of the research reactor 
and negotiations with nuclear power companies 
regarding intermediate storage of the decommis-
sioning waste. In addition, VTT has commissioned 
a preliminary safety analysis of the disposal of 
waste. STUK commented on its observation made 
in connection with its inspection of the waste man-
agement plan regarding the fact that there are 
still considerable uncertainty factors associated 
with VTT's cost estimate for decommissioning the 
research reactor. These uncertainties are caused by 
the fact that the nuclear waste management plans 
have not been finalised. The uncertainty of the cost 
estimate is further increased by the uncertainties 
regarding the timing of the return of spent nuclear 
fuel to the USA.
In 2017, the nuclear use items of the research 
reactor’s experimental research activities in the ma-
terial balance area were transferred to VTT’s new 
Centre for Nuclear Safety. Concerning nuclear safe-
guards, the material balance area of VTT’s research 
reactor includes nuclear materials in the Otakaari 
3 building and their related activities. VTT’s plant 
site, which is compliant with the Additional Protocol 
of the Safeguards Agreement, includes the buildings 
in the material balance areas of both the research 
reactor and the Centre for Nuclear Safety. In June 
2017, STUK inspected the nuclear material ac-
countancy of the research reactor together with the 
European Commission. The oversight and inspec-
tions by STUK indicated that VTT has fulfilled its 
nuclear safeguards obligations.
2.6 Spent nuclear fuel encapsulation 
and disposal facility
In 2017, Posiva continued the construction of the dis-
posal facility. Auxiliary rooms, such as vehicle routes, 
connection tunnels of canister lift shaft, parking halls 
and personnel shaft were excavated for the dispos-
al facility. Excavation of the central tunnel for the 
shared testing area began in late 2017.
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The regulatory oversight during the construc-
tion stage of the nuclear fuel encapsulation and 
disposal facility covers the design, manufacture, 
construction and installation of the nuclear waste 
facility and its safety-classified systems, struc-
tures and components, as well as drawing up the 
justifications for the long-term safety for oversight 
purposes. The oversight also includes the commis-
sioning of the nuclear waste facility, at which time 
STUK will oversee Posiva’s operations during com-
missioning, oversee testing, review test plans and 
test results, and perform commissioning inspec-
tions of components, structures and systems.
Construction of the disposal facility
Posiva continued the construction of the first tun-
nel contract (LTU1) included in the scope of the 
disposal facility covered by the construction li-
cence. The facilities to be excavated during LTU1 
include vehicle connections, connection tunnels of 
canister lift shaft, the tunnel network of a shared 
testing area and central tunnels 1 and 2 of the first 
disposal area. STUK has set the extent of regula-
tory oversight for the design and implementation 
so that it is in line with the safety importance of 
the subject to be overseen.
In addition to the technical planning, it must 
be ensured when constructing the disposal facility 
that the areas to be excavated have been positioned 
in a manner that meets the rock suitability criteria 
required for ensuring long-term safety. STUK has 
monitored the development work and reviewed the 
rock suitability assessment for the shared testing 
area. Posiva will further develop its procedures 
for the assessment of the rock classification of the 
actual disposal facilities. The procedures must be 
completed before starting excavation of the first 
central tunnel of the disposal area.
Oversight of requirements set at 
the construction licence phase and 
Posiva’s development work
During the construction licence application review, 
STUK set requirements on Posiva that must be 
taken into account during the construction or be-
fore submitting the operating licence application. 
STUK has systematically monitored compliance 
with the requirements set based on the construc-
tion licence application review and Posiva’s plans 
to ensure compliance with the requirements.
Posiva took into account the requirements set 
by STUK during the construction licence review 
in the system design. According to the schedule it 
has produced Posiva has submitted system design 
documents for review by STUK. In 2017, STUK 
has reviewed the documentation regarding rock 
caverns, canisters, lifting and transfer equipment, 
radiation measurements, protection automation, 
air conditioning and drainage water collection sys-
tems for the controlled area of the disposal facility.
Posiva has launched projects for the planning 
and development of long-term safety and engi-
neered barriers. STUK has reviewed project plans 
and programmes, and they have been discussed at 
meetings with Posiva. In 2017, Posiva submitted 
the validation plan for fracture network modelling 
as well as project plans related to development of 
the disposal concept to STUK for approval. With 
its oversight, STUK ensures that the project plans 
and programmes have sufficiently taken into ac-
count the requirements set by STUK during the 
construction licence review.
STUK has developed its own analytical capabili-
ties for supporting its oversight. Their purpose is to 
produce comparison analyses for the analyses of the 
safety case produced by Posiva. Comparison analy-
ses will be made of the thermo-hydro-geochemical 
(THC) modelling describing the lines of evolution in 
the near-field of the disposal facility, of the radionu-
clides released from the canisters migrating above 
ground and of the scenario analysis estimating pos-
sible lines of evolution in final disposal.
Organisational operations 
and quality assurance
STUK has overseen the activities of Posiva’s or-
ganisation in inspections included in the construc-
tion inspection programme. The areas assessed in 
the inspections have included analysis activities, 
maintenance of the disposal facility, manufactur-
ing operations, management system processes and 
management. The inspections and their results, 
as well as the requirements set by STUK, are de-
scribed in more detail in Appendix 7.
In addition to the construction inspection pro-
gramme, the actions of Posiva’s organisation have 
been assessed by an externally produced assess-
ment report of the self-assessment of the manage-
ment system and safety culture by Posiva and of 
the safety culture action plan it has submitted. 
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The results of the report have been discussed with 
Posiva, and it has been noted that Posiva’s safety 
culture action plan has been systematically imple-
mented.
In 2017, STUK continued oversight and assess-
ment of Posiva’s auditing activities by participat-
ing in ten audits of Posiva’s suppliers. The over-
sight has shown that Posiva’s supplier audits are 
compliant with STUK’s requirements.
Preparations for the operating licence phase
Posiva has established an operating licence project 
and submitted a plan regarding it to STUK for 
information. STUK has commented on the pro-
ject plan, and regular discussions are taking place 
with Posiva regarding the operating licence phase. 
In Posiva’s operating licence project, STUK has 
paid attention to the phasing of submitting the 
operating licence documentation and to how Posiva 
manages the changes caused in the licencing docu-
mentation by the industrialisation of the disposal 
activities.
Preparations for operating activities
Posiva has established a project for production 
preparations, including test operation of the facili-
ty, demonstrations of disposal operations and plan-
ning of the operating activities of the plant. The 
project is still at its initial stages, and it has been 
presented to STUK. Regarding the demonstrations 
of disposal operations, STUK has reviewed the pro-
ject plans and monitored the installation equip-
ment demonstrations, for example.
Nuclear safeguards
STUK implemented nuclear safeguards for the fi-
nal disposal in compliance with the national regu-
latory plan.
In 2017, STUK approved the nuclear safe-
guards manual updated by Posiva, describing safe-
guards arrangements of the encapsulation plant 
and the disposal facility during construction. In 
December, STUK approved a deputy for the person 
responsible for nuclear safeguards. STUK inspect-
ed the plant site which was reported by Posiva 
to be compliant with the Additional Protocol of 
the Safeguards Agreement and the construction 
activities in two periodic inspections, as well as 
in connection with an inspection carried out with 
the IAEA and the European Commission. Posiva 
has submitted the nuclear safeguards reports and 
notifications it is responsible for in good time. The 
oversight and inspections by STUK indicate that 
Posiva has fulfilled its nuclear safeguards obliga-
tions.
In 2017, STUK continued its close cooperation 
with the IAEA and the European Commission 
aimed at ensuring that the plans on arranging the 
international nuclear safeguards for the encapsu-
lation plant and disposal facility will proceed in 
line with the design of the facility and also meet 
national requirements.
A meeting was organised at STUK with the 
European Commission and the IAEA, where the 
status of Posiva’s plant plans and designs was 
reviewed and the continuation of oversight and 
update of the monitoring equipment plan were 
agreed. Similar oversight has so far not been 
implemented anywhere else in the world. STUK 
continued its negotiations with the IAEA, the 
European Commission and Posiva on the facility 
attachments regarding the encapsulation plant in 
which the communications, nuclear material ac-
countancy and oversight in the material balance 
area concerned are formally agreed.
STUK’s project aimed at developing the methods 
and equipment for verifying the disposal of spent 
nuclear fuel progressed during the year within 
the framework of international cooperation. The 
new Passive Gamma Emission Tomography (PGET) 
equipment suitable for verifying spent nuclear fuel 
was tested in Olkiluoto and Loviisa in spring 2017. 
At the end of the year, the IAEA approved the equip-
ment for use in the verification of spent nuclear fuel 
also in the IAEA’s inspection activities.
2.7 Other uses of nuclear energy
Producers of uranium, parties in possession of 
small amounts of nuclear use items or nuclear 
information subject to a licence, and research fa-
cilities participating in research of the nuclear fuel 
cycle are also included in the scope of regulatory 
nuclear energy oversight. STUK oversees that the 
users of nuclear energy (operators) meet the set re-
quirements. In 2017, STUK approved eight nuclear 
safeguard manuals prepared by operators. In line 
with the respective applications, STUK approved 
the responsible managers or deputies for VTT’s 
Centre for Nuclear Safety and Terrafame Oy.
STUK granted the University of Helsinki a li-
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cence in compliance with the Nuclear Energy Act 
for continuing the activities for ten years at the 
Department of Chemistry. The IAEA paid a com-
plementary access type inspection visit with STUK 
to the site of the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at 
the University of Helsinki. An inspection was car-
ried out at the Department of Chemistry of the 
University of Helsinki, where the safety of the use 
of radiation and security arrangements were in-
spected in addition to the nuclear materials.
STUK granted VTT a licence to import and 
possess nuclear information subject to the particu-
lar safeguards obligations from South Korea. In 
June, STUK inspected the nuclear material inven-
tory at the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety together 
with the European Commission. In November, 
STUK carried out a commissioning inspection of 
VTT’s new laboratory facilities, where the safety 
of the use of nuclear energy and radiation, secu-
rity arrangements and nuclear safeguards were 
inspected. In addition, the IAEA and European 
Commission took environmental swap samples of 
the initial situation before operations in the hot 
cell began in the presence of STUK’s representa-
tive. The inspection results indicate that the use 
of nuclear energy at the VTT Centre for Nuclear 
Safety fulfils the requirements regarding safety, 
security arrangements and nuclear safeguards.
Terrafame Oy applied for a licence from STUK 
for starting trial uranium extraction operations 
and for establishing the details of the uranium 
extraction process, and STUK granted this licence 
in December 2017. Terrafame submitted an appli-
cation to the Finnish Government for starting the 
extraction of uranium in the uranium extraction 
plant earlier built in the mine area. Terrafame did 
not submit the safety documentation to STUK re-
lated to the licence application during 2017, which 
is why STUK could not start its inspection work 
before 2018.
Of the uranium producers, the reports and noti-
fications submitted by Freeport Cobalt Oy plant in 
Kokkola and Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy plant in 
Harjavalta were inspected by STUK. In addition, 
STUK received a notification concerning the con-
centration of uranium as a result of the zinc metal 
production process and a licence application from 
Boliden Kokkola Oy for the production and pos-
session of the above uranium. Boliden Harjavalta 
Oy has also submitted preliminary basic techni-
cal characteristics documents to STUK and the 
Commission. STUK is in the process of evaluating 
the licence application from Boliden Oy.
The other operators have also submitted the 
required nuclear safeguards reports and notifica-
tions. Of these operators, the nuclear material 
inventories of the Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority, the University of Helsinki and the 
University of Jyväskylä were inspected by STUK 
in 2017. No remarks were made in the inspections.
STUK revised the special nuclear safeguards 
report from RAOS Project Oy on the unauthorised 
import of nuclear information falling under the 
scope of limitations on the country of origin and 
approved the corrective actions proposed by RAOS 
Project Oy in the special report. STUK also revised 
the special report submitted by the Department 
of Physics at the University of Jyväskylä (JYFL) 
regarding the loss of a uranium sample. STUK 
required JYFL to update its ordering and reception 
procedures for nuclear use items and to include 
them in the nuclear safeguards manual.
STUK inspected the stakeholders’ annual re-
ports on nuclear fuel cycle related research and 
development activities and produced a report on 
their basis for the IAEA.
On the basis of the inspections, as well as the 
reports and notifications submitted, STUK has 
satisfied itself that other use of nuclear energy in 
Finland has been implemented in compliance with 
the nuclear safeguards obligations.
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3 Safety research
port services, such as the VTT Technical Research 
Centre of Finland, the University of Helsinki, the 
Aalto University, the Geological Survey of Finland 
and Lappeenranta University of Technology.
The SAFIR2018 safety research programme 
consists of 30 projects that were selected in the 
autumn of 2016 based on a competitive bidding. 
The available VYR funding for the research was 
around EUR 3.7 million. The total funding of the 
research programme remained at the 2016 level. 
The research projects are larger than in the previ-
ous programme, and the goal has been to create 
multidisciplinary projects to promote multidisci-
plinary cooperation and achievement of an overall 
idea of safety. Volume of the SAFIR2018 research 
programme is EUR 6.5 million, which is divided 
into three areas as illustrated in image 3 a: 1) over-
all safety and management of design, 2) reactor 
safety and 3) structural integrity and materials. 
The VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland 
and Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT) 
will use around 17% of the entire public funding 
for safety research when reforming the na-
tional infrastructure. This mainly covers 
the work related to the acquisition and 
commissioning of infrastructure-related in-
vestment objects. VYR finances equipment 
investments from a separate re-search-re-
lated funding portion aimed at the renewal 
of nuclear safety level hot chambers and the 
thermohydraulic test equipment of LUT. In 
2017, the funding was channelled to VTT in 
the manner required by the Nuclear Energy 
Act, and it amounted to EUR 2.74 million. 
The research programme covers all issues 
integral to nuclear safety, and it will estab-
lish and maintain the expertise, analysis methods 
and experimental readiness to resolve any unfore-
seen safety issues.
The SAFIR2018 research projects are controlled 
by six steering groups in addition to the three 
Publicly funded safety research on the use of nu-
clear energy has a key role in the development 
and maintenance of nuclear technology exper-
tise in Finland. A new four-year nuclear safety 
programme, SAFIR2018, and a four-year nuclear 
waste management programme, KYT2018, contin-
ued in 2017, which was the third year of these 
programmes.
Without safety research programmes like 
SAFIR and KYT, developing the expertise needed 
to support the authorities would not be possible in 
Finland. According to the Nuclear Energy Act, re-
search funded by the Finnish State Nuclear Waste 
Management Fund (VYR) aims at ensuring that 
the authorities have access to comprehensive nu-
clear expertise. Both STUK and the licensees have 
hired several people who have obtained their train-
ing for expert positions in the field of nuclear en-
ergy use and oversight in publicly funded research 
programmes. The safety research programmes also 
have an important role in the training of organi-
sations that provide STUK with technical sup-
Figure 3. Research areas of SAFIR2018 programme and 
their shares of the total funding in 2017.
Automation, organisation and human factors
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research areas. The steering groups take care of 
the academic control of research. Members of the 
supporting groups were named from organisations 
important to the research of the use of nuclear 
energy. The supporting groups are: 1) I&C, organi-
sation and human factors, 2) severe accidents and 
research of risks, 3) reactors and fuel, 4) thermal 
hydraulics, 5) structural integrity and 6) research 
infrastructure. The supporting groups were named 
based on the research areas. All of the projects 
included in one support group are usually part of 
a single research area. An exception to this is the 
second support group, which includes both pro-
jects pertaining to the determination of plant de-
sign bases and projects developing safety analysis 
methods. The infrastructure support group oper-
ates in the SAFIR2018 safety research organisa-
tion alongside the research areas (Fig. 4).
The projects included in the SAFIR2018 pro-
gramme for 2017 meet the requirements set for 
VYR-funded research. Special challenges of the 
research programme include reduced funding and 
a large share of infrastructure funding. High-class 
research on the use of nuclear energy requires a 
modern architecture.
The SAFIR2018 projects includes several pro-
jects for developing capabilities, e.g. for avoiding 
accidents of the type that occurred at the Tepco 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, or for 
understanding the sequence of events in such ac-
cidents. The projects’ subject matters range from 
design bases of nuclear facilities and the analysis 
of accidents to the operation of organisations dur-
ing accidents and as systems comprising several 
organisations. An international research project 
that started in 2015 has offered as reliable infor-
mation as possible about the course of the Tepco 
Fukushima Daiichi accident in order to create 
Finnish accident analyses and compare results 
globally.
Figure 4. The administrative structure of SAFIR2018 research programme.
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In addition to the above, the SAFIR2018 man-
agement group may fund small projects aimed at 
helping the development of research projects with 
new topics into becoming members of the pro-
gramme. This procedure has been in use from the 
beginning, and it has proven to be an efficient way 
to promote the creation of high standard topical re-
search projects. Of the earlier small projects, those 
studying the ageing of polymers and disruptions in 
the electrical grid have led to new research projects 
in the programme. The objectives for small projects 
in 2017 included promoting the requirements for 
seismic measurements during the operation of 
nuclear power plants and continued development 
of the overall safety. The research assessed the to-
tality formed by licence holders, public authorities 
and stakeholders and the functioning of defence-
in-depth in this context.
The four-year KYT2018 research programme 
was launched in 2015. The programme consists of 
re-search areas which are important for national 
expertise. It aims at extensive coordinated research 
pro-jects, particularly regarding the research areas 
related to the performance of buffer and backfilling 
materials as well as the long-term durability and 
microbiology of final disposal canisters. When the 
Nuclear Energy Act was amended (in 2016), fund-
ing of the research infrastructure was added to 
the KYT2018 programme. In 2017, the programme 
continued with much the same contents as in 2016. 
The distribution of funding during the framework 
programme is shown in Table 1 and Figure 5.
The KYT management team provided funding 
recommendations to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment based on assessments by 
the support groups, and the applicability and con-
tent of the subject matter. In 2017, the total fund-
ing of the KYT2018 programme from the National 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) was 
about EUR 1.7 million. In 2017, the research pro-
gramme provided funding for 29 research projects 
representing new and alternative technologies for 
nuclear waste management (2 projects), safety 
research concerning nuclear waste management 
(25 projects), social nuclear waste management 
research (1 project) and research infrastructure (1 
project). The most important coordinated research 
subjects were buffer and backfilling materials, 
long-term durability of canisters and microbiology.
The international group of experts appointed by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
assessed the KYT2018 research programme in 
2017. The assessment group interviewed the pro-
ject managers and produced a report on the basis 
of these interviews. Entitled the “KYT2018 Review 
Report”, the report was published 
by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs and Employment. The re-
sults of the assessment will be 
utilised when preparing the next KYT framework 
programme period.
Table 1. Distribution of VYR funding by research area in 2016–2017. Research area/1000€.  
Administration project budged is not included in the total funding.
Research area/1000 € 2016 2017
Safety assessment 61 70
Buffer and backfill materials 341 385
Long-term durability of the canister 253 255
Microbiology 220 230,3
Other safety relevant research 414 418
Social science studies related to nuclear waste 
management
40 100
New and alternative technological solutions 88 62
Research infrastructure 143 143
Total 1560 1663.3
Figure 5. Distribution of VYR funding by research area 
in 2017.
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4 Oversight of nuclear 
facilities in figures
4.1 Processing of documents
A total of 3,740 documents were submitted to 
STUK for processing in 2017. Of these, 1,080 con-
cerned the nuclear power plant unit under con-
struction and 148 concerned the disposal facility 
for spent nuclear fuel. The review process of a 
total of 3,529 documents was completed, includ-
ing documents submitted in 2017, those submit-
ted earlier and licences granted by STUK by vir-
tue of the Nuclear Energy Act, which are listed in 
Appendix 8. The average document review time 
was 65 days. The number of documents and their 
average review times in 2013–2017 are illustrated 
in Figure 6. Figures 7–10 illustrate the review time 
Figure 7. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the Loviisa plant.
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Figure 8. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on the operating plant units of Olkiluoto.
Figure 9. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Olkiluoto plant unit 3.
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Figure 6. Number of documents received and reviewed 
as well as average document review time.
Figure 10. Distribution of time spent on preparing 
decisions on Posiva.
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distribution among documents from the various 
plant units and documents about Posiva.
32
STUK-B 225
4.2 Inspections at nuclear power plant 
sites and suppliers’ premises
Inspection programmes
A total of 12 inspections at the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant and 13 inspections at the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant were carried out under the 
2017 periodic inspection programme (Appendix 
4). STUK carried out 13 inspections within the 
Olkiluoto 3 construction inspection programme 
(Appendix 5) and 12 inspections pertaining to the 
processing of Fennovoima’s construction licence ap-
plication (Appendix 6). Five inspections of the en-
capsulation plant and disposal facility construction 
inspection programme were carried out in 2017 
(Appendix 7). The key findings of the inspections 
are presented in the appendices and the chapters 
on regulatory oversight.
Other inspections at plant sites
A total of 2,079 inspections were carried out on 
site or on the suppliers’ premises in 2017 (other 
than the above-mentioned construction inspection 
programme inspections and nuclear safeguards 
inspections, which are separately described). An 
inspection comprises one or more sub-inspections, 
such as a review of results, an inspection of compo-
nent or structure, a pressure or leak test, a func-
tional test or a commissioning inspection. Of the 
inspections, 885 were related to the regulatory 
oversight of the plant under construction and 1194 
to that of the units in operation.
The number of inspection days on site and on 
the component manufacturers’ premises totalled 
3,321. This number includes not only inspections 
pertaining to the safety of nuclear power plants 
but also those associated with nuclear waste man-
agement and nuclear safeguards as well as audits 
and inspections of the underground research facil-
ity at Olkiluoto. Five resident inspectors worked at 
the Olkiluoto power plant and two resident inspec-
tors at the Loviisa power plant. The numbers of 
onsite inspection days in 2013–2017 are illustrated 
in Figure 11.
4.3 Finances and resources
The duty area of nuclear safety regulation included 
basic operations subject to a charge, as well as op-
erations not subject to a charge. Basic operations 
subject to a charge mostly consisted of the regula-
tory oversight of nuclear power plants, with their 
costs charged to those subject to the oversight. 
Basic operations not subject to a charge included 
international and domestic cooperation, as well as 
emergency response operations and communica-
tions. Basic operations not subject to a charge are 
publicly funded. Overheads from the preparation 
of regulations and support functions (administra-
tion, development projects in support of regulatory 
activities, training, maintenance and development 
of expertise, and reporting, as well as participation 
in nuclear safety research) were carried forward 
into the costs of both types of basic operation and 
of contracted services in relation to the number of 
working hours spent on each function.
In 2017, the costs of the regulatory control of 
nuclear safety subject to a charge were EUR 18.0 
million. The figure includes the radiation moni-
toring in the immediate vicinity of nuclear power 
plants that was changed from a service operation 
to regulatory oversight in 2015. The total costs of 
regulatory oversight of nuclear safety were EUR 
20.1 million. Thus, the share of activities subject to 
a charge was 89.6%. Figure 12 shows the annual 
costs of the regulatory oversight of nuclear safety 
in 2013–2017.
Attainment of the cost price for the regulatory 
oversight of nuclear safety is ensured by adjust-
ing the invoicing with a balancing bill to corre-
spond to actual costs after annual cost accounting. 
Consequently, the cost correlation of the regulatory 
oversight was 99.0%. The difference between in-
come and costs is due to the charges on oversight 
of small amounts of radioactive waste and on ra-
Figure 11. Number of inspection days onsite and at 
component manufacturers’ premises. Overtime work 
is included.
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Figure 12. Income and costs of nuclear safety 
regulation.
diation monitoring in the vicinity of nuclear power 
plants which were excluded from the balancing. 
The balancing bills for these activities are not in-
cluded in the nuclear plant specific balancing bills 
issued at year-end. The income from the regulatory 
oversight of nuclear safety in 2017 totalled EUR 
17.8 million (including radiation monitoring in the 
vicinity of nuclear power plants). Of this, EUR 3.0 
million and EUR 9.0 million came from the over-
sight of the Loviisa and Olkiluoto nuclear power 
plants, respectively. In addition to the operating 
units, the income from Olkiluoto NPP includes 
income derived from the regulatory oversight of 
the Olkiluoto 3 construction project. Income from 
the oversight of the Fennovoima nuclear power 
plant project amounted to EUR 2.7 million. The 
regulation of Posiva Oy’s operations yielded EUR 
2.2 million.
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Loviisa nuclear power plant was 13.9 man-years 
or 9.2% of the total working time of the regulatory 
personnel. The time spent on the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant’s operating units was 16.8 man-years 
or 11.2% of the total working time. In addition to 
the monitoring of the operation of the nuclear pow-
er plants, these figures include nuclear safeguards. 
The time spent on the inspection and review of 
Olkiluoto 3 was 21.9 man-years or 14.6% of the 
total working time. Work related to new nuclear 
power plant projects amounted to 10.0 man-years 
or 6.6% of the total working time. A total of 8.5 
man-years or 5.7% of the total working time was 
spent on inspection and review of Posiva’s opera-
tions, and that spent on the FiR 1 research reactor 
was 0.7 man-years. Figure 13 shows the division of 
working hours of the personnel engaged in nuclear 
safety oversight (in man-years) by subject of over-
sight during 2010–2017.
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Figure 13. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel by subject of oversight 
in 2010–2017. Until 2011 the nuclear waste management includes both the oversight of the operating 
nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management as well as the oversight of Posiva, since 2012 only the 
oversight of Posiva. The oversight of the operating nuclear power plants’ nuclear waste management is 
combined with the oversight of the power plants.
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Table 2. Distribution of working hours (person-years) of the regulatory personnel in each duty area.
Duty area 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Basic operations subject to a charge 69.7 72.0 76.6 74.9 72.0
Basic operations not subject to a charge 5.0 3.5 2.6 4.0 4.0
Contracted services 1.6 2.9 2.8 2.1 4.3
Rule-making and support functions 45.3 41.8 42.2 44.5 42.9
Holidays and absences 25.1 25.3 26.4 26.6 26.9
Total 146.7 145.5 150.5 152.1 150.1
Where necessary, STUK commissions independ-
ent safety analyses and research in support of 
regulatory decision-making. Figure 14 illustrates 
the costs of such assignments in 2013–2017. The 
expenses in 2017 were mainly associated with the 
comparison analyses of Hanhikivi 1, Olkiluoto 3 
and Olkiluoto 1&2, with independent assessments 
and reports, as well as assessment of the safety of 
the spent fuel disposal project.
Distribution of the annual working time of the 
nuclear safety regulation personnel to the various 
duty areas is shown in Table 2. The figures do not 
include the work for radiation monitoring in the 
surrounding environment. Figure 14. The costs of research and commissioned 
work.
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International conventions
Starting from 1999, Finland has produced national 
reports which are compliant with the Convention 
on Nuclear Safety every three years. The latest 
report was produced in 2016. A review meeting in 
compliance with the Convention was held in spring 
2017, and STUK representatives participated in 
the meeting with other Finnish actors. The review 
meeting focussed on reporting the attainment of 
the objectives of the Vienna Declaration (VDNS) 
that describes the general safety objectives of nu-
clear facilities. In the EU, the objectives have been 
recorded in the Nuclear Safety Directive and are 
currently being implemented in national legisla-
tion of the Member States, but the declaration has 
led or is leading to essential changes in regulations 
or plant safety in very few non-EU countries.
The reports compliant with the Joint Convention 
on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on 
the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management have 
been produced since 2003, with the latest report 
produced in 2017. The report submitted to the 
IAEA in October will be reviewed in a review meet-
ing to be held in May–June 2018. In May 2017, 
STUK participated in an extraordinary JC meet-
ing where proposals for developing the Convention 
were discussed. Minor amendments were made 
to the Convention text as a result of the meeting. 
STUK also participated in the May organisation 
meeting for preparing the 2018 review meeting 
where the arrangements and officials for the meet-
ing were decided.
MDEP
The Multinational Design Evaluation Programme 
(MDEP) was established on the initiative of the 
United States nuclear safety authority (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, NRC). It involves 16 coun-
tries with the objective of improving cooperation in 
5 International cooperation 
the field of the assessment of new nuclear power 
plants and developing convergent regulatory prac-
tices. In addition to the United States of America, 
the following countries are participating in the pro-
gramme: Canada, China, Finland, France, Hungary, 
India, Japan, Korea, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, 
Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and United 
Kingdom, as well as Argentina as a new member. 
Participants in the programme include only those 
countries with new nuclear power plants at some 
stage of assessment by the regulatory authorities. 
The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency functions as 
the secretariat for the programme.
The MDEP’s work is organised in design-specif-
ic and issue-specific working groups. In addition, 
the MDEP has a Policy Group and a Technical 
Steering Committee. Petteri Tiippana, the Director 
General of STUK, is the chair of the Policy Group. 
There are six Design-Specific Working Groups: 
The EPR Working Group, AP1000 Working Group, 
APR1400 Working Group, VVER Working Group 
and ABWR Working Group, as well as the new 
Working Group for the Chinese HPR1000 plant 
type. Of these, STUK has participated in the EPR 
Working Group and the VVER Working Group, 
because an EPR plant is under construction in 
Olkiluoto (the Olkiluoto 3 project) and Fennovoima 
has submitted a construction licence application 
for the construction of a VVER plant in Pyhäjoki 
(the Hanhikivi 1 project). The MDEP Working 
Groups which are independent of plant design 
dealt with the following two subjects: supply chain 
inspections and pressure equipment standards. 
In 2017, the third subject-specific group on digital 
I&C was transferred to part of the cooperation per-
formed under the framework of the CNRA. STUK 
participated in the activities of all three Issue-
Specific Working Groups.
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Cooperation within the IAEA
The IAEA continued to develop its safety stand-
ards on nuclear safety and security. STUK had 
a representative on the Commission on Safety 
Standards (CSS) managing the preparation of the 
standards as well as in the committees dealing 
with the content of the standards, i.e. the Nuclear 
Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC), the Waste 
Safety Standards Committee (WASSC), the 
Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC), 
the Transport Safety Standards Committee 
(TRANSSC) and the Nuclear Security Guidance 
Committee (NSGC). STUK issued statements on 
the IAEA safety standards under preparation. An 
expert of STUK has been named in the Advisory 
Committee on Nuclear Security to the Director 
General of the IAEA (AdSec) for the term 2016–
2018.
Cooperation within the OECD/NEA
The Nuclear Energy Agency of the OECD (NEA) 
coordinates international cooperation in the field of 
safety research in particular. The organisation also 
provides an opportunity for cooperation between 
regulatory authorities. STUK was represented in 
all main committees of the organisation dealing 
with radiation and nuclear safety issues. The main 
committees’ fields of activity are:
•	 Nuclear	 safety	 regulation	 (CNRA,	 Committee	
on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)
•	 Safety	research	(CSNI,	Committee	on	the	Safe-
ty of Nuclear Installations)
•	 Radiation	safety	(CRPPH,	Committee	on	Radia-
tion Protection and Public Health)
•	 Nuclear	waste	management	 (RWMC,	Radioac-
tive Waste Management Committee).
DGRRF
The Deep geological repository regulators forum is 
a cooperation forum for six nuclear and radiation 
safety authorities (USA, Canada, Sweden, France, 
Switzerland and Finland) where disposal projects 
for spent nuclear fuel and high-level nuclear waste 
are discussed from the perspective of public au-
thorities. In 2017, the forum organised a workshop 
in Sweden for discussing the challenges of the per-
mit process for disposal facilities. STUK partici-
pated in this workshop.
VVER Forum
The VVER Forum is a cooperation group for au-
thorities operating Russian VVER pressurized wa-
ter type nuclear facilities, mainly concentrating on 
developing oversight activities of plants operating 
in its member countries. The annual meeting of the 
VVER Forum was organised in May in Iran, and 
STUK participated in the meeting. STUK also took 
part in activities of the Forum’s working groups 
during 2017.
Cooperation within the EU
WENRA WGWD
STUK actively participated in the work of WENRA’s 
Working Group on Waste And Decommissioning 
(WGWD) in 2017. The working group convened 
twice. Self-assessments and peer reviews of ref-
erence levels associated with disposal were com-
pleted during the year, and a reference level report 
on nuclear waste processing facilities was finalised. 
The peer review of Finnish regulations concerning 
disposal facilities was successfully completed in 
2017.
ENSREG
STUK participated in the activities of the European 
Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) and 
in three of its subgroups (nuclear safety, nuclear 
waste management and communication). ENSREG 
decided that the theme of the first Topical Peer 
Review, which will be arranged every six years 
from now on according to the Nuclear Safety 
Directive that was updated in 2014, is manage-
ment of the ageing of nuclear power plants. In 
cooperation with Finnish power companies, STUK 
produced a national report on the peer review and 
published it on its website at the end of December 
2017. Finland will participate in the peer review of 
EU countries in the spring of 2018.
The next national report regarding the direc-
tive on the management of radioactive waste and 
spent nuclear fuel will be sent to the Commission 
in August 2018. ENSREG updated its reporting 
guidelines during 2017.
In spring 2017, ENSREG organised the fourth 
nuclear safety conference for public authorities in 
Brussels. STUK participated in organising the con-
ference, and the Director General of STUK acted as 
its President.
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Bilateral cooperation 
STUK continued its regular meetings with the 
Swedish nuclear safety authority SSM, focusing 
on topical issues concerning nuclear power plants. 
The issues included topical oversight matters con-
cerning plants, management systems as well as 
competence and resource issues of the authorities, 
STUK’s new strategy, as well as the renewal of 
Swedish safety requirements.
STUK started regular cooperation with the 
French nuclear safety authority Autorité de Sûreté 
Nucléaire (ASN) and its technical support or-
ganisation Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté 
Nucléaire (IRSN) when the Olkiluoto 3 project was 
launched in the early 2000s. Regulatory practices 
and safety requirements of the countries involved 
have been compared, and challenges and problems 
pertaining to the EPR plants under construction 
(Olkiluoto 3 and Flamanville 3) have been dis-
cussed. In September 2017, STUK met with ASN 
and IRSN in the bilateral meeting held in Paris. 
Topical issues regarding commissioning and me-
chanical components were discussed in the meet-
ing. The Flamanville 3 site was visited after the 
meeting.
Cooperation with the Russian nuclear safety au-
thority Rostechnadzor (RTN) was expanded to also 
cover issues pertaining to the safety assessments 
of AES2006-type VVER plants. Four AES-2006 
plants are currently under construction in Russia. 
Of them, the Leningrad 2 plant in Sosnovyi Bor is 
the reference plant for Fennovoima’s Hanhikivi 1 
project. In 2017, five cooperation meetings with 
RTN were arranged to review the construction 
status of the new plant units. STUK visited the 
construction site of the Leningrad 2 nuclear power 
plant twice related to cooperation. In 2017, STUK 
made two visits with Fennovoima to witness the 
commissioning tests of the Leningrad 2 power 
plant. One of these was the containment pressure 
and leak tightness test. During the visit, pressure 
in the containment had not reached the maximum 
test pressure. The second visit to witness the com-
missioning tests concerned new passive safety 
systems. The visits gave STUK a good understand-
ing of how the commissioning tests for new plants 
are carried out in Russia. STUK has stated to 
Fennovoima and the plant supplier that the results 
of the tests cannot be utilised as a safety case for 
the Hanhikivi 1 construction licence application.
An AES-2006 plant is also under construction 
in Astravets, in Belarus. In autumn 2017, the nu-
clear safety authority of Belarus Gosatomnadzor 
(GAN) and STUK held a cooperation meeting in 
Helsinki. Further cooperation was agreed in the 
meeting and STUK is to visit Astravets in 2018.
The Hungarian radiation and nuclear safety 
authority HAEA has also started preparation for 
a safety assessment of an AES-2006 nuclear power 
plant (PAKS-2 project). In 2017, STUK and HAEA 
held two meetings concerning plant design issues.
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Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Olkiluoto 1 2 Sep 1978 10 Oct 1979 910/880 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 2 18 Feb 1980 1 Jul 1982 920/890 Boiling water reactor (BWR),
    Asea Atom
Olkiluoto 3 Construction license granted Approx. 1,600 (net) Pressurized water reactor (PWR),
 17 Feb 2005   Areva NP
Teollisuuden Voima Oyj owns the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units located in Olkiluoto, Eurajoki, and  
the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit under construction.
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Plant Start-up National Nominal electric power, Type,
unit  grid (gross/net, MW) supplier
Loviisa 1 8 Feb1977 9 May 1977 531/507 Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Loviisa 2 4 Nov 1980 5 Jan 1 981 526/502 Pressurized water reactor (PWR), 
    Atom ener goex port
Fortum Power and Heat Oy owns the Loviisa 1 and 2 plant units located in Loviisa.
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
APPENDIX 1 Objects of regulation
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Plant Supplemented  Nominal electric power, Type,
unit Decision-In-Principle approved net (MW) supplier
Hanhikivi 1 5 Dec 2014  Approx. 1200 Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR),
    ROSATOM
Hanhikivi nuclear power plant FH1 is a power plant project of Fennovoima.
Hanhikivi nuclear facility project 
Olkiluoto encapsulation 
plant and disposal facility
In November 2015, the 
Government granted Posiva 
a construction licence for the 
Olkiluoto encapsulation plant 
and disposal facility. The 
planned facility consists of a 
surface facility for the encapsu-
lation of spent nuclear fuel, an 
underground disposal facil-
ity, and supporting buildings. 
Posiva has already built an ac-
cess tunnel, three shafts and a 
technical facility and research 
area at a depth of 420–437 
metres as parts of the under-
ground research facility Onkalo. For the actual 
disposal facility, the underground facility will be 
expanded by two additional shafts and the dis-
posal tunnels that will be excavated in stages. The 
construction of an underground research facility 
was a prerequisite for granting a construction 
Diagram of the encapsulation and disposal facility in Olkiluoto (Posiva Oy).
licence. Onkalo provides an opportunity for more 
detailed study of the rock volumes best suited for 
the disposal of spent nuclear fuel, and allow for 
the testing of disposal facility construction meth-
ods and installation of the disposal system compo-
nents.
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FiR 1 research reactor
Other uses of nuclear energy
The regulation also applies to mining and any min-
eral processing aiming at obtaining uranium or 
thorium. Such operations are practiced at the pro-
duction plants of Norilsk Nickel Harjavalta Oy 
and Freeport Cobalt Oy. The planned Terrafame 
uranium extraction plant is also part of this group. 
STUK granted Terrafame a licence for small-scale 
pilot level production of uranium in December 
2017. In addition, a few laboratories have small 
amounts of controlled nuclear materials. The regu-
lation also applies to nuclear equipment, systems 
and information as well as nuclear fuel cycle-re-
lated research and development activities and the 
transport of nuclear materials and nuclear waste.
Facility Thermal power In operation Fuel TRIGA reactor’s
    fuel type
TRIGA Mark II 250 kW March 1962– Reactor core consists Uranium–zirkonium-
research reactor  June 2015 of 80 fuel rods which hybrid combination:
   contain 15 kg of uranium 8% uranium
    91% zirkonium and 
    1% hydrogen
The FiR 1 research reactor, operated by VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland, was commissioned in  
March 1962. VTT stopped using the reactor in June 2015 and placed in permanent shutdown. VTT submitted 
the operating licence application for the decommissioning  phase to the Government in June 2017.
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Summary of the safety performance 
indicators for nuclear power plants
Background and objectives 
of the indicator system
Safety is a primary prerequisite for the operation 
of nuclear power plants. The power companies and 
STUK evaluate and oversee the safety and opera-
tion of the plants in many ways. Along with inspec-
tions and safety assessments, indicators are a fur-
ther method of acquiring information on the safety 
level of nuclear power plants and on any changes 
therein.
The objective of the indicator system is to recog-
nise changes in plant safety as early on as possible. 
If the indicators weaken, the underlying factors 
influencing the development must be determined 
and changes to plant operation and STUK’s over-
sight of the area must be considered. The indica-
tors can also be used to monitor the efficiency and 
effectiveness of corrective measures. Furthermore, 
the information yielded by the indicators is used 
when communicating nuclear safety.
In the indicator system, nuclear safety is di-
vided into three sectors: 1) operation and main-
tenance, 2) operational events and 3) structural 
integrity. The indicators, their maintenance pro-
cedures and the interpretation of the results are 
presented at the end of this summary. A brief 
summary of the safety status of both the Loviisa 
and Olkiluoto NPPs in 2017 on the basis of safety 
indicators is presented below, followed by detailed 
results for each indicator.
STUK began developing its indicator system in 
2016. The indicator system will be further revised 
in 2018, when the new system will be launched 
and integrated more closely into STUK’s other in-
spection activities and overall safety assessment. 
Therefore, from 2016 onwards, the annual reports 
will not include the entire indicator system but 
only the indicators that best describe the plant 
safety in different sectors in 2017.
Nuclear safety
A.I Operation and maintenance of 
a nuclear facility A.II Operational events A.III Structural integrity
1. Failures and their repairs 1. Number of events 1. Fuel integrity
2. Exemptions and deviations from 
the Operational Limits and 
Conditions
3. Risk-significance of events
2. Primary and secondary circuits 
integrity
3. Unavailability of safety systems 4. Accident risk of nuclear facilities
3. Containment integrity
4. Occupational radiation doses
5. Number of fire alarms5. Radioactive releases
6. Investments in facilities
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Results of the safety performance 
indicators for the nuclear 
power plants in 2017
Summary of indicator results for the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Operation and maintenance
Ageing management and maintenance at the 
Loviisa power plant have been fully functional and 
the development measures taken have been cor-
rect. Preventive maintenance has ensured suffi-
cient operability. The number of operation restric-
tions on components subject to the OLC and the 
ratio of preventive maintenance to fault repairs 
remained at a stable, acceptable level. The num-
ber of fault repairs has increased in the past few 
years because more components were repaired 
while they were still operable – the number of 
immediate faults has remained at the same level. 
The average component repair times have also re-
mained stable. The fact that the average repair 
time at Loviisa 2 was clearly longer than in recent 
years was due to a few individual repair operations 
taking somewhat longer. The detection and antici-
pation of faults have been continuously improved 
in the maintenance operations of Loviisa nuclear 
power plant and components have been replaced, 
which is why there have been no faults that would 
have had a major impact on the safe operation of 
the plants, and the operability of components has 
remained good.
This development was also reflected in the good 
availability of safety systems. The availability of 
the high-pressure safety injection system, emer-
gency feedwater system and the emergency diesel 
generators was excellent in 2017.
No common-cause failures important to safety 
occurred. Very few events affecting production oc-
curred, and they did not affect the safe operation 
of the plant. Only one event important to safety 
(INES ≥1) took place in 2017. That event was re-
lated to handling nuclear fuel. Following the event, 
extensive remedial actions were taken in Loviisa 
during 2017 with regard to activities, the organi-
sation responsible for the operation concerned, as 
well as the condition monitoring and ageing man-
agement of the refuelling machine. In 2018, STUK 
will also closely monitor the transfers of nuclear 
Operation and maintenance are assessed on 
the basis of information concerning the radiation 
protection and the operation and maintenance of 
the plant. The operation and maintenance of the 
plant is monitored using the failure and mainte-
nance data for the components with an effect on 
the safe operation of the plant, as well as by moni-
toring compliance with the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC). The success of radiation protec-
tion is monitored on the basis of the employees’ 
radiation doses and radioactive releases into the 
environment. Attention is also paid to investments 
to improve the plant and to the up-to-dateness of 
the plant documentation.
The indicators concerning operational 
events are used to monitor special situations and 
significant disturbances at the plant. Special situ-
ations include events with an effect on the safety of 
the plant, the personnel or the environment. A spe-
cial report is required for any special situations. 
Correspondingly, a transient report must be pre-
pared for any significant disturbances occurring 
at a plant unit. Such transients include reactor 
and turbine trips, and other operational transients 
leading to a forced reduction of more than 5% in 
the reactor power or average gross power. Risk 
indicators are used to monitor the safety effect of 
component unavailability and development of the 
plant’s risk level. The results provide insight into 
the operational activities at the plant and the effi-
ciency of the operating experience feedback system.
Structural integrity is assessed on the basis 
of the leak-tightness of the multiple radioactivity 
confinement barriers – the fuel, primary and sec-
ondary circuits, and the containment. The integri-
ty must meet the set objectives while the indicators 
must show no significant deterioration. Fuel integ-
rity is monitored on the basis of the radioactivity 
of the primary coolant and the number of leaking 
fuel bundles. The water chemistry indicators are 
used to monitor and control the integrity of the 
reactor coolant system and the secondary circuit. 
The monitoring is done by indices depicting the 
maintenance of water chemistry and by following 
selected corrosive impurities and corrosion prod-
ucts. Integrity of the containment is monitored by 
testing the leak tightness of isolation valves, pen-
etrations and air locks.
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fuel and impacts of the actions taken. There were 
five events where the plant was non-compliant 
with the OLC. However, these were isolated events 
and their safety significance was low. Three of 
them concerned a failure to carry out periodic 
tests, one was a momentary deviation from chemi-
cal limit values, while one concerned the inoper-
ability of a measurement device which was impor-
tant to safety. The most important events in 2017 
are described in Appendix 3. The main purpose 
of the OLC exemption procedure is to verify that 
the safety level specified in the OLC is achieved 
during modifications, more extensive maintenance 
or during fault repairs. An average number of 
exemptions were granted in 2017, and they were 
all related to on-going modification work aimed at 
improving safety.
Radiation safety at the Loviisa power plant has 
been appropriately handled, and it is being devel-
oped in a determined manner. Radiation doses are 
mainly accumulated during outages. Thanks to 
improvements in radiation safety, the employees’ 
radiation doses were very low in 2017 – the lowest 
ever measured at Loviisa 1 – and remained well 
below the individual dose limits and the collective 
occupational dose limit. In 2017, the average of the 
ten largest doses was also a record-low. In 2017, 
radioactive releases into the air and water from 
Loviisa NPP were of the same magnitude as in 
previous years, which are well below the emission 
limits set.
Operational events
The number of reported events remained the same 
or decreased slightly. The number of simultaneous 
safety significant events (INES 1 or higher) de-
creased in the short and long term, which indicates 
a positive development trend. Of the major events 
submitted for approval in 2017, nearly all were 
single events referred to above, and were events of 
low safety significance where the plant was non-
compliant with the OLC. The safety significance of 
the events is also reflected in the events’ risk sig-
nificance, which has remained low and continued 
to slightly decrease over the years. The accident 
risk to the Loviisa nuclear power plant (the core 
damage frequency), which describes the technical 
safety and reliability of the plant, has continued to 
decrease over the last ten years at both plant units, 
and new risk factors, discovered as the scope of 
the PRA has been extended, have been efficiently 
eliminated. Fire safety at the Loviisa nuclear pow-
er plant remained at the good level of the previous 
years – there were no events classified as fires in 
2017. The number of fire detection system faults 
has remained at the same level for the past ten 
years.
Structural integrity
The structural integrity of the fuel, the primary 
circuit and the containment has remained good at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant.
There was no leaking fuel in the reactors of the 
Loviisa plant units in 2017, which is why the maxi-
mum iodine (I-131) activity value of the primary 
coolant was also low. The indicators describing fuel 
integrity have remained at a good and stable level 
in 2014–2017.
Among other things, the condition of primary 
and secondary circuits is monitored using chemis-
try indicators. The small number of leaks and all of 
the chemistry indicators demonstrate that the in-
tegrity of the primary circuits of the Loviisa plant 
units was good in 2017.
Integrity of the containment remained at a 
good level at both of the Loviisa plant units. Total 
leakage through containment penetrations and 
isolation valves remained low, clearly below the set 
limits, in 2017 as in the previous years.
Summary of indicator results for 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Operation and maintenance
Ageing management and maintenance at the Olki-
luoto nuclear power plant have been functional 
and the development measures taken in the past 
few years have been successful, which is clearly 
indicated by the fact that the number of faults 
has remained low since 2012. Preventive mainte-
nance has ensured good operability. The inoper-
ability times for OLC components were also short. 
Although the number of fault repairs has slightly 
increased, the number of immediate faults lead-
ing to inoperability has decreased at both units. 
Detection and anticipation of faults have been con-
tinuously improved in the maintenance operations 
of Olkiluoto nuclear power plant and components 
have been replaced, which is why there have been 
no faults that have a major impact on the safe 
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operation of the plant units. The number of preven-
tive maintenance actions performed has increased, 
with the result that the ratio of preventive main-
tenance to fault repairs has remained unchanged. 
The average repair times of faults causing inoper-
ability of components subject to the OLC have also 
remained short. This positive development is also 
reflected in the good availability of safety systems 
(the containment spray system, the auxiliary feed-
water system and the emergency diesel genera-
tors).
There was one common-cause failure important 
to safety: jamming of the control rod actuators due 
to an installation error. During the unscheduled 
refuelling outage of Olkiluoto 1 in autumn 2017, 
one jammed control rod actuator was repaired and 
three others serviced for safety reasons. One of 
the three had the same installation error as the 
jammed rod. The common-cause failure could have 
prevented pushing the control rods into the reac-
tor by screwing, but the hydraulic scram function 
would nevertheless have operated.
In 2017, Olkiluoto power plant had six events 
during which the plant was non-compliant with the 
OLC, which was more than on average. However, 
they these isolated events and their safety signifi-
cance was low. The most important events in 2017 
are described in Appendix 3.
The main purpose of the OLC exemption pro-
cedure is to verify that the safety level specified in 
the OLC is achieved during modifications, more ex-
tensive maintenance or fault repairs. In 2017, more 
applications (11) than average were submitted due 
to the large number of plant modifications. Two of 
the applications concerned test arrangements dur-
ing the ramp-up of Olkiluoto after the unscheduled 
refuelling outage and in the VLJ repository.
Radiation safety at the Olkiluoto plant has been 
good and is being developed in a determined man-
ner. The employees’ radiation doses were low due 
to improvements in radiation safety and were well 
below the individual dose limits and the collective 
occupational dose limit. In 2017, the average of the 
ten largest doses was at the previous years’ level 
and lower than in 2016. In 2017, radioactive releas-
es into the air from the Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power 
plant unit were of the same magnitude as in the 
previous years. Due to the fuel leaks at Olkiluoto 1 
in 2016 and 2017, the noble gas and iodine releases 
from Olkiluoto were higher than in previous years. 
A minor release also took place at Olkiluoto in May 
2017 from the turbine island facilities. However, 
the release consisted of short-lived nuclides which 
decay before spreading into the environment, and 
hence there was no impact on the radiation safety 
of the surrounding environment. Releases into the 
environment remained clearly below the limits set 
at both plant units. In 2017, the radiation doses in 
the surroundings of Olkiluoto were very low, and 
were less than 1% of the 100 mSv limit set in the 
Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988).
Operational events
No events important to safety occurred at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant in 2017. The number 
of reported events remained the same or decreased 
slightly. The number of simultaneous safety sig-
nificant events (INES 1 or higher) has decreased in 
the short and long term, which indicates a positive 
development trend. Of the major events submitted 
for approval in 2017, most were single events or 
events of low safety significance where the plant 
was non-compliant with the OLC.
This is also reflected in the risk significance of 
the events which has remained low all the time. 
The accident risk level of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant, which describes technical safety and 
reliability of the plant, has continued to decrease in 
the long run at both plant units, and new risk fac-
tors, discovered as the scope of the PRA has been 
extended, have been systematically eliminated. At 
the end of 2017, the core damage frequency of both 
Olkiluoto units was of the same order as in 2016.
Fire safety at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
has remained at the same good level as in previ-
ous years – no events classified as fires occurred 
in 2017 and the number of fire detection system 
faults has remained at the same very low level for 
the past ten years.
Structural integrity
The structural integrity of the primary circuit 
and the containment has remained good at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. One leaking fuel as-
sembly was detected and removed from Olkiluoto 
1 in 2017. STUK is also monitoring the maximum 
activity of primary coolant (I-131). The low con-
centration indicates the absence of any leaks. The 
activity levels of primary coolant due to the pres-
ence of I-131 were elevated at Olkiluoto 1 due to 
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a fuel leak. The activity level corresponds to that 
measured at Olkiluoto 1 in 2016 when six leaking 
fuel assemblies were removed from the reactor. The 
fuel leaks are discussed in Appendix.
Condition of the primary and secondary cir-
cuits is monitored with the chemistry indicators, 
in particular. The small number of leaks and the 
chemistry indicators show that the integrity of the 
primary circuits of the Olkiluoto plant units was 
good in 2017.
Integrity of the containment has remained good 
at both plant units. STUK monitors leak test re-
sults of the outer isolation valves, total leakage 
and as-found leakages from containment penetra-
tions and airlocks. The number of leaks has re-
mained steady and were clearly below the set lim-
its at both plant units. The total found leakage rate 
of containment penetrations and airlocks increased 
slightly from the previous years’ level, particularly 
at Olkiluoto 2, but was still very small compared to 
the permissible values.
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Safety performance indicators
A.I Operation and maintenance
A.I.1 Faults and repairing them
A.I.1a Faults in components subject to the OLC
Definition
The number of faults causing the unavailability of 
components during load operation defined in the 
operational limits and conditions (OLC) is moni-
tored as an indicator. The faults are divided by 
plant unit into two groups: faults causing an im-
mediate operation restriction and faults causing 
an operation restriction in connection with repair 
work.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the work order systems 
and the operational documents of NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to assess nuclear power plant 
lifecycle management and development of the con-
dition of components.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The total number of faults causing an operation 
restriction of components subject to the OLC in 
2017 was 175. The average number of faults during 
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Number of failures of OLC components causing unavailability 
during power operation, Loviisa NPP
the four previous years was 179, which means that 
there was no increase in the number of faults in 
2017 or in the fault trend.
The number of faults per year remained stable. 
Any variation therein has been caused by the ran-
dom occurrence of faults that occurs in any large 
number of components. Fault detection and antici-
pation have been continuously improved in plant 
maintenance operations at Loviisa, and compo-
nents have been replaced. Due to these measures, 
the management of component availability has 
been successful.
Based on the above, it can be stated that the in-
dicator or the underlying fault data does not show 
any significant negative effects associated with the 
ageing of the facilities, which is an indication of 
well-functioning component lifecycle management 
and component maintenance.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The number of failures occurring during power 
operation and leading to the lack of availability of 
components subject to operational limits and condi-
tions has decreased during the period 2012–2016. 
In 2012, the number of faults was nearly double 
the number of faults in 2009. In 2012, the number 
of faults decreased back to the level of 2010, and 
the number of faults did not change in 2013 or 
2014. According to this indicator, the year 2016 was 
similar to the years 2014 and 2015. The number 
of defects increased slightly in 2017. The increase 
was very moderate, and the number of faults was 
practically the same as in 2015. 
The indicator shows that maintenance of the 
plants has been successful. 
Occurrences of the “immediate operation re-
striction on detection of fault” indicator decreased 
considerably in 2016. The considerable decrease 
was because most of the faults in the systems sub-
ject to the OLC were in components whose failure 
did not cause an immediate operation restriction. 
In 2017, the total at both plants was zero. 
Most of the times of inoperability for OLC com-
ponents at OL1 during all four quarters of 2017 
were brief. An exception was one of the control rods 
of the plant’s reactor which failed in a periodic test 
on 29 December 2016 and was moved to its inner 
position as a control rod group in compliance with 
the instructions. A second failure in the same com-
ponent group occurred on 28 June 2017. In this 
case, the control rod group including the failed rod 
was also moved to its inner position, and no opera-
tion restriction was caused.
At OL2, most of the inoperability times of OLC 
components were brief in 2017. The longest inoper-
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
 54 64 28 36 29 17 31
 57 56 35 20 29 26 30
 111 120 63 56 58 43 61
OL1
OL2
OL1,2
Number of failures of OLC components causing unavailability 
during power operation, Olkiluoto NPP
ability times concerned radiation measurement 
systems and their measurement results. They did 
not cause operation restrictions either, because 
these measurements are duplicated. The other 
fault reports did not concern any particular sys-
tem.
Due to the above reasons, the operating re-
strictions on components have slightly increased 
from 2016, although one must bear in mind that 
immediate operation restrictions on the detection 
of a fault have at the same time considerably de-
creased.
A.I.1b Maintenance of components 
subject to the OLC
Definition
The indicator is used to follow the number of fault 
repairs and preventive maintenance work orders 
for components subject to the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC) by plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the nuclear power plant 
work order systems, from which all preventive 
maintenance operations and fault repairs are re-
trieved.
Purpose
The indicator describes the volumes of fault repairs 
and preventive maintenance, and illustrates the 
condition of the nuclear power plant and its main-
tenance strategy. The indicator is used to assess the 
maintenance strategy implemented at the NPP.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
When considering the annual variation in the vol-
ume of fault repairs and particularly in the num-
ber of preventive maintenance jobs, the scheduling 
of various annual outages (refuelling outage, short 
annual outage, four-year annual outage, eight-year 
annual outage) included in the maintenance strat-
egy of the Loviisa NPP during a four-year cycle 
should be considered, as it can have a significant 
impact on the annual figures. In 2017, a short an-
nual outage (a refuelling outage) was implemented 
at LO1 and LO2.
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According to the data on which the indicator is 
based, the year 2017 showed no major deviation from 
the average numbers of fault repairs and preventive 
maintenance volumes of the four previous years.
In 2017, the number of maintenance tasks on 
components subject to OLC was 3% lower than the 
average. The volume of preventive maintenance 
was 8% lower and the number of fault repairs 
19% higher than the average. The number of fault 
repairs includes the repair of faults and repairs 
of components that are still operable. The indica-
tor’s increase was due to the increased number 
of the latter. The number of immediate faults has 
remained unchanged.
The ratio of preventive maintenance to fault re-
pairs was 4.4. The ratio is 36% lower than 6.0, the 
average of the four previous years, which means 
that the share of preventive maintenance of all 
maintenance work has continued to decrease from 
the previous years’ level.
However, the large share of preventive mainte-
nance operations reflects the selected maintenance 
strategy, the purpose of which is to keep the number 
of faults and the effects of faults at a tolerable level.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
In 2017, the number of fault repairs that led to 
component inoperability increased slightly from 
the 2016 level and was at the 2015 level. The num-
ber of preventive maintenance operations slightly 
increased, keeping the ratio of preventive mainte-
nance to fault repairs unchanged, as there was a 
slight increase in both. 
The number of preventive maintenance op-
erations increased at OL2. The number of faults 
repaired at OL2 remained at the same level as in 
2015 and the relative number of preventive main-
tenance tasks also increased more than at OL1, 
which is why the maintenance ratio increased to 
1.09 at OL1 and to 1.56 at OL2. These are close to 
the 2013 values.
Based on the development of the ratio of pre-
ventive maintenance work to fault repairs and an 
assessment of the work on which the figures are 
based, the maintenance strategy can be considered 
successful.
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A.I.1c Repair times of components 
subject to the OLC
Definition
As an indicator, the average repair time of faults 
causing the unavailability of components defined 
in the operational limits and conditions (OLC) is 
monitored. For each repair, the time recorded is 
the time of inoperability. In the case of a fault that 
causes an immediate operation restriction, it is cal-
culated from the detection of the fault to the end of 
the repair work. If the component is operable until 
the beginning of repairs, only the time it takes to 
complete the repairs is taken into account.
Source of data
The data is obtained from the nuclear power 
plants’ work order systems as well as maintenance 
and operation documentation.
Purpose
The indicator shows how quickly failed components 
subject to the OLC are repaired when compared to 
the repair time allowed in the OLC. The indicator 
is used to assess the strategy, resources and effec-
tiveness of NPP maintenance.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
The OLC define the maximum allowed repair times 
for components based on the components’ safety 
significance. The times vary from four hours to 21 
days. Furthermore, faults in OLC components are 
to be repaired within the allotted time without 
undue delay.
Due to the small amount of work requiring op-
eration restrictions and the varying allowed repair 
times, an individual repair operation may have a sig-
nificant effect on the indicator, even if it is completed 
within the allotted time. This aspect of the indicator 
is taken into account in the interpretation of the in-
dicator by evaluating the significance of individual 
long-term fault repairs in terms of maintenance 
strategy, resources and efficiency of operations.
The average repair times of faults causing 
unavailability of components have remained stable 
at the Loviisa NPP for several years. In 2017, the 
average repair time in the plant units was ap-
proximately 19 hours, while the average of the four 
previous years was approximately 18 hours. The 
higher figure for Loviisa 2 in 2017 is explained by 
a few individual repair operations, the longest one 
being the 360-hour repair operation of the air con-
ditioning damper of SAM diesel 21EY05.
Based on the 2017 indicators and the underly-
ing data, the plant’s maintenance operations can 
be considered appropriate. Despite the positive 
development in repair times, attention still needs 
to be paid to ensuring the necessary resources are 
available for fault repairs, and for carrying out the 
repairs without unnecessary delays.
Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The indicator is used to monitor the repair times 
of components subject to the operational limits and 
conditions (OLC). The repair time allowed in the 
OLC is usually 30 days for faults concerning one 
subsystem and three days for faults concerning 
two subsystems. Depending on the system and the 
component, other allowed repair times may also be 
defined in the OLC.
In the long term, the average repair time has 
varied between six to ten hours. 
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In 2015, the average repair time of faults caus-
ing inoperability of components subject to the OLC 
at OL1 and OL2 was around 7 h. At both plant 
units, the average repair time for faults leading 
to component inoperability subject to OLC was 
lower in 2016 than in the previous year, and at 
OL2 it was exceptionally low. This was due to the 
low number of faults and that no long-term faults 
occurred.
In 2017, the values of this indicator returned 
to earlier years’ level, i.e. 7 h for OL1 and 6.8 h for 
OL2.
On the basis of the 2017 indicators and the un-
derlying data, the NPP’s maintenance operations 
were appropriate.
A.I.2 Exemptions and deviations from the OLC
Definition
As indicators, the number of non-conformances 
with the operational limits and conditions (OLC), 
as well as the number of exemptions granted by 
STUK, are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is collected from applications 
for exemption by the power companies and from 
event reports.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the power compa-
nies’ activities in accordance with the operational 
limits and conditions: compliance with the OLC 
and identified situations during which it is neces-
sary to deviate from the OLC; conclusions regard-
ing the appropriateness of the OLC can also be 
made based on this data.
Interpretation of the indicator
The main purpose of the OLC exemption procedure 
is to enable modifications and maintenance that 
will improve safety and plant availability.
Non-conformance with the OLC refers to a situ-
ation where the NPP or a system or component of 
the NPP is not in a safe state as required by the 
operational limits and conditions. The objective is 
to have zero non-conformance events at the NPPs. 
The licensee must always prepare a special report 
on each non-conformance and any corrective meas-
ures, and submit it to STUK for approval.
Loviisa
Exemptions
Based on the last ten years (2007-2016), the Loviisa 
NPP applies for STUK’s approval for exemptions 
from the OLC six times per year on average. The 
number of applications in 2017 (six applications) 
was in line with the average. All six applications 
were related to modifications. As the planned de-
viations had no significant safety implications, 
STUK approved the applications.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2017, five events during which the plant did not 
comply with the OLC without an advance safety 
analysis and approval were detected at the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant. Such events have occurred 
on average four times a year in the past ten years 
(2007–2016).
Loviisa NPP analyses all non-conformances 
with the OLC within a month of detection. The 
analysis includes finding out the underlying caus-
es, assessing the safety significance of the event 
and determining corrective measures to prevent 
reoccurrence of the non-conformances. The results 
of the analysis are documented in a special report 
(indicator A.II.1). One key issue is identifying the 
possibility of reoccurrence, i.e. studying whether a 
similar event has occurred in the past and whether 
the corrective measures implemented at the time 
were sufficient. One issue in common to several of 
the events in 2012-2017 was non-compliance with 
the OLC during the changing of a plant unit’s op-
erating mode, i.e. either when switching the unit 
from load operation to shutdown or from shutdown 
to load operation. The shutdown or start-up of a 
plant unit is implemented in stages. Before mov-
ing on to the next stage, it must be verified that all 
the requirements for the next stage have been met. 
0
2
4
6
8
10
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
 5 6 7 4 5 9 6 6 8 6
 2 5 0 2 7 5 6 4 4 5
Number of deviations from the OLC, Loviisa NPP
 Exemptions
Deviations
52
STUK-B 225 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for npp’S in 2017 APPENDIX 2
One must make sure that there are no defects that 
could lead to an inadvertent deviation in people’s 
knowledge of the OLC, procedures related to com-
pliance with the OLC or the formatting of the OLC 
themselves.
Olkiluoto
Based on data from the last ten years (2008-2017), 
the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant applies for 
STUK’s approval for exemptions from the OLC 
seven times per year on average. Hence, the num-
ber of applications in 2017 (11) was above average. 
Most of the applications concerned modifications. 
For example, the construction work of the founda-
tion of the pump in the new high-pressure safety 
injection system required an exemption from the 
OLC at both plant units. In the unscheduled refu-
elling outage of OL1, an exemption from carrying 
out a criticality test after refuelling was applied 
for. Sufficient subcriticality was demonstrated by 
computational means instead of a test. Validity of 
the exemption granted for the gas generation test 
in the VLJ repository was extended. STUK ap-
proved all exemptions applied for.
Non-conformance with the OLC
In 2017, Olkiluoto had six events during which the 
plant was non-compliant with the OLC without an 
advance safety analysis or STUK’s permission. Two 
of the situations non-compliant with the OLC were 
related to fuel pool gates when the associated ad-
ministrative requirements deviated at both plant 
units. At OL1, the fuel pool gate was tied open with 
a rope during the annual outage, and at OL2, the 
fuel pool gate was left open during a load operation 
after the transfers of sample pieces. During annual 
maintenance at OL1, the relief train was insuffi-
ciently tested. During annual maintenance at OL2, 
the door of the auxiliary building was left open in 
breach of the OLC. At OL2, the root valve of the 
auxiliary feedwater system was incorrectly closed 
in connection with maintenance work, causing an 
incorrect reading in the flow rate measurements. 
At OL1, the replacement power supply was not 
switched on within the required time in connection 
with a malfunction in the battery-backed power 
supply. The events in breach of the OLC did not 
compromise plant safety, and TVO has analysed 
the events.
The average number of events for the past ten 
years is three events non-compliant with the OLC 
per year.
A.I.3 Unavailability of safety systems
Definition
As the indicators, the unavailability of safety sys-
tems is monitored separately for each plant unit. 
The systems monitored at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant are the containment spray system 
(322), the auxiliary feedwater system (327) and 
the emergency diesel generators (651–656). Those 
followed at the Loviisa nuclear power plant are the 
high-pressure safety injection system (TJ), emer-
gency feedwater system (RL92/93, RL94/97) and 
the emergency diesel generators (EY).
Essentially, the ratio of a system’s unavailabil-
ity hours and its required availability hours is used 
as the indicator. Unavailability hours are the com-
bined unavailability of redundant trains divided by 
the number of trains.
Annual plant criticality hours are the availabil-
ity requirement for the systems 322, 327, TJ and 
RL. For diesel generators, the requirement is con-
tinuous, i.e. equal to the annual operating hours.
The unavailability hours of a subsystem include 
the time required for the planned maintenance of 
components and unavailability due to faults. The 
latter includes, in addition to the time spent on 
repairs, the estimated unavailability time prior 
to fault detection. If a fault is estimated to have 
occurred in a previous successful test but to have 
escaped detection, the time between inservice tests 
is added to the unavailability time. If a fault has 
occurred between tests but its date of occurrence is 
unknown, half of the time that has lapsed between 
tests will be added to the unavailability time. If the 
fault clearly occurred during an operational, main-
tenance, testing or other event, the time between 
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the event and the defection of the fault is added to 
the unavailability time.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensee’s representatives submit 
the necessary data to the relevant responsible per-
son at STUK.
Purpose
The indicator indicates the unavailability of safety 
systems. The indicator is used to track the condi-
tion of safety systems and any identifiable trends.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
TJ system
Analysis of the unavailability figures for the high-
pressure safety injection systems of the plant units 
in 2017 and their background information shows 
that no faults leading unavailability occurred at 
Loviisa 1 and two faults, which caused the system 
to be unavailable for 13 hours due to repairs, oc-
curred at Loviisa 2. In other words, their condition 
and availability were good.
RL system
In Loviisa 1, the total unavailability time of the 
emergency feedwater systems was 199 hours in 
2017, of which 97 hours were spent for fault re-
pairs during load operations. The rest of the una-
vailability time (102 hours) was caused by periodic 
maintenance of a diesel generator for the emer-
gency feedwater system RL-94 during the annual 
outage of Loviisa 1, which is done every four years.
The total unavailability time for the emergency 
feedwater systems at Loviisa 2 was 91 hours in 
2017. There was no unavailability during load 
operation. The whole period of unavailability was 
caused by the periodic maintenance of a diesel gen-
erator for the RL-97 emergency feedwater system 
during the annual outage of Loviisa 2, which is 
done every four years.
The unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater 
systems was low in 2017, i.e. their condition and 
availability were good.
EY system
In 2017, the unavailability time of the eight emer-
gency diesel generators was a total of 262 hours.
In 2017, there were a total of 21 emergency 
diesel generator events leading to unavailability 
(10 events in 2016). Of these faults, nine caused an 
immediate operation restriction and 12 led to an 
operation restriction starting at the beginning of 
the repair work.
Most of the repairs (12) were due to leaks in the 
engines’ air, fuel and cooling/mantle water pipe-
lines. The plant will replace cooling/mantle water 
pipelines during future annual outages.
The unavailability rate for the emergency die-
sel generators in 2017 was 0.37% and is almost of 
the same level as the value for the previous year 
(2016), which was 0.29%, i.e. the availability level 
was good.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
The unavailability rate for the containment spray 
system and the diesels has remained at a good 
level in recent years. The unavailability rate of the 
auxiliary feedwater system in 2016 and 2017 was 
also stable and remained at a relatively low level.
The unavailability rate of the containment 
spray system was good in 2008–2017, with either 
zero or almost zero throughout the period.
The unavailability rate of the auxiliary feed-
water system has varied over the years. There 
were no significant faults in 2008 or 2009, and 
the unavailability of the auxiliary feedwater sys-
tem decreased to zero in 2009 at both plant units. 
In 2010, unavailability of OL1 was still zero but 
unavailability of OL2 slightly increased from the 
previous year, mainly as a result of several new 
faults discovered during the annual outage. In 
2011, the figure for OL1 was multiplied from the 
previous years as the result of a hidden fault in one 
auxiliary feedwater system valve that remained 
inoperable for 504 hours; In 2013, the unavail-
ability rate for the auxiliary feedwater system was 
restored to the level prior to 2011 and remained 
at this level until 2015. The unavailability rate 
increased somewhat at OL2 in 2016 and in 2017 at 
OL1. The higher unavailability rate in 2017 at OL1 
was caused by a latent fault in valve 327V102. The 
fault was detected in April.
The unavailability rate of diesels varied from 
one year to the next during the period under re-
view, but has been low in recent years. In 2008, the 
unavailability rate of diesels increased by almost 
95% compared to the previous year. The increase 
was due to hidden faults in the compressed air mo-
tors of the diesels at both plant units. In 2009, the 
unavailability of the diesel generators decreased 
considerably from the 2008 figures. In 2010, una-
vailability increased somewhat from the previous 
year as a result of faults occurring in connection 
with in-service testing. At OL1, the stator winding 
of a diesel generator failed in connection with an 
in-service test in August 2010, and the generator 
was replaced with an overhauled unit. In 2011, the 
unavailability of the emergency diesel generators 
was more than four times higher than in 2010, the 
highest figure ever recorded during the time this 
parameter has been monitored. The reason for the 
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increase was the above-mentioned diesel genera-
tor fault, which may have lasted as long as from 
August 2010 to May 2011. In addition, there were 
faults in exhaust manifolds and exhaust pipes 
in 2011. In 2012, the unavailability of the diesel 
generators was zero. The unavailability of the die-
sel generators slightly increased in 2014 but still 
remained very low. The unavailability increased 
again to 0.96 in 2015. The unavailability of the 
diesel generators in both units was zero in 2016 
and 2017. due to preventive maintenance and im-
provements that were successfully realised during 
planned maintenance outages.
STUK-B 225
55
APPENDIX 2 STUK’S SafeTy performance indicaTorS for npp’S in 2017
A.I.4 Radiation exposure
Definition
As the indicators, collective radiation exposure of 
nuclear power plant employees by plant site and 
the annual average of the ten highest occupational 
doses are monitored.
Source of data
The data on collective radiation exposure is re-
ceived from the quarterly and annual reports of the 
nuclear power plants as well as the national dose 
registry. The data on individual radiation doses is 
obtained from the national dose registry.
Purpose
The indicators are used to control the radiation 
exposure of employees. The collective occupational 
doses describe the success of the nuclear power 
plant’s ALARA programme. The average of the ten 
highest doses indicates how close to the 20 manSv 
dose limit the individual occupational doses at the 
nuclear power plants are. It also indicates effec-
tiveness of the nuclear power plant’s radiation pro-
tection unit.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and the 
amount of work having significance on radiation 
protection affect the annual radiation doses. Both 
Loviisa plant units have more extensive annual 
outages every four and eight years (the four-year 
annual outage and the eight-year annual outage) 
so that both plant units never have a major annual 
outage during the same year. The four-year and 
eight-year outages have been arranged in even-
numbered years and normal annual outages in 
odd-numbered years. In 2017, there was a short 
annual outage at both plant units. The effect of 
annual outages on collective occupational doses 
can be seen in the graph Collective occupational 
dose, Loviisa. Thanks to improvements in radiation 
safety, the employees’ radiation doses were very 
low in 2017 – the lowest ever measured at LO1 – 
and remained well below the individual dose limits 
and the collective occupational dose limit.
In 2017, the average of ten largest doses was 
also record-low. The Radiation Decree (1512/1991) 
stipulates that the effective dose for a worker from 
radiation work may not exceed the 20 manSv/year 
average over any period of five years, or 50 manSv 
during any one year.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Olkiluoto
Most doses are incurred through work done during 
outages. Thus, the duration of the outage and the 
amount of work having significance on radiation 
protection affect the annual radiation doses. The 
annual outages of the Olkiluoto plant units are di-
vided into two groups: refuelling outages and main-
tenance outages. The refuelling outage is shorter 
in duration (approximately 7 days). The length of 
the maintenance outage depends on the amount of 
work (2–3 weeks). Annual outages are scheduled so 
that in the same year, one plant unit undergoes a 
maintenance outage and the other a refuelling out-
age. In 2017, a refuelling outage took place at OL1, 
while a maintenance outage of record-breaking du-
ration and extent took place at OL2.
The radiation doses have clearly decreased 
after the installation of new moisture separators 
in 2005–2007. The radiation level in the turbine 
buildings has continued to decrease after the in-
stallation of the moisture separators, and this has 
also decreased the collective occupational dose. 
Furthermore, improvements aiming at reducing 
the employees’ radiation doses have been made in 
the radiation protection of the plant. In 2017, the 
collective occupational dose of employees was 0.22 
manSv at OL1 and 0.73 manSv at OL2. The annual 
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effective dose from radiation work for a worker 
may not exceed 100 mSv during a period of five 
years (on average 20 mSv per year) and a maxi-
mum of 50 mSv during any single year. The actual 
radiation doses remained clearly below the limits 
prescribed in the Radiation decree (1512/1991).
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A.I.5 Releases
Definition
As the indicators, radioactive releases into water-
ways and the air from the nuclear power plants are 
monitored, together with the calculated dose due 
to releases to the most exposed individual in the 
vicinity of the nuclear power plant.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies’ quarterly and annual reports. From 
this data, the calculated radiation dose for the 
most exposed individual in the vicinity of the plant 
is determined.
Purpose
The indicator is used to monitor the amount and 
trend of radioactive releases and assess factors 
having a bearing on any changes in them.
A.I.5a Releases into the air
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
In 2017, radioactive releases into the air from the 
Loviisa nuclear power plant were of the same mag-
nitude as in the previous years.
No fuel leaks were detected at Loviisa in 2017. 
Aerosol nuclides (including activated corrosion 
products) are released during maintenance work.
Noble gas releases to the atmosphere (Bq 87Kreq),
Loviisa NPP
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Olkiluoto
In 2017, radioactive releases into the air from the 
Olkiluoto 2 nuclear power plant unit were of the 
same magnitude as in the previous years. The re-
leases remained clearly below the limits set. A fuel 
leakage was detected at Olkiluoto 1 in the sum-
mer, and one leaking fuel assembly was removed 
from the reactor during an unscheduled outage 
in October. As a result of the fuel leakage, there 
were larger releases of fission products. The re-
leases remained clearly below the limits set also 
at Olkiluoto 1, however. In May, a release from the 
turbine building occurred at Olkiluoto. It caused a 
short-term noble gas and aerosol nuclide release 
past the delay systems directly into the vent stack. 
The event increased the aerosol nuclide release 
level in particular, but the impact of the short-lived 
nuclides on radiation safety is minimal as they 
will decay into stable elements in the immediate 
vicinity of the vent stack. The level of longer-lived 
aerosol nuclides during the release at Olkiluoto re-
mained at the same level as in the previous years.
Gaseous fission products, noble gases and io-
dine isotopes originate from leaking fuel rods, from 
the minute amounts of uranium left on the outer 
surfaces of fuel cladding during fuel fabrication 
and from reactor surface contamination due to ear-
lier fuel leaks. Due to the fuel leaks at Olkiluoto 1 
in 2016 and 2017, the noble gas and iodine releases 
from Olkiluoto were clearly higher than in previ-
ous years.
A.I.5b Releases into the sea
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Releases of radioactive substances emitting gamma 
radiation into the environment from the Loviisa 
nuclear power plant remained clearly below the set 
limits. In 2009, 2013 and 2017, the Loviisa power 
plant released low-activity evaporation bottom into 
the sea as planned. Consequently, the releases of 
substances with gamma activity were larger than 
the average in those years.
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Olkiluoto
Releases of radioactive substances emitting gamma 
radiation into the environment from the Olkiluoto 
nuclear power plant remained clearly below the 
set limits. The releases of substances with gamma 
activity into the sea from Olkiluoto have decreased 
in the long term.
A.I.5c Population exposure
Interpretation of the indicator
Assessment of the radiation dose of the most ex-
posed individual in the vicinity of a nuclear power 
plant is based on information about the plant’s re-
leases and meteorological measurements. The ex-
posure routes that are taken into account include 
external radiation and internal radiation, i.e. ra-
diation caused by radioactive materials ending up 
inside the body via air or food. The estimated doses 
given here are lower than the values reported by 
the plants due to, for instance, the different model-
ling system of the dose caused by the nuclide C-14. 
Loviisa
The radiation dose of the most exposed individual 
in the vicinity of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
assessed by means of calculations in 2017 was at 
the same level of 2013 due to the release of evapo-
ration residue, but still less than 1% of the 100 mSv 
limit set in the Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988).
Olkiluoto
In 2017, the radiation dose in the vicinity of 
Olkiluoto was very small in spite of a fuel leak, and 
was less than 1% of the 100 mSv limit set in the 
Nuclear Energy Decree (161/1988).
Gamma activity of the liquid effluents (Bq), 
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A.II Operational events
A.II.1 Number of events
Definition
As the indicator, the number of operational event 
reports is monitored in compliance with Guide YVL 
A.10. Guide YVL A.10 entered into force in late 2015, 
which is why the old term “events warranting a spe-
cial report” is still used in the indicator. In addition 
to special reports and transient reports, the new op-
erational event reports include other plant events 
submitted to STUK for information. A special report 
corresponds to an operational event report submitted 
for approval in the new Guide YVL A.10.
Source of data
Data for the indicator is obtained from the STUK 
document management system (SAHA).
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the number of safe-
ty-significant events.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Based on data from the previous ten years (2006-
2016), the average number of annual events war-
ranting a special report is five per year, while the 
average number of events warranting a transient 
report is four per year. The number of events war-
ranting a special report was normal in 2017 (five 
in total), while the number of events warranting 
a transient report (six in total) was slightly above 
average. Many of the events warranting a special 
report are deviations from the operational limits 
and conditions (OLC). The development of events 
non-compliant with the OLC is considered under 
indicator A.I.2.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events by plant unit since, for 
technical reasons, the reports that concern both 
plant units have been entered for Loviisa 1 alone. 
No events warranting a special report or events 
warranting a transient report that involved both 
plant units took place in 2017, however.
Olkiluoto
No reactor trips occurred at the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant in 2017. Based on the data from the last 
ten years, an average of 0–1 reactor trips per year 
occur at the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. During 
the previous decade (1993–2001), an average of al-
most three to four reactor trips per year occurred. 
The larger number of trips is explained by the fact 
that it also includes reactor trips during annual out-
ages that occurred, for example, in connection with 
testing of the reactor protection system.
Based on data from the previous ten years 
(2008–2017), the average number of annual events 
warranting a special report is four per year, while 
the average number of events warranting a tran-
sient report is five per year. In 2017, the number 
of events warranting a special report (seven in 
total) was higher than average, while the number 
of events warranting a transient report (three in 
total) was lower than the annual average. Many 
of the events warranting a special report are de-
viations from the operational limits and conditions 
(OLC). The development of events non-compliant 
with the OLC is considered under indicator A.I.2.
Events warranting a special report in 2017 are 
described in Appendix 3.
When considering the indicators concerning 
special and transient reports, it must be noted that 
the number of reports does not give a correct idea 
of the division of events for each plant unit since, 
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for technical reasons, reports that concern both 
plant units or the interim storage facility for spent 
nuclear fuel have been entered for Olkiluoto 1 
alone. No special report concerned the interim stor-
age facility for spent nuclear fuel in 2017.
A.II.3 Risk-significance of events
Definition
As the indicator, the risk-significance of events 
caused by component unavailability is monitored. 
An increase in the conditional core damage prob-
ability (CCDP) associated with each event is used 
as the measure of a risk. CCDP takes the duration 
of each event into consideration. Events are di-
vided into three categories: 1) unavailability due to 
component failures, 2) planned unavailability and 
3) initiating events.
Unavailability caused by work for which STUK 
has granted an exemption is included in category 
2. Any non-conformances with the OLC that can be 
applied to this indicator are included in category 1. 
Non-compliances with the OLC are also dealt with 
in Chapter A.I.2.
Calculations concerning the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant have been made with FinPSA software 
and those concerning Loviisa nuclear power plant 
with RiskSpectrum software. For Loviisa, calcula-
tions of a simultaneous fault in several compo-
nents are based solely on the load operation model, 
which means that the results are not as exact as 
for single faults which have been calculated for 
all operating modes. The modelling of simultane-
ous faults across all operating modes (17 of them) 
would be possible, but the calculation time would 
be too long when compared to the benefits gained. 
This year, no simultaneous faults of several compo-
nents with the highest risk-significance occurred.
Source of data
Data for the calculation of the indicator is collected 
from the power companies’ reports and applica-
tions for exemptions.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the risk-significance 
of component unavailability and to assess risk-sig-
nificant initiating events and planned unavailabil-
ity. Special attention is paid to recurring events, 
common cause faults, simultaneously occurring 
faults and human errors. Another objective of the 
event analysis is to systematically search for any 
signs of a deteriorating organisational and safety 
culture.
Interpretation of the indicator
The combined total CCDP divided by the prob-
ability of a severe accident gives an overview of the 
risk-significance of operational events. To facilitate 
analysis, risk calculation is based on conservative 
assumptions and simplifications, which materially 
weakens the applicability of the results for trend 
monitoring. If the risk-significance remains at the 
same average level year after year, the annual fluc-
tuation does not warrant particular attention.
Loviisa
At Loviisa 1 and 2, the risk caused by operational 
activities remained at around the same level as in 
the past years in 2017. A brief description of the 
most significant events regarding risks is provided 
below.
Loviisa 1:
No events of the highest risk category.
Loviisa 2:
1. The maintenance of the start-up and shutdown 
pump system of LO1 took 126 hours during the 
annual outage of LO1. This caused a risk to 
LO2 which was in load operation, because the 
start-up and shutdown pump system of LO1 
can also be used for cooling LO2. The calculated 
CCDP was 1.7E-7.
2. Air cooling machine UV45B002 in the instru-
mentation facilities was faulty for 344 hours. 
The calculated CCDP was 1.1E-7.
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Loviisa NPP
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Olkiluoto
At OL1, in 2017 the risk caused by operational 
activities was of the same order of magnitude as 
in previous years. A brief description of the signifi-
cant events is given below.
Olkiluoto 1:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the D train took 108 h. CCDP: 1.1E-07.
2. When the auxiliary feedwater system was test-
ed, it was found that the isolation valve of train 
A failed to open. It was a latent fault. The valve 
was faulty for 507 hours. The calculated CCDP 
was 2.4E-7.
Olkiluoto 2:
1. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the B train took 110 h. CCDP: 1.0E-07
2. Preventive maintenance of a diesel generator in 
the D train took 109 h. CCDP: 1.1E-07.
A.II.4 Accident risk at nuclear power plants
Definition
As the indicator, the annual probability of an acci-
dent leading to severe damage to nuclear fuel (core 
damage frequency) is monitored. The accident risk 
is presented per plant unit.
Source of data
The data is obtained as the result of probabilis-
tic risk assessments (PRA) of the nuclear power 
plants. The PRA is based on detailed calculation 
models, which are continuously developed and 
complemented. A total of 200 man-years have been 
used at Finnish NPPs to develop the models. The 
basic PRA data includes globally collected reliabil-
ity information of components and operator ac-
tivities, as well as operating experience from the 
Finnish NPPs.
Purpose
The indicator is used to follow the development of 
the nuclear power plant’s accident risk. The objec-
tive is to operate and maintain the plant in such 
a manner that the accident risk decreases or re-
mains stable. Probabilistic risk assessments can 
assist in detecting a need to make modifications to 
the plant or revise the operating methods.
Interpretation of the indicator
When assessing the indicator, one must keep in 
mind that it is affected by both the development 
of the nuclear power plant and the development 
of the calculation model. Plant modifications and 
changes in methods, carried out to remove risk 
factors, will decrease the indicator value. An in-
crease of the indicator value may be due to the 
model being extended to new event groups, or the 
identification of new risk factors. Furthermore, de-
veloping more detailed models or obtaining more 
detailed basic data may change the risk estimates 
in either direction. For example, an increase in the 
Loviisa indicator in 2003 was due to the PRA being 
extended to cover exceptionally harsh weather con-
ditions and oil accidents at sea during a refuelling 
outage. In the following year, the indicator value 
decreased, partly as a result of a more detailed 
analysis of these factors.
Loviisa
Accident risk of the Loviisa nuclear power plant 
has continued to decrease over the last ten years, 
and new risk factors, discovered as the scope of 
the PRA has been extended, have been efficiently 
eliminated. The indicator decreased in 2007 due 
to a new service water line completed during the 
period. The new line allows for the alternative in-
take of seawater from the outlet channel to cool 
the plant when it is at a shutdown. The change 
Risk contribution of the safety system unavailability at Olkiluoto NPP
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decreased the risks in situations where algae, fra-
zil ice or an oil spill endangers the availability of 
seawater via the conventional route. A decrease of 
the indicator in 2008 and in the following years re-
sulted from more detailed assessments performed 
in conjunction with the renewal of the operating 
licence, as well as changes at the plant planned 
to be carried out earlier or in connection with the 
licence renewal. Such changes include decreasing 
the probability of a criticality accident using, for 
example, boron analysers, and decreasing the prob-
ability of an external leak. At the end of 2017, the 
core damage frequency or annual probability of 
core damage calculated with the PRA model for 
Loviisa 1 was around 1.2·10–5/year, which is around 
8% less than in 2016 (1.3·10–5/year). The core dam-
age frequency for Loviisa 2 was 1.5·10–5/year, which 
is 6% less than in 2016 (1.6·10–5/year). The differ-
ence between the plant units’ risk assessments is 
due to differences in ventilation and air condition-
ing systems that contain safety systems, for exam-
ple. The following plant modifications and changes 
in procedures reduced the risk in 2017: 1) the rest 
of the RC stations were also replaced by oil-free 
ones, which reduced the core damage risk due to 
fires by 2·10–7/a at LO1 and by 8·10–8/a at LO2; 
2) a priority system for accident management at 
both plant units; 3) the last temporary dam will be 
replaced by sluices during the 2018 annual outage, 
the building of temporary dams no longer has to be 
taken into account in the risk assessment for 2017; 
4) filling the sea water channels before raising the 
sluices reduced the risk by 8·10–8/a; 5) opening 
the steam generator -specific emergency feedwater 
valves in advance in case of high seawater levels.
Olkiluoto
The indicator for the Olkiluoto nuclear power plant 
decreased by approximately 30% in 2008 compared 
to previous years’ relatively stable values. The de-
crease was mainly due to the more detailed model-
ling of earthquake events and changes carried out 
at the plant to improve seismic qualification. The 
increase in 2009 was due to the fact that a heat ex-
changer in the screening system could not be used 
for residual heat removal after all, contrary to ear-
lier assessments. The decrease of the risk in 2010 
was due to changes in the modelling of DC systems 
672 and 679 (inclusion of battery diversity), while 
the increase in 2011 resulted from reassessment of 
fire frequencies. At Olkiluoto, the most important 
factors affecting the overall accident risk include 
internal events during power operation (compo-
nent failures and pipe ruptures leading to an op-
erational transient).
At the end of 2017, the calculated core damage 
frequency for OL1 was 0.64·10–5/year, i.e. more or 
less the same as in 2016. At the end of 2017, the 
calculated core damage frequency for OL2 was 
1.1·10–5/year, i.e. also more or less the same as 
at the end of the previous year. The addition of 
planned isolations to the PRA models has caused 
a slight change in the core damage frequencies. 
The difference between the plant units is mainly 
caused by the fact that OL1 underwent modifica-
tions in 2014 that ensured operability of the aux-
iliary feedwater system, which is used to cool the 
reactor in case seawater cooling is lost because of 
a blockage at the seawater intake or due to com-
ponent failures. Such modifications have not been 
implemented at OL2 yet.
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A.II.5 Number of fire alarms
Definition
As indicators, the number of fire alarms and actual 
fires are monitored.
Source of data
Data for the indicators is collected from the power 
companies. The licensees submit the data needed 
for the indicator to the person responsible for the 
indicator at STUK.
Purpose
The indicators are used to follow the effectiveness 
of fire protection at the nuclear power plants.
Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
No events classified as fires occurred in the Loviisa 
plant area in 2017. There was one extinguishing 
operation outside the plant area, when the tracks 
of a forest machine created a small fire in the 
timber felling area by the Atomitie road approxi-
mately 500 metres from the gatehouse towards the 
town. Initial extinguishing had been carried out 
when the plant’s fire brigade arrived and ensured 
the fire was extinguished by watering the terrain. 
The number of fire detection system faults and the 
number of actual alarms made by fire detectors at 
the Loviisa nuclear power plant have remained 
stable for the past ten years. Alarms from the fire 
detection system have also remained at a relatively 
low level. Most of the alarms were caused by dust, 
smoke or humidity. Advance alarms issued by the 
fire detection system are no longer included in 
these statistics.
The average fire safety of the Loviisa nuclear 
power plant has remained at around the same lev-
el. There have been four events classified as fires 
at the Loviisa plant site in the past ten years. The 
number of alarms from the fire detection system is 
affected by the amount of maintenance and repair 
work performed at the nuclear power plants. Fire 
detection systems are not always disconnected in a 
wide enough area during maintenance work.
Olkiluoto
No events classified as fires occurred at the Olki-
luoto nuclear power plant area (OL1/OL2) in 2017. 
Two small fires occurred outside the plant area. A 
fire ignited in a woodworking shop in the outdoor 
area when the blade of a circular saw hit a screw 
in a plank. The plant’s fire brigade extinguished 
a fire smouldering in the sawdust hose and silo 
of the circular saw. Another small fire started at 
Posiva’s disposal facility, when a bearing in the 
track roll of an excavator overheated.  Initial extin-
guishing had been carried out when the plant’s fire 
brigade arrived and completed the extinguishing. 
No fire detection system faults were observed at 
the Olkiluoto power plant (OL1/OL2) in 2017. No 
faults were observed during the eight past years, 
either. Correct alarms of the fire detection system 
have remained at a fairly low level over the past 
ten years. This lower trend started after the year 
2007. Advance alarms issued by the fire detection 
system are no longer included in these statistics.
The average fire safety of the Olkiluoto nuclear 
power plant has remained at around the same 
level. The trend of events classified as fires in 
Olkiluoto is decreasing: the last event classified 
as a fire occurred at the plant area (OL1/OL2) 
seven years ago. The number of alarms from the 
fire detection system is affected by the amount of 
maintenance and repair work performed at the nu-
clear power plants. Fire detection systems are not 
always disconnected in a wide enough area during 
maintenance work.
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A.III Structural integrity
A.III.1 Fuel integrity
Definition
As indicators, the plant unit-specific maximum 
level and the highest maximum activity value of 
the iodine-131 activity concentration (I-131 activ-
ity concentration) in the primary coolant in steady-
state operation (startup operation or load opera-
tion for Loviisa and load operation for Olkiluoto) 
are followed. The change in activity concentration 
of I-131 in primary coolant due to depressurisation 
in conjunction with shutdowns or reactor trips and 
the number of leaking fuel assemblies removed 
from the reactor are also followed as indicators.
Source of data
The licensees submit the indicator values directly 
to the person in charge of the indicator at STUK. 
The maximum activity levels are also available 
in the quarterly reports submitted by the power 
companies.
Purpose
The indicators describe fuel integrity and the fuel 
leakage volume during the fuel cycle. The indica-
tors for shutdown situations also describe the suc-
cess of the shutdown in terms of radiation protec-
tion.
A.III.1a Primary circuit activity
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reac-
tors of LO1 or LO2 in 2017. The last time a leaking 
fuel assembly was removed from the LO1 reactor 
was in 2010, and the last time a leaking fuel as-
sembly was removed from LO 2 was during the an-
nual outage of 2013. As a result of these measures, 
the maximum activity (I-131) of the primary cool-
ant has remained low. The indicators describing 
fuel integrity have remained at a good and stable 
level in 2014-2017.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
One fuel assembly was removed from the OL1 re-
actor in 2017, and the primary coolant activity 
level caused by iodine-131 at Olkiluoto 1 was el-
evated. Leaking fuel assemblies were last detected 
at Olkiluoto 1 in 2016. In 2017, the primary coolant 
activity caused by I-131 was at the same level as 
in 2016.
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A.III.1b Number of leaking fuel assemblies
All leaking fuel assemblies are removed during an-
nual outages. Both licensees use an external party 
when identifying leaking assemblies. This means 
that a subcontractor handles the actual equipment 
and provides the operators, but the plant’s own 
radiochemistry laboratory analyses the water sam-
ples from the reactor. The leaking fuel assembly is 
identified based on the analysis results.
Interpretation of indicators (Loviisa)
There were no leaking fuel assemblies in the reac-
tors of LO1 or LO2 during the period under review.
Interpretation of indicators (Olkiluoto)
There was one leaking fuel assembly in the reac-
tor of OL1 in 2017. The leaking fuel was removed 
from the reactor during a cold outage in October. 
The damage is thought to have been caused by 
a foreign particle. The chemical target limits of 
were momentarily exceeded due to the leaking 
fuel. There was no leaking fuel in the reactor of 
OL2 in 2017. The fuel leak of OL1 is discussed in 
Appendix 3 to this report.
A.III.3 Containment integrity
Definition
As indicators, the following parameters are moni-
tored:
•	 Total	as-found	leakage	of	outer	isolation	valves	
following the first integrity tests compared with 
the maximum allowed total leakage from the 
outer isolation valves.
•	 Percentage	of	isolation	valves	tested	during	the	
year in question at each plant unit that passed 
the leak test at the first attempt (i.e. as-found 
leakage smaller than the acceptance criteria of 
the valve and no consecutive exceeding of the 
attention criteria of a valve without repair).
•	 Combined	as-found	leakage	rate	of	containment	
penetrations and airlocks in relation to their 
maximum allowed total leakage. The combined 
leakage rate at Olkiluoto includes leaks from 
personnel airlocks, the maintenance dome and 
the containment dome. At Loviisa, the combined 
leakage rate comprises the leak test results from 
personnel airlocks, the material airlock, cable 
penetrations of inspection equipment, contain-
ment maintenance ventilation systems (TL23), 
main steam piping (RA) and feedwater system 
(RL) penetrations; seals of blind-flanged penetra-
tions in ice-filling pipes are also included.
Source of data
Data is obtained from the power companies’ leak-
tightness test reports that are submitted by the 
licensees to STUK for information within three 
months from the completion of an annual outage. 
STUK calculates the total as-found leakages, as 
the reports give total leakages as they are at the 
end of the annual outage (i.e. after the completion 
of repairs and re-testing).
Purpose
The indicators are used to monitor the integrity 
of containment isolation valves, penetrations and 
airlocks.
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Interpretation of the indicator
Loviisa
Based on the indicators, containment integrity at 
the Loviisa units is good.
Total leakage of the outer isolation valves com-
pared to the maximum allowed total leakage has 
increased at both plant units. The as-found leakage 
of both units remains clearly below the set limit.
The number of isolation valves passing the 
leak test in the first attempt has decreased in both 
plant units but is still at a good level. The leaking 
isolation valves have been repaired so that they 
meet the operational limits and conditions. 
The overall as-found leakage rate of contain-
ment penetrations and airlocks has remained low 
at both plant units.
Olkiluoto
Based on the indicators, containment integrity at 
the Olkiluoto units is good.
The total number of found leakages of outer 
isolation valves at OL1 have increased but are still 
low and remain clearly below the below the limit 
set for overall found leakage in the OLC.
The overall found leakages of outer isolation 
valves at OL2 had decreased from the previous year, 
and were clearly below the limit set in the OLC.
The percentage of isolation valves that passed 
the leak test at first attempt remained high for 
both plant units. The percentage decreased some-
what at OL1 and increased somewhat at OL2. The 
leaking isolation valves have been repaired so that 
they meet the operational limits and conditions.
The total found leakage rate of containment 
penetrations, for which TVO includes leakages in 
the upper and lower personnel airlocks, the main-
tenance dome and the containment dome, was low 
at both plant units.
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APPENDIX 3 Significant events 
at nuclear power plants in 2017
Loviisa nuclear power plant
Annual outages at Loviisa, 
6 August – 20 September 2017
The annual outages of the plant units were imple-
mented as planned in terms of nuclear and radia-
tion safety. This year, both units had short annual 
outages where Fortum carried out a refuelling op-
eration in deviation from the normal regime, as 
well as several modification operations – the most 
significant ones being installations of the ELSA 
I&C renewal project for which phase 2 was imple-
mented for both units. The plan is to complete the 
I&C renewal during the 2018 annual outage.
The annual outage inspections were carried out 
on schedule and in the planned scope. The ultra-
sonic inspection of reactor pressure vessel nozzles, 
carried out for the first time during the 2016 annual 
outage, was repeated on STUK’s request this year 
for both plant units, because in 2016 the inspec-
tion method gave a deviant result for one nozzle at 
Loviisa 1. Now the same Loviisa 1 nozzle that had 
given the deviant result was inspected, together 
with all similar nozzles at Loviisa 2. The inspection 
result at Loviisa 1 had not changed, and no indica-
tions were observed in the nozzles in Loviisa 2. The 
current magnitude of the indication in the Loviisa 
1 nozzle does not affect the safe use of the reactor 
pressure vessel. Fortum monitors the condition of 
the reactor pressure vessels in compliance with the 
inspection programme approved by STUK.
The radiation doses of the employees who par-
ticipated in the annual outages remained well be-
low the dose limits set in the Radiation Decree and 
the target levels set by Fortum. The radiation dose 
rates measured from the primary circuit at Loviisa 
1 were lower than in the previous year and the 
combined radiation dose of the plant unit’s employ-
ees, 186 mmanSv, was the lowest ever measured 
for the plant unit.
Radioactive materials did not pose any danger 
outside the plant either. STUK is monitoring the 
Figure A3.1. INES classified events at the Loviisa plant 
(INES Level 1 or higher).
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Figure A3.3. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa 2 plant unit in 2017.
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Figure A3.2. Daily average gross electrical power of the 
Loviisa 1 plant unit in 2017.
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radioactivity in the surroundings of the Loviisa nu-
clear power plant by regularly taking samples from 
the air, soil and sea. The measurements did not indi-
cate the presence of any radioactive substances that 
would pose a hazard to people or the environment.
Approximately 30 experts from STUK oversaw 
the annual outages. They ensured that Fortum 
managed the radiation and nuclear safety and car-
ried out the maintenance work in a safe manner. 
STUK also oversaw the activities of the organisa-
tion in the annual outage and carried out an in-
spection of the annual outages under the periodic 
inspection programme. With this inspection, STUK 
verified that there are instructions for the opera-
tions, the instructions are being followed and the 
instructions are up to date. No safety deficiencies 
that require STUK’s immediate action were ob-
served during the inspection. A summary of the 
inspection is presented in Appendix 4. In addition, 
STUK oversaw the transfers of fuel which were 
carried out in compliance with the new procedure.
Fall of a fresh fuel assembly in the 
fuel transfer pool of Loviisa 2
The most significant operational event in 2017 was 
the fall of a fresh nuclear fuel assembly in the fuel 
transfer pool on 28 February 2017. The event was 
rated as an INES category 1 event. The event did 
not compromise nuclear or radiation safety, but it 
did reveal obvious deficiencies in the power com-
pany’s activities and in the condition of the refuel-
ling machine.
In the event, transfers of fresh nuclear fuel 
assemblies were carried out in the reactor hall 
of Loviisa 2 on 28 February 2017. The fresh fuel 
assemblies were first brought in a fuel transport 
basket to the interim storage pool intended for the 
reactor hall transfer vessels. From there, the refuel-
ling machine moved them one by one to the reload-
ing pool where all the fresh fuel required for the 
next reactor refuelling are collected. The employees 
performing the transfers did not notice that one 
fresh fuel assembly remained caught in the grip-
per mechanism in the refuelling machine mast as 
it was being transferred to the reloading pool. This 
was only noticed when attempting to fetch the next 
assembly from the transfer basket. The employees 
decided to move the assembly still caught in the 
gripper mechanism to a vacant space in the trans-
fer basket. As they started lowering the refuelling 
machine mast, the fuel assembly fell off the gripper 
mechanism and landed in the fuel basket approxi-
mately three meters below. The refuelling operation 
was suspended, and Fortum carried out extensive 
inspections of the fuel, transfer basket and refuel-
ling machine. The fuel assembly that fell into the 
transfer basket did not break – its lower end was 
just deformed, and the support structure of the 
transfer basket bottom was bent. A surface defect 
was observed in the affixing surface of the gripping 
mechanism, possibly causing the jamming.
As this was fresh fuel, there was no radia-
tion hazard, but as similar transfers are also car-
ried out for spent fuel, the event was significant. 
Similar mistakes have been made in fuel handling 
at the Loviisa NPP in recent years. Due to the situ-
ation, STUK sent a request to Fortum, stating that 
Fortum can only continue fuel transfers after STUK 
has assessed the rectifying actions proposed by 
Fortum as sufficient for preventing similar events.
The inspections and necessary immediate recti-
fying actions specified by Fortum were acceptably 
completed, and the personnel were provided with 
additional training before the operations could con-
tinue with STUK’s permission on 18 April 2017. In 
addition, STUK carried out an operational control 
inspection regarding refuelling activities in the 
summer for ensuring that the long-term develop-
ment actions promised by Fortum have progressed 
and monitored the activities during annual outage.
On the basis of processing and investigating the 
matter, it is obvious that Fortum has significantly 
reformed its refuelling methods. The refuelling ma-
chine modernisation project has also been consider-
ably progressed. The organisational change related 
to reforming the refuelling activities is to enter into 
force from the beginning of 2018. STUK will moni-
tor the effects of Fortum’s organisational change in 
its inspection in 2018 and ensure through its other 
oversight activities that the refuelling machine 
modernisation project advances and the lessons of 
the event are taken into account in the activities. 
Furthermore, STUK carried out its own inter-
nal investigation regarding its activities concerning 
the event in order to develop its activities during 
the next strategy period. The investigation was 
completed at the end of 2017 and resulted in recom-
mendations regarding the oversight of transfer and 
lifting equipment as well as regarding the oversight 
processes of STUK in general.
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Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Annual outages at Olkiluoto, 
23 April – 17 July 2017
The annual outages at Olkiluoto began on 23 April 
2017 when TVO shut down the Olkiluoto 1 plant 
unit for refuelling. In the annual outage of plant 
unit 1 ending on 1 May, TVO carried out the nor-
mal maintenance operations for an annual out-
age, replacing, among other things, approximately 
one-fifth of the fuel with fresh fuel. The annual 
outage of the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit began on May 
10 and had a longer duration than normal mainte-
nance outages due to extensive maintenance and 
repairing operations. During the outage, TVO car-
ried out other operations in addition to normal 
maintenance and refuelling, for example an exten-
sive operation where the reactor coolant pumps 
were replaced. TVO replaced all six reactor coolant 
pumps and their frequency converters with new 
ones. Furthermore, TVO carried out repairs in the 
reactor pressure vessel during the annual outage. 
The annual outages ended when Olkiluoto 2 was 
reconnected to the national grid on 17 July follow-
ing the start-up permission granted by STUK.
The radiation doses of the employees who par-
ticipated in the annual outages were well below 
both the dose limits set in the Radiation Decree and 
the dose limits set by the power company. Due to the 
large extent of the annual outage of plant unit 2, the 
collective occupational radiation dose was neverthe-
less higher than in the previous annual outage.
Radioactive materials did not pose any danger 
outside the plant either. STUK is monitoring the 
radioactivity in the surroundings of the Olkiluoto 
power plant by regularly taking samples from the 
air, soil and sea. No radioactive substances origi-
nating from the power plant were detected in the 
air samples taken from the surroundings of the 
power plant during the annual outage.
Approximately 30 experts from STUK oversaw 
the annual outages. They ensured that TVO man-
aged the radiation and nuclear safety during the 
annual outage. STUK’s oversight work always 
includes an inspection of the maintenance plan 
and on-site monitoring of the work. STUK also 
oversaw the activities of the organisation during 
the annual outage. This year, the annual outages 
involved a lot of work and challenges for TVO’s or-
ganisation. During the annual outages, STUK also 
carried out an annual outage inspection included 
in the scope of the periodic inspection programme. 
The inspection indicated that the annual outage 
was completed safely and almost all the scheduled 
work was completed. No safety deficiencies that 
require STUK’s immediate action were observed 
during the inspection. A summary of the inspection 
is presented in Appendix 4.
Repair of reactor pressure vessel nozzles
In the annual outage of Olkiluoto 2, the nozzles 
of the reactor pressure vessel commissioned in 
1980 were repaired using a method never before 
used in Finland. TVO had noticed cracks when 
inspecting the reactor pressure vessel during ear-
lier annual outages. The cracks were found in two 
welded joints of a reactor pressure vessel nozzle. 
TVO has inspected the nozzles every year and as-
sessed the safety implications of the cracks. STUK 
has required TVO to investigate the reasons for the 
cracking and to propose actions for preventing the 
emergence of new cracks.
In 2016, STUK approved a plan submitted by 
TVO for proactive repairs of all reactor pressure 
vessel nozzles in Olkiluoto 1 and Olkiluoto 2. There 
are a total of ten nozzles in both plant units. The 
nozzles will be repaired by machining the weld from 
the inside and by welding new filler material into 
the joint using a material that is less susceptible to 
stress corrosion. The method has never before been 
used in Finnish NPPs. At the same time, TVO will 
repair the identified cracks in the nozzles.
TVO started the nozzle repair work according 
to the plan in the 2017 annual maintenance by re-
pairing the cracks detected in plant unit 2. The re-
actor was emptied of fuel for the repair operation. 
The repair of the reactor pressure vessel nozzles 
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Figure A3.4. INES classified events at the Olkiluoto 
plant (INES Level 1 or higher).
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was implemented on a smaller scale than planned. 
There were a lot of problems in the repair work, 
among others with the tools used for machining 
and welding. TVO decided to only repair during 
the annual outage the two nozzles where cracks 
had been detected in earlier annual outages. No 
cracks have been detected in the other eight noz-
zles. STUK oversaw the repair work on site and 
inspected and approved the results.
At the end of 2017, TVO submitted an applica-
tion to STUK for acceptance regarding an amend-
ment to the policy of proactive repairs of pressure 
vessel nozzles. TVO proposes that the proactive 
nozzle repairs at the plant units are discontinued. 
TVO will continue to ensure the operability of noz-
zles by carrying out regular inspections under the 
periodic inspection programme. Furthermore, TVO 
will maintain repair capabilities for the eventual-
ity of new nozzle repairs. STUK will process TVO’s 
application during the beginning of 2018.
Unscheduled refuelling outage at Olkiluoto 1
The first indication of a fuel leak was detected at 
Olkiluoto 1 during exhaust gas system measure-
Figure A3.5. Daily average gross power of  
the Olkiluoto 1 plant unit 2017.
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Figure A3.6. Daily average gross power of  
the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit 2017.
ments on 18 July 2017. Approximately one-fifth 
of the fuel cycle had been run when the fuel leak 
was detected. TVO monitored the activity in the 
exhaust gas system with measurements and noted 
that the activity level continued to increase. TVO 
assessed that it would be impossible to run for the 
entire fuel cycle when the fuel leak rate increased 
significantly during September–October. TVO de-
cided on 11 October 2017 to shut the plant unit 
down for an extra refuelling outage. The refuelling 
outage began on 18 October 2017 as the fuel leak 
had continued for three months.
During the refuelling outage, TVO checked all 
fuel assemblies in the reactor for their tightness. 
TVO located and removed one leaking fuel assem-
bly from the reactor. TVO aims to establish the root 
cause of the leak in the inspections to be carried 
out when the assembly is repaired. The current 
plan is to carry out the repair in autumn 2018. 
The possibility of Pellet Cladding Interaction (PCI) 
damage is excluded because the rod was undergo-
ing the first cycle in the reactor where the gas gap 
between the pile of pellets and the cladding still 
remains open even at high linear power, which 
means that there is no tensile stress that would 
facilitate the progress of a PCI fracture. No sig-
nificant pulls of the control rods were carried out at 
the time the leak was detected, and the leaking rod 
was also a long way from the control rod.
TVO also inspected the manufacturing history 
of the fuel rod and found nothing exceptional about 
it. The probability that the leak was caused by a 
manufacturing error appears small. TVO has as-
sessed that the most probable cause of the leak is 
damage caused by a foreign particle. International 
operating experience shows that this is the most 
common type of damage with all fuel suppliers.
These factors lead to the assessment that the 
damage to the assembly had no connection with 
the fuel leaks that occurred in 2016. Instead, this 
leak seems to be an isolated incident. As part of 
its continuous oversight, STUK monitors the work 
carried out by TVO and the fuel supplier for estab-
lishing the root cause.
The event was rated at level 0 on the interna-
tional INES scale because it had no significance to 
nuclear or radiation safety. The event did not have 
any impact on the safety of the plant, the employ-
ees or the environment.
STUK-B 225
71
APPENDIX 3 Significant operational eventS at nppS in 2017
APPENDIX 4 Periodic inspection programme 
of nuclear power plants 2017
Inspections included in the periodic inspection programme focus on safety 
management, operational main processes and procedures, as well as the 
technical acceptability of systems. The compliance of safety assessments, 
operation, maintenance and protection activities with the requirements of 
nuclear safety regulations are verified with the inspections. No material 
deficiencies with an effect on the safety of the plant, the personnel or the 
environment were observed in the 2017 inspections.
Basic programme
Inspections in 2017 
Loviisa 1 and 2 Olkiluoto 1 and 2
Personnel resources and competence   x*
Management and safety culture x x
Management system x x
Disposal facilities x
Chemistry
Operating experience feedback x x
Operation  x 
Plant maintenance**   
Fire protection x
Utilisation of the PRA  x
Structures and buildings  x
Radiation protection x x
Nuclear security x x
Safety planning x
Safety functions x x
Emergency preparedness arrangements x x
Reactor waste x
Annual outage x x
Nuclear safeguards
Special subjects
Establishing the reason for operational events and  
impact of the actions
x
* The inspection of human resources and competence was carried out in cooperation with the construction inspection programme  
of Olkiluoto 3.
** In exemption from the normal cycle of the basic programme, no plant maintenance inspection was carried out in 2017. The subject was  
comprehensively reviewed as the licensees’ updates to the ageing management programme were processed, as well as through the 2017 
peer assessment of ageing management, compliant with EU’s Nuclear Safety Directive.
Matters concerning Olkiluoto 3 can also be reviewed in the periodic inspection programme of Olkiluoto if the matters to be reviewed are  
common for the whole of TVO, not merely plant unit -specific.
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Inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme at Loviisa nuclear power plant
Management and safety culture, 
13–15 February 2017
Fortum changed the structure of its organisation 
in 2016. In the inspection, STUK investigated how 
Fortum is managing the change, how the organisa-
tion sets its goals and how it uses key indicators 
and safety indicators for measuring results. The 
procedures for assessing and developing the safety 
culture were also investigated in the inspection.
The inspection indicated that the plant organi-
sation at Loviisa has primarily had a positive at-
titude towards the organisational change, and no 
significant situations hampering operations have 
emerged. However, STUK issued a requirement 
that the licensee must develop its procedures re-
lated to monitoring the safety impacts of changes. 
Furthermore, the new organisation has functions 
closely associated with nuclear and radiation safe-
ty in different units, which is why STUK required 
that the instructions should describe how the 
Nuclear Safety Unit obtains an up-to-date pic-
ture of them. The plant organisation monitors the 
results of activities using a multi-level indicator 
system where safety is included. Both the plant 
management and the licensee’s management moni-
tor safety by monitoring the indicators. There are 
many actions in progress at the plant for develop-
ing and assessing the safety culture, but the rela-
tions between the actors and the overall coordina-
tion need to be further developed. STUK issued a 
requirement for updating the safety culture pro-
gramme and for ensuring that an overall picture of 
the current state of the safety culture is obtained.
Management system, 19–20 October 2017
The inspection covered functionality of the licen-
see’s integrated management system from the per-
spective of nuclear and radiation safety. It was 
investigated in the inspection how the licensee pro-
duces its management system, observes it in its 
activities, assesses and develops it. In 2017, the 
inspection concentrated on supplier audits, assess-
ments and approvals by the licensee, document 
management and assessment of the management 
system (including internal and external audits and 
self-assessments). Before the inspection, the per-
sons conducting supplier audits were interviewed 
regarding audit procedures and supplier approval. 
In addition, STUK monitored the basic training in 
document management at Fortum.
The inspection indicated that the supplier audi-
tors of the Loviisa power plant are familiar with 
the audit procedures observed in Loviisa. The find-
ings of the inspection indicate that the supplier 
audit procedure and assessment and approval of 
suppliers at Loviisa was compliant with the proce-
dures established for Loviisa. Regarding document 
management, the procedures observed at the plant 
were reviewed, and e.g. the results of an internal 
audit concerning document management were ver-
ified. In the inspection, the covering letters of docu-
ments sent to STUK were discussed. STUK noted 
that the covering letter template used in Loviisa 
only has limited guiding effects. There have been 
deficiencies in the covering letters, and STUK 
brought these up in the inspection. A requirement 
was issued regarding the matter, according to 
which Fortum has to develop its covering letters 
and the way they are drawn up. In addition, the 
internal audits, self-assessments and external au-
dits regarding operations in Loviisa were reviewed 
in the inspection. The inspection verified that the 
operations have been active and compliant with 
Loviisa’s procedures.
Disposal facilities, 27–28 September 2017
The inspection assessed whether the disposal fa-
cilities for operational waste (the VLJ repository) 
at the Loviisa power plant and their use comply 
with the general safety principles of nuclear waste 
management and with the official requirements. 
The inspection also included the results and con-
clusions from the licensee’s self-monitoring and 
the monitoring programme regarding bedrock and 
groundwater around the operational waste dis-
posal facility. The organisation-related part of the 
inspection focussed on the processes developed for 
Fortum related to the use of the VLJ repository 
and to the monitoring programme. This year, the 
visit to the VLJ repository during the inspection 
also included a visit to maintenance waste facili-
ties (HJT1–3). Particular attention was paid in the 
inspection to the reinforcements of the solidified 
waste facility (KJT) and its arch.
Fortum has clearly developed many matters 
compared to the situation in the equivalent inspec-
tion in 2015 including: the production of process 
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charts related to the VLJ repository, development 
of monitoring-related alert and action limits, de-
velopment of a systematic approach to ageing 
management, development of the representative-
ness and reliability of monitoring results from dif-
ferent fields of science, common interpretation of 
monitoring results from different fields of science, 
as well as significant reductions in the amount 
of operational waste, among other things by de-
veloping sorting and packaging methods. STUK 
recorded several positive observations, as well as 
observations regarding matters that could be fur-
ther developed. Three requirements were issued 
in the inspection, all concerning the planning of 
inspection of the reinforcement of the condition 
and adhesion of shotcrete in the solidified waste 
facility, performance of the inspection work, re-
pair of points possibly requiring repairs as well 
as planning the ageing management of the solidi-
fied waste facility for the entire service life of the 
facility. The solidified waste facility was excavated 
20 years ago, and the arc of the facility has never 
been inspected in the manner required since it 
was excavated. The actions on the solidified waste 
facility are much easier to carry out now than after 
intermediate-level waste has been brought to the 
facility. STUK will inspect the implementation of 
the requirements before the commissioning inspec-
tion of the solidified waste facility.
Operating experience feedback, 
6, 11 and 13 April 2017
In the inspection of operating experience feed-
back, STUK satisfied itself that the requirements 
specified in the Guide YVL A.10 had been fulfilled. 
Furthermore, STUK targeted the inspections so that 
the July 2016 organisational change at Fortum was 
taken into account. The organisational change re-
sulted in several changes of persons and job descrip-
tions regarding operating experience feedback. In its 
inspection, STUK primarily reviewed the sufficiency 
of Fortum’s human resources, the competence devel-
opment of new employees, as well as documentation 
and functionality of the feedback procedures con-
cerning operating experience. STUK carried out the 
inspection by studying Fortum’s instructions and 
by examining the results of event interpretations. 
In addition, STUK interviewed Fortum’s employees, 
monitored the activities and verified documents re-
quired in Fortum’s instructions.
Fortum has reserved sufficient human resourc-
es for managing the internal and external operat-
ing experience feedback. Fortum has established 
procedures for identifying and investigating events 
at the Loviisa power plant and for processing the 
events taking place at other plants. The procedures 
are under continual development. STUK observed 
some development needs that need to be met to 
achieve full compliance with the requirements of 
Guide YVL A.10. On the basis of inspection find-
ings, STUK issued requirements related, among 
other things, to learning from events at the Loviisa 
power plant and other plants, competence develop-
ment of new personnel and implementation of own 
event interpretations. 
Utilisation of the PRA, 23 November 2017
The inspection concerned the utilisation of the 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) in safety man-
agement inspection, the current status of PRA 
models and applications, the expansions being pre-
pared and the development of PRA results. The 
inspection also covered the licensee’s PRA organi-
sation, resources and guidelines. Organisational 
PRA processes were also assessed. The modelling 
of internal floods and fires in certain premises were 
discussed as separate issues.
The PRA model has been extensively updated 
over the course of the past two years. The Loviisa 2 
plant unit model has been further developed, and 
the work will continue in 2018. The software used 
for the PRA has also been developed. PRA applica-
tions have been produced, e.g. for different change 
projects and to support the licensee’s decision-
making processes. The PRA level 2 analysis will 
be supplemented at the end of 2017 with an early 
emission analysis, and the PRA will be extended in 
2018 to cover spent fuel storage in compliance with 
the requirements of the implementation decision 
regarding Guide YVL A.7. The licensee is using the 
PRA as planned and in a versatile manner to sup-
port safety management. STUK did not pose any 
requirements on the licensee based on the inspec-
tion.
Structures and buildings, 11–12 April 2017
The inspection focussed on the steel and concrete 
structures of buildings, their condition monitor-
ing, maintenance instructions, the inspections 
and repairs carried out, and examined the ageing 
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management procedures and procedures related to 
modification work.
The inspection verified the implementation of 
management system processes and the actions tak-
en as a consequence of implementing YVL Guide 
instructions. Furthermore, the existing instruc-
tions, repairs and results of the periodic inspection 
were revised. It was also verified that feedback re-
ports on international operating experiences have 
been utilised to a sufficient level of accuracy in 
meetings and that there was comprehensive par-
ticipation from all essential parties.
One requirement was issued in the inspection. 
It concerned the planning and scheduling of a 
repair that was mentioned in the periodic inspec-
tion report and was classified as significantly 
urgent. Two earlier requirements remain open. 
They concern an instruction update and carrying 
out a risk assessment for repair work. The records 
reviewed indicate that the day-to-day operations 
of the Maintenance Unit are appropriate. The unit 
systematically collects comments and observations 
for the purpose of updating instructions. Electronic 
work and information management systems also 
support the activities of the personnel.
Radiation protection, 25–26 October 2017
This year, the inspection concerning radiation pro-
tection focussed on measuring radiation at the nu-
clear power plant. The special inspection subject in 
this year’s inspection was the monitoring of emis-
sions and radiation measurement instruments.
The inspection reviewed the management of 
radioactive emissions to the aquatic environment 
and air from the Loviisa power plant and examined 
the responsibilities from sampling to reporting. 
Although the emission management responsibili-
ties are described in the power plant’s instructions, 
STUK nevertheless required Fortum to update and 
further specify the responsibilities in its documen-
tation. STUK also requires a report of the actions 
with which Fortum intends to improve contamina-
tion management in sampling and sample process-
ing. STUK recommended that the qualifications of 
sampling staff should be ensured and developed. 
The fairly extensive review round of emission 
reports before their approval and the analyses of 
trends in the results for detecting any deviations 
were considered to be a good practice.
In the inspection, STUK found that some fixed 
radiation meters had very few spare parts in stock. 
Although the situation has not been critical lately, 
STUK recommended that Fortum should pay at-
tention to the spare parts situation for instruments 
and to the increasing failure risk due to ageing 
instruments. Fortum has appropriately taken care 
of the renewal of portable measuring instruments 
and their suitability assessments.
In the inspection, STUK presented two require-
ments and eight observations, from which the pow-
er company will assess any development actions.
Nuclear security, 27–28 October 2017
The inspection of nuclear security was mainly im-
plemented in two parallel working groups: one for 
conventional (physical) security arrangements and 
the other for information security. In these two 
working groups, an inspection was carried out ex-
tensively, including the structural, operative and 
organisational security arrangements of the nu-
clear power plant.
Two requirements were issued in the inspec-
tion. The actions due to the requirements issued in 
earlier inspections (for all 12 requirements in two 
separate inspections) had been appropriately car-
ried out apart from one exception.
Safety functions, 8–9 January 2018
The inspection was postponed by just over one 
month from the originally scheduled time, which is 
why it was only performed in 2018. The inspection 
concerned one of the annually changed subjects, 
this time “Fuel cooling and residual heat removal”. 
The systems constituting the main subject of the 
inspection were the sea water cooled residual heat 
removal system, and applying the diversity princi-
ple, the heat sink which is independent of sea wa-
ter cooling that can be connected to it. The control 
room and field actions were reviewed during a site 
tour in compliance with the action instructions for 
the systems.
The situation regarding actions taken following 
the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident was 
also reviewed in the inspection, including plant 
modifications as well as impacts on instructions 
and training. In this context, e.g. the situation 
concerning the power supply modification to be im-
plemented from a separate diesel generator to a di-
verse residual heat removal system was reviewed.
No requirements were imposed in the inspec-
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tion. No open requirements were remaining from 
the previous inspection. A total of 12 observa-
tions were recorded in the inspection protocol, 
concerning, among other things, the operation of a 
separate diesel generator in cold conditions, the se-
lection criteria of the most significant events com-
piled in ageing monitoring reports, the spare parts 
situation for many equipment locations and minor 
inaccuracies contained in the above instructions.
Emergency preparedness 
arrangements, 7 November 2017
The emergency preparedness arrangements in-
spection comprehensively covered the nuclear 
power plant’s emergency preparedness arrange-
ments. Issues that are regularly inspected include 
emergency preparedness guidelines, emergency 
preparedness facilities, emergency preparedness 
equipment, the emergency preparedness organi-
sation and training for the emergency prepared-
ness organisation. For emergency preparedness, 
equipment and facilities, the weather observation 
system, nuclide identification and facilities of the 
repair team were reviewed.
Two deputies approved by STUK have been in 
charge of arrangements for emergency prepared-
ness at the Loviisa plant since the beginning of 
September. The plant has a plan for filling the posi-
tion of the person in charge of these arrangements, 
and until that happens, the duties are handled by 
contingency arrangements. There have not been 
any major changes in the organisation of emergen-
cy preparedness during the period under review. 
Fortum has introduced a process-type arrange-
ment for maintenance training concerning emer-
gency preparedness. The arrangements include 
competence planning for emergency preparedness, 
induction training of personnel and planning emer-
gency preparedness drills.
Fortum has expanded its weather observation 
system with a metering station out on the sea, at 
Orrengrund. The equipment damage at the new 
metering station caused by a lightning strike a 
short while after the system was commissioned 
has been repaired, and the reason for the measure-
ment results deviating from those provided by the 
Finnish Meteorological Institute has been identi-
fied and rectified.
In compliance with the requirement issued dur-
ing the previous inspection, Fortum has developed 
the contamination management arrangements at 
the command posts of the emergency preparedness 
organisation and integrated them into the emer-
gency preparedness plan.
The inspection included a site walk-about dur-
ing which the additional new premises for the 
emergency preparedness organisation were re-
viewed. The work has begun on preparing facili-
ties for the emergency preparedness organisation 
repair team below the actual emergency prepared-
ness centre in the space left empty after removal of 
the earlier emergency diesel generator. The facili-
ties are now partly in use.
In the inspection, STUK issued four require-
ments, mainly concerning the arrangements for a 
police-led emergency preparedness situation, the 
audibility of alarms in the steam generator room 
and update of the emergency preparedness plan 
with the changed nuclide inventories. STUK also 
recorded three possible development subjects and 
two good practices. The good practices were related 
to the development of facilities for the emergency 
preparedness repair team and development of 
training process.
Annual outage, 6 August – 27 September 2017
The purpose of STUK’s annual outage inspection 
is to verify that the licensee plans and implements 
annual outages in a safe manner in terms of ra-
diation and nuclear safety and that the licensee 
uses staff with sufficient competence and provides 
adequate resources. STUK also performs general 
oversight of the plant site by means of regular 
site walk-arounds and overseeing the progress of 
planned work, for example. Furthermore, STUK 
oversees the way in which safety is prioritised in 
the licensee’s decision-making process.
In 2017, the annual outage inspection of the 
Loviisa power plant was mainly implemented by 
interviewing employees using a questionnaire form 
prepared in advance. In its inspection, STUK 
verified that there were instructions for operations, 
and that the instructions are being followed and 
are up to date.
No deviations requiring STUK’s immediate ac-
tion were observed in the power plant’s activities. 
Based on the inspection, STUK presented four 
observations to be assessed by the Loviisa power 
plant as potential development areas and issues 
to be continuously improved. The observation con-
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cerned the start-up meeting procedure, use of the 
plant’s HUP procedures (taking the human factor 
into account), emphasis on safety in urgent work 
operations and knowledge of loose particle proce-
dures.
The power plant also receives observations re-
garding its operations from other sources (such as 
internal audits). This way, the NPP is able to see 
the whole picture to assess whether the inspection 
observations include any new or recurring issues 
that require improvements or additional measures.
Inspections of the periodic inspection 
programme at Olkiluoto nuclear power plant
Management and safety culture, 
23–24 March 2017
The inspection reviewed the status of the work-
ing atmosphere and safety culture at TVO, as well 
as actions taken by TVO’s management for moni-
toring and developing them. The inspection also 
reviewed how TVO’s management monitors the 
performance of the organisation using safety indi-
cators and other key indicators.
It was found in the inspection that although 
TVO has functional procedures in place for assess-
ing the working atmosphere, safety culture and 
overall picture of safety, the management does not 
appear to have a uniform view of the meaning of 
the results. Based on the inspection, STUK stated 
that TVO must immediately ensure that actions 
for developing the workplace atmosphere the and 
safety culture are sufficient. The organisation has 
challenges which may become problems, e.g. for 
carrying out demanding annual outages in the 
future and for commissioning the Olkiluoto 3 plant 
unit in a concentrated, smooth and safety-oriented 
manner. STUK issued two requirements: to pre-
sent the results of workplace atmosphere surveys 
and rectifying actions to STUK, and competence 
development of TVO’s personnel, particularly its 
management, for identifying the human and or-
ganisational factors associated with the safety 
culture.
Management system, 1–2 November 2017
The subjects reviewed were process indicators, 
risk management in projects and modification op-
erations, as well as integration of the management 
system of the Olkiluoto 3 plant unit with TVO’s 
operating system. In the inspection, persons from 
different levels of organisation and different units 
were interviewed, and material from the licensee’s 
systems and documentation was verified.
Following the inspection, STUK issued four 
requirements. Among other things, it was found 
in the inspection that different project managers 
use different procedures for risk management. The 
understanding and uniform practices of risk man-
agement must be enhanced, e.g. through training, 
discussions, events for learning from experience, 
and the harmonization of practices. The allocation 
of risk handling responsibilities between project 
managers, project steering groups and the tech-
nical services steering group must be clarified. 
Furthermore, TVO must assess the risks of pro-
jects at every stage more extensively than the sup-
plier, taking also into account the risks related to 
the organisations participating in the project and 
risks to the plant environment, for example.
Operating experience feedback, 
9–10 February 2017
This was a follow-up inspection where STUK veri-
fied the situation of the requirements it had issued 
in the operating feedback experience inspection in 
2016.
It was found in the inspection that TVO had ini-
tiated improvement measures regarding all inspec-
tion requirements. However, some of the changes 
in activities were minor and in some respects the 
situation was still much the same as a year ago. 
For this reason STUK deemed it necessary to re-
peat three requirements.
Furthermore, STUK noted that fulfilling some 
of the requirements of new YVL Guides A.10 and 
A.3 took one year, and fulfilling one of the require-
ments will take two years longer than the schedule 
proposed by TVO and approved by STUK. In the 
inspection, STUK required that even this require-
ment must be fulfilled by autumn 2017.
STUK took the view that the overall result 
of the inspection showed that TVO has failed to 
reserve sufficient time and resources for improv-
ing the activities concerning operating experience 
feedback and for developing the relevant personnel 
competencies. The observation concerns the man-
agement. STUK required TVO to provide a report 
on the appropriateness of organisation of the re-
sources and work regarding operating experience 
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feedback. A deadline was set so that the report can 
be taken into account when processing the applica-
tion for operating licence renewal for Olkiluoto 1 
and 2 and the statement request concerning the 
operating licence of Olkiluoto 3.
In the inspection, TVO presented results of its 
internal control procedures, showing that the chal-
lenges related to fulfilling the requirements of YVL 
Guides are more extensive. Internal control has in-
formed the management of TVO of the observation. 
TVO’s internal control procedure seem good. TVO 
identifies deviations important to safety itself and 
reacts to them.
Operational activities, 19–20 October 2017
The inspection of operational activities concerned 
the activities and resources of TVO’s Operation 
Support Unit. Among other things, the unit is re-
sponsible for the maintenance and development of 
instructions and documents related to the opera-
tion of the plant units.
The purpose of the inspection was to establish 
the situation concerning the development of the 
operating instructions for the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 
plant units, particularly with respect to instruc-
tions for disturbances and emergency situations. 
The inspection also verified the implementation of 
procedures which were compliant with the report 
concerning the renewal of the plant units’ operat-
ing licences.
In the inspection, STUK found that the re-
source situation concerning the development work 
on operating instructions had been challenging due 
to several changes of staff and absences of person-
nel. However, the situation has improved following 
an increase in resources in late 2017. In the inspec-
tion, STUK found that there was scope for develop-
ment in the validation procedure for instructions 
for disturbances and emergency situations, for ex-
ample with regard to the independence and goals 
of validation. STUK did not issue a requirement on 
the matter, but it will monitor the validation pro-
cedures as part of its normal inspection activities.
At the end of 2017, TVO completed the sys-
tematic development work on instructions for dis-
turbances and emergency situations that started 
in 2012. Completion of the development work 
was delayed by two years from the original plan. 
TVO intends to continue the development work 
in 2017–2019. The company has made a compre-
hensive survey of the subjects for development, 
and the development work has already started for 
some of them. However, the development work is 
not regularly monitored at TVO. STUK considers 
it important that the planned development actions 
are implemented in the planned time schedule.
Based on the inspection, STUK issued two re-
quirements. TVO must check the paper printouts 
of instructions for transient and emergency situ-
ations kept in the main control room, emergency 
shutdown station, as well as in the facilities of the 
emergency preparedness team and support team 
for any printing errors. Checks must also be made 
when updating the said printouts. The require-
ments are based on a problem observed at TVO 
which means that the texts in flow diagrams are 
not shown in the documents due to a reason attrib-
utable to information technology. The checks must 
be continued until the problem is reliably solved.
Fire protection, 14–15 September 2017
The inspection focused on fire protection ar-
rangements at the nuclear power plant, including 
structural fire protection, fire detection, extin-
guishing systems and operative fire protection. 
In the inspection, the efficiency of the NPP’s fire 
protection arrangements and the power company’s 
operations was assessed and the amendment plans 
for fire protection arrangements were analysed.
Following the inspection, it can be stated that 
the matters related to fire protection are gener-
ally in order. The organisation responsible for 
fire protection at TVO has been satisfied with 
the organisational change of 2015, and the neces-
sary resources are available for carrying out the 
work according to the planned schedule. Minor 
modernisation and modification operations have 
been carried out on the sprinkler and fire detec-
tion systems. During the period under review, no 
significant cases of ignition have taken place in the 
plant units in operation.
No new requirements were issued on the basis 
of the inspection. Two positive observations were 
highlighted in the inspection. TVO’s own fire pro-
tection audits were deemed to be of high quality. 
Furthermore, the mock-up workspace used in the 
occupational safety training organised by TVO was 
considered to be very useful for practical internali-
sation of matters.
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Radiation protection, 14–16 February 2017
The radiation protection inspection focussed on the 
nuclear power plant’s radiation protection, radiation 
measurements, as well as emissions and environ-
mental monitoring. This year, special attention was 
paid to radiation measurements. The special focus 
of the inspection was the monitoring of emissions 
and portable radiation measurement instruments.
During the inspection, the parties had a general 
discussion on the types of temporary arrangements 
TVO has planned for situations where fixed radia-
tion measurement instruments have to be replaced 
with contingency arrangements. STUK considered 
it important that clear instructions should be been 
issued for the contingency arrangements and that 
measurement instruments whose suitability for 
the purpose can be demonstrated in advance are 
used in these arrangements. Therefore, the suit-
ability assessments for portable radiation meas-
urement instruments are an important part of the 
process where new instruments are commissioned 
at the plant.
The errors detected in reporting the emissions 
were discussed in the inspection. STUK required 
that corrected reports are to be submitted to 
STUK. STUK also stated that TVO must process 
the errors detected in the official reports as devia-
tions in accordance with its instructions.
STUK required TVO to assess and justify the 
sufficiency of personnel in the Radiochemistry 
Laboratory and the related substitution and staff 
backup arrangements. In addition to the normal 
workload and operating events in the plants in 
operation, the review must take into account com-
missioning of the new plant unit and the extensive 
development projects planned for the laboratory in 
the near future.
Nuclear security, 5–9 June 2017
The inspection concerned the nuclear security of 
Olkiluoto plant units 1, 2 and 3. In the inspec-
tion, TVO’s risk management process was reviewed 
from the perspective of nuclear security, together 
with its results, information security and the ef-
fectiveness of nuclear security. The information se-
curity subjects reviewed included the networked 
systems important to safety as well as the overall 
architecture of information security. The security 
arrangement subjects reviewed included the train-
ing and exercises of the security personnel, secu-
rity arrangement events and observations, as well 
as internal audits and assessments. In addition, 
the fence of the plant area was inspected, as well 
as the procedures related to goods transports and 
the security organisation’s capabilities to observe 
and respond.
Following the inspection, STUK issued 10 re-
quirements. The security arrangements were in-
cluded in TVO’s security monitoring report as 
actual results of the corporate security monitoring 
programme, one of the quality indicators. The pro-
cedures generally used in the Group will be applied 
to assessing the risk of unlawful activities, and the 
risks are discussed in the management team for 
corporate and information security. STUK took the 
view that a more detailed breakdown of risks in 
the risk matrix would help in the definition of tar-
geted management actions as well as communica-
tions and awareness of the risks. In the inspection, 
STUK observed the improvements made to the 
operational capabilities of the security organisa-
tion. Exercises are used for assessing, demonstrat-
ing and improving the operational capabilities. 
However, TVO still needs to further develop the 
planning and reporting of exercise activities.
Safety planning, 10–11 January 2018
The inspection was postponed by just over one 
month from the originally scheduled time, which is 
why it was only performed in 2018. The inspection 
focussed on the current status of TVO’s modifica-
tion work process, as well as the application of the 
diversity principle of I&C equipment and taking 
the principle into account in planning and design 
work. In the inspection, the status of the modifica-
tion work process and plans for further develop-
ment were revised. It was also investigated how 
the diversity principle has been taken into account 
in the instructions guiding the I&C equipment 
design work.
TVO intends to reform the description of the 
modification work process and its associated in-
structions during the first half of 2018. This reform 
will reduce the ambiguity of instructions guiding 
the operations. In the inspection, STUK paid atten-
tion to the fact that preparations for plant modifi-
cations should be initiated in good time to ensure a 
trouble-free commissioning phase.
Following the inspection, STUK issued one 
requirement. The instructions currently in use at 
TVO take into account the diversification of electri-
STUK-B 225
79
APPENDIX 4 periodic inSpection programme of nuclear power plantS 2017
cal and I&C equipment and the way in which the 
design solutions are documented. However, it did 
not become clear in the inspection how the diversi-
fication solutions already made were documented 
so that future plant modifications would not vio-
late the principles earlier used in the design work. 
TVO must specify the procedures for ensuring the 
documentation of solutions made for implementing 
the diversity principle in the continuously updated 
plant documentation in a manner that supports 
planning and maintenance functions.
Safety functions, 26–27 September 2017
The inspection of safety functions assesses the licen-
see’s procedures used to ensure that the systems im-
plementing safety functions are in a state required 
for safety and that their basis is correct. In 2017, the 
inspection concerned “Fuel cooling and residual heat 
removal”. The inspection focussed on the auxiliary 
feedwater system and its associated auxiliary sys-
tems. The actions decided on the basis of the safety 
assessments made following the Fukushima nucle-
ar power plant accident and their status were also 
discussed in the inspection. These actions included 
various plant modifications and their impacts on 
instructions and training. The inspection verified 
documentation and involved site walk-arounds, dur-
ing which actions specified in the instructions were 
simulated with staff in TVO’s shift crew.
Regarding the fuel cooling function, the equip-
ment instructions, fault reports and spare parts 
situation of the auxiliary feedwater system were 
inspected. No cause for remarks regarding these 
was found in the inspection. TVO has continued 
its investigations into the sound and vibration 
detected in the recirculation line of the auxiliary 
feedwater system. The current action plan includes 
adding a choke valve at the end of the recirculation 
line and taking the end of the return line below the 
water level in the reservoir pool. It has also been 
found in trial operations that pressure transients 
exceed the design pressure of the pipeline. TVO is 
in the process of producing new strength analyses 
for justifying an increase in the design pressure. 
According to the draft schedule drawn up by TVO, 
the modifications to the recirculating line will be 
completed by autumn 2018. However, this will 
require making modifications during power opera-
tion and deviations from the operational limits and 
conditions. TVO will produce a safety assessment 
and present its final schedule plan as part of the 
pre-inspection documents of the system to be sub-
mitted to STUK for approval.
In order to manage a situation where a total loss 
of AC power has occurred, TVO is in the process of 
installing an automatically starting steam turbine-
powered high-pressure auxiliary water system. In 
addition to the high-pressure system, TVO is plan-
ning an arrangement for manually feeding auxiliary 
water after pressure reduction to the reactor using 
the fire water system. The low-pressure auxiliary 
water system has been installed and commissioned 
at the Loviisa 2 plant unit. According to the sched-
ule, other modification operations will be completed 
so that after the 2018 annual outages both plant 
units will have both high- and low-pressure auxil-
iary water systems in place.
Following the inspection, STUK issued three 
requirements. Irregularities were observed in the 
commissioning and associated inspection proce-
dures of the low-pressure auxiliary water system 
installed for the Olkiluoto 2 plant unit. TVO must 
process the observed irregularities and determine 
corrective actions. Furthermore, ambiguity of the 
instructions associated with the system must be 
reduced, errors in them corrected and the person-
nel must be trained in the field actions specified in 
the instructions. In order to ensure power supply, 
TVO has implemented several modifications to the 
plants’ electrical systems. In the inspection, the 
instructions regarding operation of the acquired 
mobile diesel aggregates were inspected, and it 
was found that the instructions were not up to date 
with regard to all flooding valves.
Emergency preparedness arrangements, 
28–29 September 2017
The emergency preparedness arrangements in-
spection comprehensively covered the nuclear 
power plant’s emergency preparedness arrange-
ments. Issues that are regularly inspected include 
emergency preparedness guidelines, emergency 
preparedness facilities, emergency preparedness 
equipment, the emergency preparedness organisa-
tion and training for the emergency preparedness 
organisation. Regarding emergency preparedness 
equipment and facilities, the automatic radiation 
protection network and nuclide identification sys-
tem were inspected. The procedures and equipment 
of the emergency preparedness facilities related to 
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contamination management were a particular sub-
ject of the inspection.
The development and training of TVO's emer-
gency preparedness organisation has particularly 
focussed on the commissioning of Olkiluoto 3. 
Malfunctions in the stations of TVO’s external 
radiation monitoring network have decreased to 
a typical level, and the measurement stations 
acquired for Olkiluoto 3 will be moved from the 
test field to their final locations in the spring. 
Contamination management by TVO’s emergency 
preparedness organisation has not been planned, 
instructed or trained as a whole. With the help of 
additional arrangements, the facilities related to 
the management of TVO’s emergency prepared-
ness organisation can be brought up to a suffi-
cient level regarding contamination management. 
Contamination management arrangements are 
difficult to implement for part of the facilities of 
the emergency preparedness teams.
In the inspection, STUK issued four require-
ments related to the contamination management, 
availability and equipment of emergency prepared-
ness facilities for a situation where a significant ra-
dioactive fallout has spread across the plant area.
Operational waste, 3–4 October 2017
STUK regulates and inspects the processing and fi-
nal disposal of radioactive operational waste at the 
Olkiluoto nuclear power plant. Low- and interme-
diate-level waste is generated during maintenance 
and repairs as well as during the treatment of cir-
culating water. An inspection of operational waste 
focused on remarks made during the last inspec-
tion, development since the last inspection and any 
important issues that have occurred. The inspec-
tion focused on waste management processes, HR 
planning and the occupational radiation dose. The 
condition of facilities in which waste is processed 
and stored, radiation levels in these facilities, their 
classification and their markings were inspected 
during the site visit.
No major non-conformances or development 
needs were detected in the inspection. In the holistic 
development of waste management, the planning 
at TVO has concentrated on the harmonisation of 
the waste solidification processes in all three plant 
units and also for underground disposal. During the 
current year, human resources have been increased 
for waste management, and the staff work in all 
three plant units. The waste management person-
nel incur radiation doses when they process waste 
during annual outages, during waste transport, and 
when packaging waste and solidifying liquid radio-
active waste. The radiation doses have been low and 
are clearly below the individual dose limits set for 
employees doing radiation work.
Annual outage, 23 April - 14 September 2017
The inspection covered and verified the pow-
er plant’s annual outage actions used to main-
tain safety as well as the actions used to manage 
and control operations during an annual outage. 
Inspectors from several fields of technology from 
STUK’s nuclear reactor regulation department 
participated in the inspection. They had their own 
predetermined inspection areas. During the inspec-
tion, STUK monitored the activities, conducted site 
walk-arounds, interviewed employees and oversaw 
the progress of planned work.
The particular subjects of this year's inspec-
tion were the renewal work regarding the reactor 
cooling pumps at Olkiluoto 2 and their frequency 
converters, as well as the repairs to reactor pres-
sure vessel nozzles. STUK oversaw these exten-
sive modification works with the help of experts 
from several different fields of technology. Other 
subjects of the inspection included work order 
procedures, maintenance operations for control rod 
actuators, management procedures regarding loose 
articles and radiation protection of employees.
The inspection indicated that the annual outage 
was completed safely and almost all the scheduled 
work was completed. No safety deficiencies that 
require STUK’s immediate action were observed 
during the inspection. STUK recorded a total of 52 
observations of varying degrees of significance in 
the inspection protocol. In addition to deviations, 
observations were also recorded for observed good 
practices and activities compliant with instruc-
tions. On the basis of the observations made, one 
requirement was recorded concerning development 
of the work order procedures.
STUK’s observations indicated that the renewal 
of reactor coolant pumps and frequency converters 
at Olkiluoto 2, a special subject of the inspection, 
went well. The first new reactor coolant pump was 
installed at Olkiluoto 1 in 2016, and the experience 
gained from the installation work could be utilised 
and activities could be improved. The second spe-
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cial subject was the repair of the reactor pressure 
vessel nozzles at Olkiluoto 2, and this was imple-
mented on a smaller scale than planned. There 
were a lot of problems in the repair work, among 
others with the tools used for machining and weld-
ing. During the annual outage TVO decided to 
only repair the two nozzles where cracks had been 
detected in earlier annual outages. No cracks have 
been noticed in the other eight nozzles, which is 
why their proactive repairs could be postponed un-
til future annual outages. The observations made 
by STUK indicated that producing the plans for re-
pair operations, construction of equipment, perfor-
mance of factory tests and submission of documen-
tation to STUK was very challenging with regard 
to the implementation schedule specified for the 
project. STUK has required TVO to submit a report 
of the deficiencies regarding project management.
Establishing the reason for 
operational events and impact of the 
actions, 14–16 November 2017
The purpose of the inspection was to establish how 
TVO utilises feedback procedures on operating ex-
periences to learn from events and how the proce-
dures have been put into practice in the organisa-
tion. The general objective is that the organisational 
units should identify and solve problems in their re-
spective areas of responsibility using different pro-
cedures, such as managerial work and self-assess-
ments. In addition, TVO has an independent body 
monitoring deficiencies and helping solve them, 
when required by event investigations. STUK car-
ried out an inspection to determine why problems of 
the same type are recurring even though attempts 
have already been made to solve the problems with 
the help of event investigations. The events are the 
ultimate stimulus, and at the latest on their basis, 
solutions must be found and the necessary improve-
ments must be introduced for the problems  The 
inspection concentrated on establishing interfaces 
and cooperation between the organisation responsi-
ble for event investigations and other organisational 
units. The inspection was implemented by inter-
viewing TVO’s personnel and by verifying TVO’s in-
structions and documentation. Event investigations 
carried out by TVO and their results were utilised in 
the inspection.
STUK found deficiencies and weaknesses in the 
interfaces which handle operating experience feed-
back, which for their part explain why the event 
investigations cannot always solve the problems. 
On the basis of its observations, STUK arrived at 
the following conclusion: when events occur, the 
problem solving ownership is transferred to the 
investigative team, away from the unit responsible. 
The current investigation process allows excluding 
the organisational units from the process of solv-
ing the problems which have emerged, with the 
result that learning in the organisational units 
only begins when reading the reports of event in-
vestigation results and when actions are taken. In 
this context, the term ‘investigation process’ refers 
to those event investigation procedures where all 
organisational units participate in continual im-
provement of operations.
Following the inspection, STUK issued one 
requirement. STUK required TVO to improve its 
investigation process so that learning in the or-
ganisation starts at the appropriate time. The in-
vestigation process must support the ownership of 
units responsible for solving the problems.
The project managers are well aware of their 
key duties as the project managers. They have 
plenty of responsibilities (on budget, schedule and 
quality), which is why having sufficient compe-
tence and the support of the rest of the organisa-
tion is important. TVO has arranged training for 
the project managers and the project managers are 
supported in their work by the licensing manager 
and the chief engineers, among others. There is no 
risk management support person, however. STUK’s 
impression after the inspection is that TVO has 
encountered some challenges in providing the per-
sonnel resources projects need and there are some 
gaps due to internal transfers caused by the or-
ganisational reform.
The persons in charge of projects do not re-
cord many non-conformances in TVO’s operations. 
Based on the interviews, TVO does not have any 
shared view of who is responsible for assessing the 
need for the authorities to process project non-con-
formances. Based on the inspection, STUK is of the 
opinion that lessons learned from TVO’s event in-
vestigations are not being reviewed to a sufficient 
extent in the case of projects, which is why STUK 
imposed a requirement on development of the 
operations. STUK is of the opinion that operating 
experience and lessons learned from other plants 
are covered to a sufficient extent.
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APPENDIX 5 Construction inspection 
programme of Olkiluoto 3 in 2017
The objective of the Olkiluoto 3 construction in-
spection programme is to verify that the operations 
required by the construction of the unit ensure a 
high quality implementation according to the ap-
proved plans and in compliance with official regu-
lations, without compromising the operating units 
within the site. The inspection programme assess-
es and oversees the licensee’s operations in con-
structing the unit, implementation of procedures in 
various technical areas, the licensee’s competence 
and use of expertise, the processing of safety mat-
ters, as well as quality assurance and control. The 
inspection programme of Olkiluoto 3 was launched 
in 2005 when construction of the unit started. The 
number of annual inspections has varied between 
nine and fifteen.
In 2017, 13 inspections included in the con-
struction inspection programme were implement-
ed, one of which was an unannounced inspection. 
Special focus areas of the construction inspection 
programme included commissioning procedures 
and provisions made for operation. Below is a brief 
description of the inspection findings for which 
STUK required improvements from TVO. On the 
whole, the inspections have led to the conclusion 
that the procedures and resources of TVO’s organi-
sation are adequate.
The quality management inspection focussed on 
TVO’s sub-project entitled Tuotantoon valmistautu-
minen (Preparing for production). The objective of 
the sub-project is to control and ensure that the dif-
ferent units in TVO’s organisation make sufficient 
and systematic preparations for the operation and 
maintenance of Olkiluoto 3. The matters discussed 
in the inspection included the progress and admin-
istration of the sub-project in general, and the areas 
inspected in closer detail included: maintenance, 
production of instructions, as well as design tools 
and design data . No requirements were imposed 
by STUK following the inspection. However, STUK 
paid attention to the employee turnover and re-
sources and emphasised the importance of induc-
tion training as well as the importance of reserving 
enough time for managerial work.
Subject of inspection Date
Quality management 18–19 January
Security arrangements 26–27 January
PRA 9 February
Management and processing of safety issues 15–17 February
Storage and inspections of spare parts, unannounced inspection 29–31 March
Commissioning of the controlled area 29–30 March
Commissioning, preparedness for starting cold tests 16–17 May
Training and resources 29–31 May
Prerequisites for importing fuel for security arrangements 22–24 August, 12–14 September
Preparedness for fuel import 29–30 August
Electrical engineering 21–22 September
I&C 28–29 November
Commissioning, preparedness for starting hot tests 29–30 November
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The matters discussed in the inspection focus-
ing on leadership and safety matters included 
the procedures and activities concerning project 
management for ensuring safety and in relation to 
changes in responsibilities when the project moves 
from the construction phase to commissioning, as 
well as the results of safety culture and workplace 
atmosphere surveys and the actions to be taken 
on their basis. It was found in the inspection that 
safety aspects are taken into account in decision-
making, but the grounds of decisions are not com-
prehensively recorded in the minutes. It would be 
beneficial for a culture emphasising safety if the 
backgrounds to decisions were also available to 
others than just the persons participating in the 
decision-making. No requirement was issued on 
the matter, because TVO had recognised the mat-
ter itself and initiated actions for rectifying the 
situation.
Transports of fresh fuel to the site started in 
the autumn. STUK carried out several inspec-
tions regarding preparations for importing the 
fuel. The preparedness of security arrangements 
was verified in inspections as the arrangements 
progressed. STUK also inspected commissioning 
of the controlled area. A controlled area refers 
to an area where special instructions have to 
be observed regarding radiation protection and 
where access is controlled. Following the inspec-
tion, STUK required a more detailed description 
of access control to be added to the commissioning 
plan. STUK also required that the authority of 
the radiation protection personnel to carry out ac-
tions for reducing radiation doses and to stop work 
must be recorded in the instructions in use at the 
plant. The third requirement issued in the inspec-
tion concerned informing STUK of the content and 
plans for radiation protection training. In the last 
inspection related to the import of fuel, STUK in-
spected different aspects regarding capabilities for 
receiving fuel. The inspections reviewed the state 
of readiness of necessary premises and systems, as 
well as other preparations in the organisation for 
importing fuel. It was found in the inspection that 
the necessary tasks have been identified, but the 
work is still in progress. STUK monitored the pro-
gress of work and in a separate decision granted 
permission to bring fuel to the plant unit once the 
capabilities wew in place.
The aspects covered in the inspection of the 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) included the 
responsibilities and resources regarding PRA dur-
ing the construction and operating phases, as 
well as instructions pertaining to the inspection, 
maintenance and use of the PRA. STUK noted that 
TVO has functional PRA procedures in place in the 
Olkiluoto units in operation, and it is important 
that the procedures and responsibilities for OL3 
are also unambiguous when the plant starts opera-
tion.
STUK carried out an inspection of spare parts 
storage and receiving inspection procedures with-
out prior notification. In the inspection, the activi-
ties and storage conditions in different storage fa-
cilities were verified. In addition, the instructions, 
resources and training of personnel for monitoring 
and inspecting spare parts at TVO were inspect-
ed. One requirement concerning documenting the 
maintenance activities during storage was issued 
during the inspection.
The topics of the inspection concerning compe-
tence, training and resources were the procedures 
TVO uses for assessing and developing staff com-
petence and resources. Based on the inspection, 
STUK issued requirements concerning assessment 
of the impact of training and work performance, 
utilisation of trial operations for induction train-
ing, as well as utilisation of the probabilistic risk 
assessment for training the entire personnel.
In the inspections regarding preparedness for 
starting cold and hot tests, the fulfilment of prereq-
uisites for starting the tests were verified. The pre-
paredness for starting the tests was assessed both 
from the perspective of the plant’s technical readi-
ness and the  organisation of the commissioning 
activities. Matters related to preparations for both 
tests were still in progress during both inspections, 
but TVO presented the procedures for completion 
before starting the tests. STUK monitored the com-
pletion of unfinished aspects after the inspection. 
Regarding hot tests, STUK required TVO to ensure 
the sufficiency of its own oversight resources irre-
spective of the timing of the tests.
The electrical engineering inspection focussed 
on performance and results of power source trans-
fer tests, preparations for operation and continuity 
measurements of signal cables. The preparations 
for operation are yet to be completed, but the nec-
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essary actions have been planned and the work is 
in progress. Regarding the power source transfer 
tests, problems related to time stamps and signal 
delays observed in the tests were reviewed. The 
report with the final results is not available yet. 
For this reason a report on the acceptability of the 
power source transfer tests was required in the 
inspection before moving on to the next phase of 
commissioning.
Preparations for the operating phase were the 
subject of the I&C inspection. In the inspection, 
the preparations for commissioning inspections 
and the status of instructions and tools required 
during the operating phase were discussed. In ad-
dition, the resource allocation for overseeing trial 
operations and procedures and observations in con-
figuration management were verified. The prepara-
tions for operation are yet to be completed, but the 
necessary actions have been planned and the work 
is in progress. No requirements were imposed in 
the inspection.
In addition to the inspections under the con-
struction inspection programme, matters were also 
discussed from the point of the OL3 plant unit in 
several inspections under the periodic inspection 
programme regarding OL1/2.
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APPENDIX 6 Inspections pertaining 
to the processing of Fennovoima’s 
construction licence application
STUK inspects and assesses the management sys-
tems of Fennovoima and the other organisations 
participating in the project. Furthermore, STUK 
performs inspections of the organisations to en-
sure that their actual operations comply with what 
is specified in the management systems and that 
they meet the necessary requirements.
STUK launched the inspections included in 
the regulatory inspection programme (RKT) in 
September 2015. They are planned six months 
in advance. In 2017, STUK carried out a total 
of 12 inspections in line with its inspection pro-
gramme. One planned inspection was postponed to 
December 2018. The inspection results will be used 
by STUK when preparing a safety assessment and 
statement on the construction licence. Summaries 
of inspections are presented below.
Radiation protection (Salmisaari)
The inspection focussed on the planning and im-
plementation of radiation protection, radiation 
measurements and preparedness arrangements. 
Fennovoima’s actions and procedures when iden-
tifying, monitoring and processing radiation safety 
issues were revised in the inspection. The inspec-
tion covered, e.g. the following issues: require-
ments management in radiation protection, plan-
ning resources for radiation protection, assessment 
of radiation conditions inside the plant, radiation 
protection calculations, taking radiation protec-
tion into account when designing the plant layout 
and systems, material choices, as well as utilisa-
tion of information obtained from reference plants 
and taking preparedness situations into account. 
During the inspection, STUK verified Hanhikivi 1 
-specific instructions, procedures and plans as well 
as their related documents.
Subject of inspection Date
Radiation protection (Salmisaari) 8–9 February 2017
Nuclear Island (Salmisaari) 13–14 February 2017
PRA (Salmisaari) 13–15 March 2017
JSC Gidropress (Podolsk) 4–6 April 2017 
I&C (Salmisaari) 3–5 May 2017 
Petrozavodsk branch of AEM-Technology JSC, Petrozavodsk 16–18 May 2017
Management and inspection procedures (Salmisaari) 6–8 June 2017 
Fennovoima, Electrical engineering, Salmisaari 6–7 September 2017
Fennovoima, Civil engineering, Salmisaari 17–18 October 2017
LLI, Salmisaari 25–26 October 2017
Fennovoima’s management and management system as well as its safety 
culture, Salmisaari
6–8 November 2017
Fennovoima, nuclear waste, Salmisaari 20–21 November 2017
RAOS Project Oy, Salmisaari 28-30 November 2017
86
STUK-B 225
On the basis of the inspection results, STUK 
required that the radiation protection require-
ments are taken into account at all stages of the 
nuclear facility planning and design process. The 
experts responsible for radiation protection must 
be provided with a possibility to participate in the 
processes during different design phases, docu-
ment inspections (including pilots), reviews and 
decision-making affecting the implementation of 
radiation protection. Furthermore, in its annual 
plans Fennovoima must assess the necessity of the 
main designer’s follow-up audit regarding radia-
tion protection. Fennovoima must also ensure that 
the calculations and dose rates required for ra-
diation protection are made and established on the 
basis of data specific to the Hanhikivi 1 plant unit. 
Regarding laboratory functions, the design work 
must take into account the sufficient availability 
of premises and equipment in all situations, taking 
into account occupational and radiation safety. The 
locations and routes of operations essential for pre-
paredness situations must be taken into account 
when designing the plant layout, and their radia-
tion conditions in possible accident situations must 
be estimated in order to ensure that the operating 
locations can be used.
Nuclear Island (Salmisaari)
The inspection covered The Nuclear Island Unit of 
Fennovoima’s Project Department. In the inspec-
tion, issues related to the unit’s organisation, du-
ties and resources were revised by verifying the 
documentation of these matters in Fennovoima’s 
document management system and in employee 
interviews.
The matters reviewed in the inspection includ-
ed the allocation of the unit’s duties to staff respon-
sible for systems, and inspection responsibilities 
regarding licensing documents the unit is respon-
sible for, with the help of an inspection matrix. 
Furthermore, Fennovoima’s meeting procedures 
and escalation of open technical issues to higher 
levels of decision-making in the organisation, when 
required, were verified in the inspection. A defi-
ciency concerning the organisation was noted in 
the inspection: no deputy was specified for the head 
of the unit in the management system documents. 
A deficiency in the inspection duties concerning 
control rooms was also observed in the inspection.
In the inspection, Fennovoima submitted that 
the persons responsible for the buildings of the 
NI Project Unit would monitor the progress of the 
design (installations and commissioning) of sys-
tems in a specified building and seek to ensure the 
compatibility of systems – for example so that the 
electrical system required for the process has been 
correctly designed or that the controls required for 
the same system have been correctly designed. In 
this context, the idea emerged in the inspection 
that the persons responsible for buildings could 
also monitor the progress of the system design 
work through the configuration baselines; and that 
the system design documents belong to the same 
configuration baseline and are compatible with 
each other.
During the inspection, Fennovoima stated that 
the planning of human resources is rather chal-
lenging in the absence of any clear idea of the 
volume and timing of work. The time schedules 
for progressing the design work have changed, 
which is why documents have not been received 
for inspection and review at the expected rate. The 
fact that there will be a lot of design documents to 
be handled simultaneously is likely to constitute a 
small risk regarding the sufficiency of resources.
Following the inspection, STUK issued one 
requirement concerning presentation of the 
Description of Project Areas to STUK.
Probabilistic risk assessment 
(PRA) (Salmisaari)
The scope of the inspection included Fennovoima’s 
procedures in reviewing and utilising the PRA dur-
ing the plant design and processing of the construc-
tion licence application. During the inspection, 
STUK verified Hanhikivi 1 -specific instructions, 
procedures and plans related to the scope of inspec-
tion, as well as the documents concerning them. 
On the second day of the inspection, Fennovoima’s 
control and inspection procedures were verified us-
ing examples.
Following the inspection, STUK required 
Fennovoima to plan the resources, volumes of 
work, need for external experts and documentation 
related to the PRA review work in closer detail. 
The PRA review plan must cover different sections 
of the PRA, and the review plan must be submitted 
to STUK. STUK found that Fennovoima has not 
verified the procedures of the party producing the 
PRA regarding the production, development and 
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maintenance of the PRA. It was also not possible 
to verify the utilisation of the PRA in support of 
design work. Following the inspection, STUK is-
sued the requirement that Fennovoima must audit 
the PRA function of the main designer Atomproect.
Gidropress (Podolsk)
A follow-up inspection of main designer OKB 
Gidropress was carried out. The inspection fo-
cussed on management and practices, the require-
ments issued in the previous inspection (in 2016) 
and the actions taken on their basis, as well as the 
requirements specified in chapter 8 of Guide YVL 
E.4 regarding quality management of strength 
analyses. The verification carried out in the inspec-
tion allowed several of the requirements issued in 
the previous inspection to be closed.
In the inspection, deterministic analyses, severe 
accidents and the design of mechanical components 
were discussed and verified using selected exam-
ples. In the inspection, activities compliant with the 
instructions were verified using selected examples.
It was stated in the inspection that STUK’s 
safety assessment and statement regarding the 
construction licence application will partly be 
based on independent comparison analyses car-
ried out or commissioned by STUK. In order to 
facilitate these analyses, Fennovoima must provide 
STUK with the initial data required for producing 
the analysis models. Production of the analysis 
models and the actual performance of the analyses 
will be time-consuming, which is why the initial 
data should be received in good time.
It was also noted that the design configuration 
baseline has not yet been frozen. The documents to 
be submitted for processing by the authorities in 
the construction licencing phase must be descrip-
tive of the Hanhikivi 1 plant and based on a uni-
form configuration, i.e. on a baseline configuration 
of technological items. In this respect, the require-
ment issued in the previous inspection remained 
an open question, because STUK is yet to receive 
the design documentation frozen at the baseline 
configuration level, which would allow STUK to 
state that the requirements have been met.
It was found in the inspection that as the main 
designer of the nuclear island, OKB Gidropress 
carries out strength analyses of safety class 1 
components. Requirement 801 of Guide YVL E.4 
requires that the organisation conducting strength 
analyses must have a quality management system 
documented and implemented for this purpose. 
According to the requirement stated by STUK, 
OKB Gidropress must assess its management sys-
tem against the strength analysis -related ASME 
NQA-1-2008 requirements. On the basis of the as-
sessment, OKB Gidropress must implement the ac-
tions required for its management system to meet 
the requirements of ASME NQA-1-2008.
I&C (automation), Helsinki
In the inspection regarding I&C, the duties of 
Fennovoima’s I&C Unit and other I&C-related or-
ganisational units were reviewed. In the inspec-
tion, taking human factors into account in design 
aspects (Human Factors Engineering, HFE), was 
also assessed. STUK verified Fennovoima’s instruc-
tions, procedures and plans related to the scope of 
inspection, as well as the documents concerning 
them.
Following the inspection, STUK required 
Fennovoima to plan and issue instructions regard-
ing how independent assessments of I&C are to 
be carried out and resources allocated for them. 
Furthermore, Fennovoima must analyse the criti-
cal major risks associated with I&C and split them 
into smaller and more easily managed entities, 
including HFE. Fennovoima must ensure that 
the new I&C Unit employees are provided with 
induction training, including the consultants pro-
viding support to Fennovoima’s own personnel. 
Fennovoima must also update the instructions re-
garding design guidance and control to correspond 
to the current practices. It was suggested in the 
inspection that Fennovoima must identify in its 
licensing planning and related plans and schedules 
that the licensing documents that cannot yet be de-
fined, e.g. due to supplier selections or plans (such 
as quality plans) that have not yet been completed.
Petrozavodsk branch of AEM-
Technology JSC, Petrozavodsk
The subject of the inspection were the management 
and delivery capabilities of the PetrozavodskMash 
factory of AEM-Technology (AEM-T) in Petro-
zavodsk, Russia. At the time of the inspection, the 
factory did not yet have a supply agreement with 
the plant supplier, and the preparations for start-
ing manufacture were in their very early stages. 
For this reason, observations requiring develop-
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ment actions were presented in the inspection in-
stead of scheduled requirements. Thanks to the 
cooperation between Finnish and Russian nuclear 
safety authorities (STUK-RTN Rostechnadzor), 
the inspection was attended by representatives of 
Rostechnadzor and VO-Safety, the technical sup-
port organisation of the Russian authority.
In the inspection, STUK identified areas for 
development, e.g. in safety culture related proce-
dures for establishing open reporting of errors and 
a “blame-free” atmosphere, version management of 
documents, in risk management planning and in 
the compliance with destructive and non-destruc-
tive testing (DT and NDT) laboratories. STUK 
stated that it will determine the development ac-
tions Petrozavodskmash must take in order to han-
dle these issues in connection with Fennovoima’s 
audit monitoring and approval procedures for its 
laboratories.
Fennovoima’s management and 
inspection procedures, Salmisaari
This inspection concerned the role and actions of 
Fennovoima’s management in the Hanhikivi 1 pro-
ject. The inspection covered the actions of Fenno-
voima’s management in identifying, monitoring 
and processing safety issues. The inspection fo-
cussed on core management processes, such as the 
processing of safety issues, project management 
including licensing planning and configuration 
management, i.e. management of the technical 
configuration including change management and 
requirement management.
In the inspection, STUK required Fennovoima 
to commence using a configuration management 
tool and to also ensure the compatibility between 
different delivery parts and procedures used by 
different actors. In addition, Fennovoima must en-
sure and demonstrate the realisation of a designer-
independent safety assessment in a situation where 
Fennovoima itself participates in the design work. 
Fennovoima must also organise, instruct and al-
locate resources for a quality control (QC) func-
tion in the project and assess the risks associated 
with the manufacture of the main components in 
case consultants are used for control in addition to 
Fennovoima’s own personnel. Fennovoima’s quality 
and safety departments must assess the suitability 
of a document describing different parts of the pro-
ject for activities compliant with the management 
system and the impact of the policy decisions in the 
document on the appropriate processing of safety 
issues. Based on the assessment, Fennovoima must 
plan and implement possible further actions in 
order to ensure consistency between activities and 
the management system. Furthermore, Fennovoima 
must ensure and instruct that the suppliers’ quality 
plans must be approved before starting to assess the 
plans produced by the suppliers.
Electrical engineering, Salmisaari
The inspection focussed on development work un-
dertaken by Fennovoima on the basis of electrical 
engineering requirements set out after an inspec-
tion under the regulatory inspection programme in 
2016. A new topic was Fennovoima’s preparations 
for future quality control (QC) functions, with the 
main focus on electrical engineering. The structure 
and status of documents for the construction li-
cence were also discussed.
The verifications carried out by the inspection 
team and the documentation submitted allowed 
requirements of the previous inspection to be 
closed. No new requirements were imposed in the 
inspection.
Civil engineering, Salmisaari
This inspection concerned the civil engineering 
functions of Fennovoima, and the requirements of 
the earlier inspection entitled “Fennovoima’s civil 
engineering and facility/layout design – provisions 
for internal and external hazards (Helsinki)” which 
remained open were also discussed.
The inspection revealed deficiencies in the doc-
umentation of the design bases, scheduling of 
long-term concrete tests and lack of systematic ap-
proach in the site functions.
Control of design and manufacture of 
Long-Lead Items (LLI), Salmisaari
The inspection concerned the control of manufac-
ture of Long-Lead Items by Fennovoima, i.e. the 
LLI functions.
The inspection showed that Fennovoima has 
good capabilities for LLI control. The situation is 
made more difficult by the supplier’s uncertain 
time schedules which mean that Fennovoima can-
not plan its activities accurately enough. This is 
also reflected in the annual planning and resource 
allocation at STUK.
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Fennovoima’s management and 
management system as well as its 
safety culture, Salmisaari
This inspection concerned Fennovoima’s manage-
ment, integrated management system and devel-
opment of its safety culture. Many earlier require-
ments were closed in the inspection.
Regarding the safety culture, the management 
is expected to take a clearer stand on the safety 
culture related recommendations by experts, and 
STUK also required that work on the safety cul-
ture at the work site is ensured. During the in-
spection, Fennovoima explained that bypassing 
experts has not occurred in the organisation. The 
inspection showed that Fennovoima must ensure 
that the information produced by the Nuclear 
Safety Awareness process is utilised in the organi-
sation. The comments by the management team of 
Fennovoima on the state of the safety culture, its 
development needs and development actions must 
be unambiguous and traceable.
Some earlier requirements regarding manage-
ment were closed after verification. STUK still 
requires further improvements to be made, e.g. to 
designer-independent safety assessments, comple-
tion of escalation instructions for safety issues, 
updates to the organisation manual regarding 
responsibilities for sub-projects, as well as instruc-
tions and resource allocation for quality control 
(QC). Earlier requirements, save a few, regarding 
management were closed. The requirements which 
still remained open were for determining the risk 
management interfaces with other processes and 
for ensuring the compatibility between FV’s pro-
cesses and the plant supplier’s processes.
The following new requirement was issued: 
Fennovoima must establish and assess the reasons 
why the planning and implementation related to 
observations are deployed. The possible actions for 
developing the process must be planned and imple-
mented on the basis of the assessment.
The general view following the inspection was 
that much has improved in the operations of 
Fennovoima in the last two years, albeit that there 
is still room for development.
RAOS Project Oy, Salmisaari
The follow-up inspection focussed on the man-
agement and operations of RAOS Project Oy, 
Salmisaari, Helsinki (RAOS). The actions and pro-
cedures at RAOS when identifying, monitoring and 
processing safety matters, as well as quality man-
agement, were discussed in the inspection. The 
inspection focussed on the following management 
system processes important to safety: the process-
ing of safety issues, quality management (QA/QC), 
project and design management (including licens-
ing planning and the management of open issues 
in the supply chain), configuration management 
(including change management) and management 
of requirements.
The inspection allowed several of the require-
ments issued in the previous inspection to be 
closed on the basis of earlier delivered documents 
and verification. New requirements were issued on 
the basis of the inspection: RAOS Project Oy must 
ensure the appropriate and traceable processing of 
safety concerns and deviations, including concerns 
related to activities brought up by persons par-
ticipating in the project, RAOS Project Oy must, in 
good time before the construction licence is grant-
ed, plan the procedures and produce the necessary 
instructions for processing changes compliant with 
the Nuclear Energy Decree, and RAOS Project Oy 
must define procedures for managing the require-
ments of STUK’s provisions in the supply chain.
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APPENDIX 7 Construction inspection programme for 
the encapsulation plant and the disposal facility
In 2017, the encapsulation plant and disposal facil-
ity oversight project at STUK systematically con-
tinued the inspections included in the construction 
inspection programme. The aim of these inspec-
tions was to assess the functionality of Posiva’s 
management system, as well as the sufficiency and 
appropriateness of the procedures for implement-
ing and controlling the plant construction work 
and for taking the safety requirements into ac-
count in the project. Inspections included in the 
programme may also be targeted at Posiva’s sup-
pliers who are important to safety. The 2017 in-
spections only focused on the licensee’s operations.
The 2017 programme included five inspections 
on current activities important to the safety of 
the construction phase. The number of inspections 
was systematically reduced from the level of previ-
ous years, because in 2016, Posiva’s organisation 
was subjected to a comprehensive assessment in 
the con-struction inspection programme and sup-
plementary inspections. The extended inspection 
programme was based on Posiva’s application for 
starting the construction phase of the disposal fa-
cility. The inspection results indicated that Posiva’s 
organisation and management system were suf-
ficient for starting the construction phase. No 
significant changes have taken place in Posiva’s 
operations since that time, and for this reason 
STUK decided to focus its 2017 inspections on 
certain key functions of the construction phase in-
stead of assessing Posiva’s basic operations. Based 
on the results of STUK’s inspection, it was noted 
that Posiva’s operations and management system 
procedures in the assessed areas of operation are 
sufficiently compliant with STUK’s requirements.
Brief descriptions of the inspections as well as 
the key observations made, based on which STUK 
has required Posiva to carry out improvements and 
development actions, are presented below.
Analyses
One of the aims of the inspection was to asses 
Posiva’s procedures, that are applied to ensure the 
integrity and safety of the encapsulation plant and 
its systems design by analysing it during the con-
struction, operation and decommissioning of the 
plant. The procedures Posiva deploys to integrate 
the analyses as part of the plant and system design 
was also a key subject of inspections.
According to Posiva, some of the analyses used 
for supporting the encapsulation plant design work 
are based on the basic design phase, while some 
are performed during the implementation plan-
ning phase as part of the construction plan docu-
mentation. The analyses based on the system de-
sign include the design phase PRA, deterministic 
safety analyses, analyses of internal and external 
threats, as well as emission, radiation dose and 
radiation dimensioning analyses, preliminary sys-
tem fault tolerance analyses, common-cause failure 
analyses, thermal analyses and deterministic fire 
and exit analyses.
Subject of inspection Date
Analyses 20–21 March 2017
Maintenance and ageing management of the disposal facility 17–18 May 2017
Manufacture 19–20 September 2017
Management system processes 4–5 October 2017
Management 23–24 November 2017
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Posiva primarily seeks to carry out the required 
analyses itself. However, if it does not have the nec-
essary resources available for a certain task, it will 
order implementation of the safety analyses from 
the TVO Group. However, part of the planning and 
design work, such as the analyses based on system 
design, have had to be implemented as consultancy 
work, in which case the work has been monitored 
and guided in compliance with Posiva’s manage-
ment system. It was verified in the inspections that 
the performance of the analyses has been appro-
priately monitored and guided even in cases where 
they were performed by a supplier, Group company 
or an external company.
The inspection results indicate that Posiva’s 
analysis activities are progressing alongside the 
design process and have appropriate links to it. 
The inspection did not reveal any deficiencies in 
Posiva’s analysis activities or its control measures. 
No requirements were set on Posiva by STUK 
based on the inspection results.
Maintenance and ageing management 
of the disposal facility
Maintenance related to the ageing management 
of nuclear facility structures helps ensure that the 
engineered barriers operate as planned. The in-
spection focussed on nuclear safety and did not 
include any personnel safety or occupational safety 
aspects. Posiva has developed instructions for the 
maintenance and ageing management of the rein-
forcement and sealing structures of underground 
rooms. The procedures used are described in these 
instructions. The maintenance and the procedures 
used in it are based on Posiva’s principal plan for 
ageing management.
The inspection concerned the maintenance pro-
gramme of reinforcement and sealing structures in 
Posiva’s underground rooms (bolting, mesh rein-
forcements, shotcreting and its subsurface drain-
age as well as injecting) as part of the ageing 
management of these structures. It was found in 
the inspection that Posiva has identified problems 
associated with the condition management of tun-
nels. Posiva has started looking for alternative 
methods to carry out condition monitoring and has 
surveyed laser scanning and thermal camera im-
aging as potential methods.
The inspection indicated that the development 
of maintenance as part of ageing management is 
systematic at Posiva, and hence no requirements 
were imposed following the inspection. However, 
STUK pointed out several observations made dur-
ing the inspection, and these should be assessed 
for further developing the maintenance operations 
related to ageing management.
Manufacture
The manufacture of engineered barriers for the 
disposal solution and control of these manufac-
turing operations were assessed in the inspection. 
The inspection also assessed Posiva’s procedures 
related to the manufacture of the above-mentioned 
systems and its control procedures. Posiva’s plans 
related to the subjects were also discussed during 
the inspection.
Posiva has issued extensive instructions for the 
manufacturing activities and their control. Among 
other things, the instructions for producing struc-
tural plans were assessed in the inspection.
The inspection also revised the manufacturing 
chain and its control procedures using an example 
case, as well as the control of manufacturing ac-
tivities as a whole. The assessment results allowed 
STUK to state that Posiva’s instructions cover the 
design and manufacture as well as control of the 
entire supply chain. If was found in the inspection 
that Posiva has instructions in place for selecting 
and approving manufacturers, as well as for select-
ing and approving testing and inspection organisa-
tions, or for having them approved.
To summarise the inspection, it was found that 
Posiva has produced sufficient basic instructions 
for manufacturing and its control. However, there 
is scope for improvement in the instructions, and 
Posiva will take this into account in its develop-
ment work. No requirements were imposed by 
STUK following the inspection.
Management system processes
Posiva’s procedures for producing, maintaining 
and further developing support processes were as-
sessed in the inspection. The assessment also cov-
ered the measurement methods and procedures re-
quired for continual improvement of the processes. 
Posiva’s design process and its functionality were 
also assessed using example cases. The objective 
was to assess whether the process is implemented 
according to plans in order to ensure its impact 
and control.
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Six support processes, aimed at fulfilling the 
requirements of STUK’s instructions, have been 
defined by Posiva’s management system. The in-
spection found that the support processes comply 
to a sufficient degree with STUK’s requirements 
regarding the processes. It was noted in the inspec-
tion that Posiva must develop the procedures for 
monitoring and measuring support processes and 
the procedures for assessing their functionality to 
better support the control of operations. The most 
significant functional change at Posiva was that 
certain processes now rely on the TVO Group.
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APPENDIX 8 Licences STUK has granted in 
accordance with the Nuclear Energy Act in 2017
Teollisuuden Voima Oy
•	 1/C42214/2017,	24/03/2017:	OL1/OL2	–	 Import	
licence for a dummy control rod. Last date of 
validity 31/12/2017. 
•	 2/C42214/2017,	07/04/2017:	OL1/OL2	–	 Import	
licence for graphite actuation nuts for control 
rod actuators. Last date of validity 31/12/2017.
•	 3/G42214/2017,	 OL3	 –	 Import	 licence	 for	
dual-use item spares. Last date of validity 
31/12/2018.
•	 1/G42214/2017,	 19/05/2017:	 OL3	 –	 Import	 of	
neutron detectors and radiation samples from 
Germany. Last date of validity 31/12/2018.
•	 5/G42214/2017,	 19/05/2017:	 OL3	 –	 Import	 li-
cence for the inner part of reactor coolant pump. 
Last date of validity 31/12/2018.
•	 3/C42214/2017,	 15/06/2017:	 OL1	 –	 Export	 li-
cence for spent nuclear fuel rods. Last date of 
validity 31/12/2017.
•	 7/G42214/2017,	 21/06/2017:	 OL3	 –	 Import	 of	
test rods. Last date of validity 31/12/2018.
•	 8/C42214/2017,	 17/10/2017:	 Import	 of	 nuclear	
fuel with Euratom obligation code “P” from Swe-
den (OL2 e 38). Last date of validity 31/12/2018.
•	 9/C42214/2017,	 17/10/2017:	 Import	 of	 nuclear	
fuel with Euratom obligation code “C” from 
Germany (OL1 e 40). Last date of validity 
31/12/2018.
•	 10/C42214/2017,	17/10/2017:	 Import	of	nuclear	
fuel with Euratom obligation code “S” from 
Germany (OL2 e 38). Last date of validity 
31/12/2018.
•	 11/C42214/2017,	21/12/2017:	Licence	for	import	
and possession of a sample fuel assembly. Last 
date of validity for import 31/12/2018 and for 
possession 31/12/2030.
Fortum Power and Heat Oy
•	 1/A42214/2017,	24/05/2017:	 Import	of	 interme-
diate shafts for control rod mechanisms for 
Loviisa 1 and 2. Last date of validity 31/12/2017.
•	 2/A42214/2017,	 21/12/2017:	 Loviisa	 1	 and	 2	 –	
Licence for the export and transfer of spent nu-
clear fuel rods. Last date of validity 31/05/2018. 
Others
•	 1/J42214/2017,	23/2/2017:	Fennovoima	/	Licence	
for the import of nuclear information subject to 
the particular safeguards obligation from Rus-
sia – replacement for licence 2/J42214/2014. 
Last date of validity 31/12/2023.
•	 13/Y42214/2017,	05/06/2017:	S.	Metso	/	Licence	
for the possession of nuclear information sub-
ject to the particular safeguards obligation. 
Last date of validity 31/4/2022.
•	 7/Y42214/2017,	03/10/2017:	RAOS	Project	Oy	 /	
Licence to import, possess and transfer  nuclear 
information subject to the particular safeguards 
obligation (superseded the incorrect licence 
granted on 3/3/2017 under the same item num-
ber). Last date of validity 31/12/2023.
•	 26/Y42214/2017,	05/12/2017:	University	of	Hel-
sinki / Licence to possess, use and store nuclear 
materials and nuclear waste on the premises of 
the Chemical Department of the University of 
Helsinki. Last date of validity 31/12/2027.
•	 27/Y42214/2017,	20/12/2017:	VTT	Technical	Re-
search Centre of Finland / Licence for the im-
port of nuclear information subject to the par-
ticular safeguards obligation from South Korea 
and for possession of the imported information. 
Last date of validity 31/12/2021.
•	 1/Y42211/2017,	13.12.2017:	Terrafame	Oy	 /	Li-
cence to produce and possess nuclear materials 
(in maximum 6 kg natural uranium). Last date 
of validity for production is 30/06/2018 and for 
possession 31/12/2023.
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